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Andrew Telford 
 
An exploration of constructions of racial and national 
identities in US and EU climate security discourses 
 
Grounded in a methodology of critical discourse analysis and semi-structured 
interviews, this thesis investigates constructions of racial and national identities in US 
and EU climate security discourses. Utilizing a theoretical framework based on 
‘essentializing logics’ (a concept developed to analyze how naturalized assumptions 
and associations about populations are held in relation to possible climate-insecure 
futures), the thesis argues that intersectional racial and national identities are 
constructed in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourses and 
are underpinned by multiple biopolitics of unequally valued lives. This argument is 
elaborated in three empirical chapters. First, the thesis examines the racialization of 
‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrant populations in particular, situated 
moments of climate security discourse. The second empirical chapter focuses on 
discursive representations of interconnections between climate change and terrorism 
and how such interconnections represent important points of intersection for racial  
and national identities in climate security. The final empirical chapter examines 
representations of American nationhood in US climate security discourse. These 
include constructions of American exceptionalism, the impacts of Hurricane Katrina 
and Hurricane Sandy for conceptions of American national identity, and the 
development of ‘climate-resilient’ American nationhood. The thesis concludes by 
reflecting on the project’s findings. I argue that multi-scalar interpretations of 
environmental justice (grounded in a manifesto for ‘abundant futures’ (Collard et al 
(2015)) and Koopman’s (2011) feminist ‘alter-geopolitics’) could provide a tentative 
means through which to think about more just, situated environmental securities.  
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Chapter 1: 
Situating ‘climate security’: introduction and 
research questions 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
‘No challenge poses a greater threat to future generations than 
climate change … The best scientists in the world are all telling us 
that our activities are changing the climate, and if we don’t act 
forcefully, we’ll continue to see rising oceans, longer, hotter 
heatwaves, dangerous droughts and floods, and massive 
disruptions that can trigger migration and conflict and hunger 
around the globe. The Pentagon says that climate change poses 
immediate risks to our national security. We should act like it … I 
am determined to make sure that American leadership drives 
international action.’ 
 
 
Taken from his 2015 State of the Union address (delivered to a joint-session of 
Congress, Jan 20th), the above proclamations by US President Barack Obama capture 
something of the profundity of climate change as a political issue. He identifies that ‘no 
challenge’ poses a greater ‘threat’ to future generations than climate change, a threat 
that leads to ‘rising oceans’, ‘heatwaves’, ‘dangerous droughts and floods’ and thus 
requires ‘forceful action’. The ‘threat’ and ‘massive disruptions’ of climate change 
suggest a condition of climate insecurity: Obama (2015a) cites the Pentagon’s 
warnings about climate change’s ‘immediate risks’ to American security. Intriguingly, 
Obama says that ‘we’ will continue to see rising oceans, that scientists from around the 
world are telling ‘us’ about climate change, and that ‘we’ should act like it. Who is the 
‘we’ Barack Obama refers to? Who counts as ‘us’ the scientists have been talking to? 
Who should ‘act’ like it? Who and what aren’t included in Obama’s collective 
commentary? His warnings suggest that climate change will be felt collectively by 
Americans, that he is speaking urgently to America as a nation, and that Americans 
should work together to listen to ‘scientists from around the world’ and ‘act’ on 
climate change. Barack Obama is invoking American identity – calling on ‘American 
leadership’ – to tackle the greatest challenge human beings face in the 21st century.  
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It is these questions, of culturally mediated (national and racial) identities  and climate 
change and security debates, which animate this thesis. I explore how the collective 
‘we’ and ‘us’ of American nationhood are constructed in US ‘climate security’ 
discourse, how these identities are mobilized in possible climate-insecure futures (for 
example food or water insecurities), and who or what is marginalized or excluded, the 
‘Them’ to an American or European ‘Us’, in these unequal imaginative geographies. In 
asking these questions, the thesis investigates the intersections of racial and national 
identities in US climate security discourse. Throughout, I argue that ‘essentializing 
logics’, a concept developed from Stuart Hall (1986) and Ben Anderson’s (2010a) work 
to describe how racial and national identities are held in relation to possible climate-
insecure futures (see chapter 3, section 3.7), inscribe unequal power relations in 
American climate change-security debates. To begin, this chapter contextualizes 
climate security and situates academic climate security debates (sections 1.2 and 1.3). 
It proceeds to outline the project’s research questions and objectives (section 1.4), 
before highlighting the thesis’ structure (section 1.5). First, I outline a brief, limited 
history of ‘climate security’ debates and their emergence in international politics.  
 
1.2 A brief history of climate security 
 
In 1988, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) founded the IPCC (the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change) to assess the current state of scientific knowledge on climate change 
and its impacts (IPCC 2016). The IPCC’s (2014: 4, original emphasis) Synthesis Report 
Summary for Policymakers (from its Fifth Assessment Report) notes that: 
‘Anthropogenic gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era … and are 
now higher than ever … Their effects, together with those of other anthropogenic 
drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to 
have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.’1 
In line with these conclusions, a formidable scientific (Alley et al 2003; Lenton et al 
2008) and social scientific (Stern 2007; Hulme 2009) consensus has developed as 
testimony to the importance of climate change. Correspondingly, an international 
                                                 
1 As Vidal (2016) reports, warming trends are accelerating, for example in the Arctic, where winter air 
temperatures (as of November 2016) have been 20°C higher than the average for this period of the year. 
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political system exists to formulate collective solutions to climate change: the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in 1992 and 
meets on an annual basis (the Conference of Parties (COP)) to negotiate international 
treaties and initiatives. Most famously, this resulted in the Kyoto Protocol (formulated 
in 1997), and the Paris Agreement (agreed in December 2015 and in effect as of 
November 2016).  
 
The UNFCCC’s (United Nations 1992: 9, my emphasis) central objective is the 
‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ The term 
‘dangerous’ suggests questions of risk and securities are at the heart of climate 
politics. And, while international climate politics are often framed in terms of 
mitigation and adaptation, interconnections between climate change and security are 
increasingly a focus of discussion. Barnett (2003) notes climate security debates have 
multiple, contested histories. Early moments include a 1974 CIA report outlining 
interrelations between climatology and US intelligence capabilities and the 1988 
Toronto conference ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ 
(Barnett 2003). Climate change is also cited in the influential Brundtland Report: 
‘Environmental threats to security are now beginning to emerge on a global scale. The 
most worrisome of these stem from the possible consequences of global warming 
caused by the atmospheric build-up of carbon dioxide and other gases’ (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 294). But, the unambiguousness 
of this assertion belies the caution of the academic debate at this time. Brown (1989) 
reflects on the conceptual difficulties of marrying strategic studies’ realism with the 
scientific scepticism of climatology, whilst Deudney (1990) warns of the dangers of a 
militarization of environmental issues.  
 
After the Cold War, a discourse of ‘environmental security’ developed oriented around 
natural resource management and links between environmental factors and conflict 
(especially the work of political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon) (Eckersley 2009). 
Geopolitical strategist Robert Kaplan also published ‘The Coming Anarchy’ (1994, in 
The Atlantic) in which he prophesized that the environment would become the 
‘national-security issue of the twenty-first century’. However, whereas Floyd (2008) 
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contends ‘environmental security’ debates are important historical and conceptual 
precedents to ‘climate security’, Dabelko (2009) argues climate change concerns were 
sidelined in environmental security discourse in favour of resource scarcities and 
conflict. In the aftermath of 9/11, the ‘war on terror’ and 2003 invasion of Iraq 
dominated security thinking in Washington, D.C. (Diez et al 2016). The Bush 
administration rolled back the Clinton-Gore presidency’s environmental security 
policies, withdrawing US support for the Kyoto Protocol (Diez et al 2016). Despite this 
‘lull’ post 9/11 (Jhaveri 2011: 977), climate change-security connections were 
highlighted in a Pentagon-commissioned report on the implications of an abrupt 
climate change scenario for US national security (Schwartz and Randall 2003). In this 
report, Schwartz and Randall (2003) construct a climate change scenario (patterned on 
a similar 100 year event which occurred 8200 years ago) and speculate on the range of 
national security implications this suggests for the US, for example resource 
competition and conflict. The then UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett is believed 
to have been the first to use the term ‘climate security’ (in a 2006 speech) (Trombetta 
2008); under Beckett’s leadership, climate change was debated at the UN Security 
Council in April 2007 (UNSC 2007a and b). Climate security was moved to the General 
Assembly floor in 2009, where a resolution (UNGA 2009) and Secretary-General Report 
were mandated (Ki-moon 2009). A second Security Council debate was held in June 
(2011) at the behest of the German government (UNSC 2011a and b). Climate change 
has also been discussed twice more by the Security Council, with two Arria-Formula 
meetings (confidential, informal sessions held by Council Members with other invited 
parties (UNSC 2016)) held in February 2013 and June 2015 (Werrell and Femia 2015). 
The election of President-elect Donald Trump on November 8th (2016) casts doubts on 
the status of climate security agendas. Trump has given Republican Congressman Mike 
Pompeo (to direct the CIA), skeptical of climate policies, an important security role 
(Levitan 2016). Trump’s selection of the outgoing CEO and chairman of Exxon-Mobil 
Rex Tillerson (10th December 2016) to be his Secretary of State, despite Tillerson’s 
previous support of the 2015 Paris Agreement (Osborne 2016), also raises questions 
about the future of climate security politics and discourse in a US context.2  
                                                 
2 Further reflections on Donald Trump’s politics can be found in chapter 7, section 7.2 
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A slew of reports were also released in 2007-8 in a range of national and supranational 
contexts (see, for example, Center for Naval Analyses ((CNA) 2007) and Campbell et al 
(2007) in the US, or Mabey (2008) for the UK). These contribute to what Liberatore 
(2013) has labelled the ‘2007 turn’, a period in which ‘climate security’ increasingly 
captured security analysts’ attention. In their study of climate security in media 
coverage in 9 countries, Schäfer et al (2015) note that overall the number of articles on 
climate change which use securitizing language (as a proportion of the total) jumps 
from 0.09% between 1996 and 2006 to 0.57% from 2007-10. Peaks in climate security 
language follow significant geopolitical events, for example the 2009 Copenhagen COP 
and the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 (Schäfer et al 2015). Of the countries 
analysed, newspapers in Western countries show the clearest trends towards 
securitization (US newspapers contain the highest proportion of climate change 
articles with securitizing language (at 28.1%, an annual increase of 1.2%), followed by 
the UK (at 26.3%, a 1.1% annual increase)). The findings for Canada (24.3%, a 1.1% 
rise), Australia (24.1%, a 2.1% increase), and New Zealand (22.2%, a 0.6% increase) also 
show annual increases. Singapore (19.4%) and Thailand (22.1%) exhibit lower 
proportions of coverage, but faster annual increases (4.6% and 7.6% respectively). In 
India and South Africa, by contrast, the annual rate of coverage decreased (2.3% in 
India, and 4.1% in South Africa) (Schäfer et al 2015). These findings indicate that whilst 
a discourse of ‘climate security’ has gained in prominence, this is  not a global trend 
and is only prevalent in particular, context-specific settings.  
 
To take this point further, with the exception of the Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) in the UN Security Council debates (Boas 2015), it could be that climate security 
debates are predominantly (but not exclusively) Western-centric. For example, 
Trombetta (2014) notes the securitization of climate-induced migration discourse in EU 
politics, whilst White (2011: 7) critiques a securitized climate-induced migration 
debate as about protecting ‘North Atlantic borders’. Boas (2015: 1) defines 
securitization as ‘the process through which non-traditional security issues … are 
discussed and/or acted upon in terms of security and thereby drawn into the security 
domain’. She (2015) argues the securitizing moves for climate-induced migration (in 
particular the 2007 and 2011 UNSC debates) were conscious, strategic attempts to 
convince international actors, especially developing countries, to take on GHG 
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(greenhouse gases) mitigation. Whereas the UK government has explicitly sought to 
cast climate change as a security issue (e.g. Margaret Beckett’s speeches), the Indian 
government has repeatedly rejected this framing (including at the 2007 UN Security 
Council debate), highlighting climate change’s sustainable development underpinnings 
and accusing Western governments of politicizing the issue (Boas 2015). However, 
instead of a historical judgment about whether climate change has been 
(un)successfully securitized, I approach a different, if interrelated, set of questions in 
this project. The thesis focuses on the role of identity constitutions, unequal power 
relations in climate security politics, and how climate security (predominantly in the US 
context) is constructed as a discourse. 
 
1.3 Discourses of climate security 
 
A fascinating series of discursive typologies have emerged to map climate security 
literature. In an analysis of the 2007 UNSC debate on climate change, Detraz and Betsill 
(2009) differentiate between environmental security and environmental conflict 
discourses. ‘Environmental security’ underscores negative impacts of environmental 
degradation for human beings, is associated with human security and the welfare of 
human populations, and utilizes a wide range of policy responses within its remit. 
‘Environmental conflict’, by contrast, maintains a narrower focus on military solutions, 
the security of states, and conflict (Detraz and Betsill 2009). Detraz and Betsill’s (2009: 
311) analysis suggests that, for UNSC delegates, the broad, human-security oriented 
‘environmental security’ is ‘the dominant discourse linking security and climate change 
in the international arena.’ Oels (2013: 25), contrastingly, flips climate security and 
posits a ‘climatization of security’, whereby traditional practices of security, e.g. 
scenario planning, risk management and early warning systems, are applied to climate 
change politics (and vice versa with climate modelling practices).  
 
For the American and German contexts, Von Lucke et al (2014) argue climate security 
discourses should be understood through two dimensions. First is the security referent 
(which could be ‘territorial’ (for example a territorial nation-state), ‘individual’, or 
‘planetary’, for instance an ecosystem). The second dimension focuses on differences 
between ‘risk’ and ‘danger’. Whereas ‘risks’ concentrate on potential uncertainties, are 
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more amenable to probabilistic calculation and are diffuse (e.g. ‘risk profiles’ or 
‘groups’), ‘security threats’ or ‘dangers’ are discrete, existential and demand strategic, 
targeted responses, a logic of ‘threatification’ (Von Lucke et al 2014; Diez et al 2016). 
On the other hand, risks cannot be eliminated and alternative interventions include 
insuring against the risk and increasing the resilience of a referent object, a logic of 
‘riskification’ (Von Lucke et al 2014; Diez et al 2016). This starting distinction provides 
an effective analytical framework through which Von Lucke et al (2014) and Diez et al 
(2016) outline their interpretations of climate security discourses. 
 
From these parameters, Von Lucke et al (2014) identify six discourses. First is a 
‘territorial danger’ discourse, with nation-states and geographical regions as referent 
objects, a neo-Malthusian prognosis of ‘climate conflicts’, and short-term military 
interventions or adaptive strategies as proposed solutions. This discourse is common in 
US climate security documents, for example Schwartz and Randall (2003). Second is 
‘territorial risk’, a discourse oriented around risk assessments of climate security issues 
and which frames ‘resilience’ and ‘preparedness’ as important political responses. This 
discourse plays a secondary role in both the US and German contexts, more often used 
to indicate climate change threats as long-term and incorporative of actors beyond the 
military (Von Lucke et al 2014). Third is an ‘individual danger’ discourse that builds on 
human security and aspires towards protection of individuals/communities. It is 
associated with issues such as agricultural yields, water scarcity, and provision of 
adaptation measures and humanitarian support as responses (Von Lucke et al 2014). 
This discourse is relatively common in all contexts, from UN based human security 
actors to national security think tanks. Fourth is ‘individual risk’, which does not specify 
individuals, but relies on risk assessments to generate populations deemed to be most 
at risk. It is relatively rarely found in both US and German documents (Von Lucke et al 
2014). Fifth is ‘planetary danger’: this discourse emphasizes symbiotic 
interdependencies of human beings with wider ecosystems. Proponents of this 
discourse advocate a range of measures, from conservation to GHG moratoriums (Von 
Lucke et al 2014). Finally, in a ‘planetary risk’ discourse long-term threats to the 
planetary ecosystem (e.g. uncontrolled economic growth) are measured through 
statistical risk analysis. Measures include energy efficiency schemes to manage 
planetary risks (Von Lucke et al 2014). Of analyses of climate security discourse, Von 
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Lucke et al (2014) provide an analytically rich account. However, whereas they identify 
several discourses, I argue they do not focus sufficiently on how Othering and subject 
positions are configured in the unequal power relations of climate security discourses.  
 
Focusing specifically on the referent object, McDonald (2013) proposes four 
discourses: human security (with ‘people’ or ‘human beings’ as the security referent), 
national security (‘nation-state’), international security (‘the international 
community’), and ecological security (‘the ecosystem’). National security is 
undoubtedly a strong discourse in climate security discussions, with the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the nation-state a key focus of protection. Alongside a 
variety of reports from security-oriented think tanks (e.g. CNA 2007 and 2014, or 
Campbell et al 2007), climate change is also cited in a range of American national 
security strategies (for example the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews  
(QDR)). The ‘human security’ discourse has also gained prominence in UN institutions 
and critical academic literature (Barnett et al 2010). For example, the 2009 UN 
Secretary-General’s Report (following the General Assembly debate) points to the 
security of individuals and communities as issues of paramount importance, with 
mitigation, adaptation, information provision and effective governance mechanisms all 
implicated in this approach (Ki-moon 2009). The IPCC’s (Adger et al 2014: 759) Fifth 
Assessment Report also includes a chapter on human security, defined (in the context 
of climate change) as ‘a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is 
protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity’. The 
authors argue there is ‘high agreement’ that climate change poses risks for human 
security, and that adaptation could minimize human security concerns (with multiple 
lines of evidence from conflict resolution to migration and food security) (p.777-778). 
However, whilst these discourses suggest an equivalent status for human and national 
security discourses in climate security politics, in practice these power relations are 
asymmetrically positioned in favour of national security (discussed below) (McDonald 
2013). 
 
For ‘international security’ discourse, climate change is viewed as a threat to 
internationalist norms (for example international trade or the rules of international 
law) and global cooperation is argued to be necessary for political progress in tackling 
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climate risks (McDonald 2013). UN bodies (for example UNEP (United Nations 
Environment Program)) are key proponents of an international security discourse. 
‘Ecological security’, underscoring the integration of human communities into an 
interconnected biosphere (Dalby 1998), is perhaps the most radical and marginalized 
of all climate security discourses, with little uptake in international policy (McDonald 
2013). Whereas McDonald provides a precise analytic schema to interpret climate 
security, I argue that instead of viewing climate security as a series of different but 
interconnected discourses, climate security should be conceived as a single, 
heterogeneous discourse. This is not to argue there are not multiple, variegated 
discursive threads in climate security, but rather to treat them as a heterogeneous 
ensemble to better comprehend their mutual interrelations. In this sense, ‘human’ and 
‘national’ securities are not separated in this account and I explore how they are 
utilized and integrated into a broader climate security discourse. The thesis’ analytical 
dividing lines are instead geographical, focusing on particular sites of production of 
climate security discourse (US and EU think tanks, institutions, NGOs etc.). This could 
weaken the analysis. By not focusing on the intricate, specific contents of individual 
security concepts (‘national security’, ‘human security’ etc.), this could mean the 
analysis misses elements of their detailed constitution. However, by treating climate 
security as a heterogeneous but (in some respects) unitary discourse, I contend this 
approach offers a more holistic perspective to investigate points at which different 
concepts of climate security and identity constructions intersect in climate security 
politics. The specific geographical demarcations (US and EU institutions) and sample 
are discussed further in chapter 2 (section 2.3.1).  
 
With the exception of Detraz and Betsill’s (2009) conclusions that environmental 
security discourses (leaning towards human security) are most prominent in the 2007 
UNSC debate, there is a consensus among other writers that national, territorial 
security interpretations are among the most powerfully positioned in climate security. 
For Schäfer et al (2015), press reports emphasize national security concerns (on 
average) above human security in 8 of 9 countries (with the US the most prevalent, but 
also in the Indian, Singaporean, Canadian, New Zealand, South African, Australian and 
British coverage). Within the time frame of 1996-2010, only Thai press reports trend 
towards human security concerns (Schäfer et al 2015). Von Lucke et al (2014) concur, 
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arguing ‘territorial security’ is the strongest discourse in the US and that, although 
individual security and risk concepts are used, these are linked to territorial security 
and facilitate protection of the United States. Importantly, ‘discourses of climate 
security matter. They serve to define who is in need of protection from the threat 
posed by climate change; who is capable of providing this protection; and (crucially), 
what forms of responses to these threats might take’ (McDonald 2013: 49, original 
emphasis). McDonald (2013) argues that current dominant ‘national’ and 
‘international’ security discourses are inappropriate for climate change issues: they 
preserve the status quo at a time when a fundamental reassessment of human beings’ 
relationships with their environments is required. I also argue that, particularly in a 
national security-oriented American empirical context, national security 
interpretations of climate change risk exclusionary Othering practices and inequalities. 
In this context, ‘Othering’ is grounded in Edward Said’s (2003 (1978)) work and 
describes discursive means by which binary, essentialized differences are constructed 
between populations and cultural groups (for instance ‘Self’/’Other’ or ‘Us’/’Them’; for 
further details, see chapter 3, section 3.2). The concept of ‘national security’ emerged 
after the Second World War and is grounded in the model of sovereign, territorially 
demarcated nation-states codified by the Peace of Westphalia (signed in 1648 (Krasner 
1996)). In one interpretation, national security depends on the protection and 
preservation of nation-states from defined external ‘threats’ and ‘Others’; it relies on 
binaries of ‘domestic/foreign’, ‘inside/outside’ and ‘Self/Other’ (Campbell 1998 
(1992)). With the Othering and subjectification practices implied by this conceptual 
basis (for instance of threatening externalized ‘Others’ to secure and defend against, 
or constructions of a collective national subject in the name of security), and the 
exclusionary inequalities these could instantiate, I argue it is important to explore 
these practices in US climate security discourse.  
 
Biopolitical accounts of climate security could also be critiqued for a lack of 
consideration of collective human subjectivities. Whilst there are studies of how 
biopolitical government (the political rationalities and technologies through which ‘life’ 
and ‘populations’ are governed (Lemke 2011)) is implicated in constructions of climate-
induced migrants (e.g. Bettini 2014), and Oels’ (2013) articulation of climate 
mitigation, adaptation and security in terms of biopolitical risk management, there are 
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relatively few accounts of how collective subjectivities (racial and national identities) 
are constructed biopolitically. Against a background of ‘turbulence’, Cooper (2006) 
classifies climate security as a new technology of American imperial power. Moreover, 
Grove (2010) explores disaster risk from climate effects, focusing on financial 
investments (e.g. catastrophe bonds) that collateralize negative impacts. Using the 
Canadian Boreal Forest as an example, Baldwin (2013a) also conceives of biopolitical 
climate security at the eco-systemic scale, discussing the forest as a crucial 
environment for the maintenance of life due to its capacities to generate tolerable 
intensities of the carbon cycle. However, despite these accounts of biopolitical climate 
securities at a range of scales, accounts of how biopolitics are implicated in Othering 
and subjectification processes in climate security discourse are sparse. Furthermore, 
whilst several studies (Barnett et al 2008; Matthew et al 2010) advocate a human 
security framework, there is a lack of clarification of what ‘the human’ means in these 
approaches. If climate security scholars postulate human security, it follows that they 
should define the referent point that anchors this conception. However, definitions are 
sparse, and accounts of the complex, multifarious and uneven ways through which 
human subjectivities are constituted are absent from climate security literature. How is 
‘the human’ of climate security gendered, sexualized, racialized, nationalized and 
classed? These are the questions that preoccupy this thesis. While there have been a 
range of investigations of discursive shifts in climate security (Detraz and Betsill 2009; 
McDonald 2013; Von Lucke et al 2014; Diez et al 2016) and their unequal political 
dynamics, I focus on how identities are unevenly constituted in climate security 
discourse. In particular, the project centres on racial and national identities (and 
moments of intersection) in US and EU climate security discourse. To be more precise, 
I now outline the thesis’ research questions and objectives.  
 
1.4 Research questions and objectives  
 
1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security 
discourse?  
 
Initially, the project’s key aim was to investigate interconnections between anti - 
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Muslim racism and climate change. As such, my starting research question was about 
how a ‘Muslim Other’ is constructed in climate security discourse. However, as the 
research evolved, it came to encompass a broader range of racialized identity 
constructions (‘African’ and ‘Muslim’3 racialized identities) and the question was 
altered accordingly. This research question is inspired by a small number of studies 
that explore processes of racialization in climate security and climate-induced 
migration discourse. These include Baldwin’s (2012; 2013b; 2016) accounts of the 
racialization of climate-induced migration (see chapter 4, section 4.3.1), and 
Methmann and Rothe’s (2014) analysis of racialized imagery in climate security 
outputs. There are also longer histories of interconnection between environmental 
inequalities, racialized identities and racism in American contexts. In the late 19 th/early 
20th centuries, environmental determinists such as Ellen Church Semple argued that a 
temperate climate in North America and Europe enabled a hard work ethic 
(Livingstone 2002). In contrast, populations and communities in tropical climates were 
denigrated as lazy, idle and endowed with a poor work ethic (Livingstone 2002). 
Additionally, the environmental justice movement arose in the US (in the late 1970s) 
as a consequence of the disproportionate exposure of minority and low-income 
communities to different forms of pollution (‘environmental racism’), for example 
proximity to toxic waste dumps (Cutter 1995; Pulido 2000). However, other than these 
important historical examples, there are very few analyses of racialization in the 
context of US climate change and climate security politics and discourse. With a 
particular focus on naturalizing representations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations 
in climate-induced migration discourse, the first research question is designed to 
explore these questions further.  
 
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed 
in and through US and EU climate security discourse? 
 
Furthermore, the thesis explores representations of terrorism in climate security 
                                                 
3 The thesis uses quotation marks around the terms ‘African’ and ‘Muslim’ to indicate the constructed, 
naturalized and racialized dimensions of these identities. More information about this decision is 
provided in chapter 2, section 2.2 
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discourse. I argue discussions of terrorism and radicalization, through constructions of 
biological/immunological metaphors, anti-Americanism discourses and masculinities, 
represent important points of intersection between racial and national identities in 
climate security. There are very few academic studies of links between terrorism, 
radicalization, and climate change (although see Renard (2008) or Siddiqi (2014), 
discussed in chapter 5, sections 5.2 and 5.4 respectively, for exceptions). However, 
connections are occasionally drawn in US climate security publications (e.g. Campbell 
et al 2007) and raised by prominent political actors, for example Bernie Sanders’ (15th 
November 2015) claim that climate change is directly related a rise in terrorist activity 
(citing the Syrian Civil War as a case in point (see chapter 5, section 5.4, for further 
discussion)). As a means to explore how representations of terrorism crystallize 
intersections of racial and national identities, I explore how climate change and 
terrorism interconnections are constructed in US and EU climate security discourses.  
 
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security 
discourse? 
 
Although the research project was initially framed solely in terms of anti-Muslim 
racisms and climate change, I found that concepts of American nationhood (e.g. 
American exceptionalisms) were important identity constructions in US climate 
security discourse. Nationhood is understood in this sense as constituted through 
difference: national identities are constructed in relation to ‘Others’ against which they 
are contingently defined (Matless 1998: 17; for further information, see chapter 3, 
section 3.8.2, and chapter 6). As with racial identities and representations of terrorism, 
there are very few academic studies of nationalism, nationhood or national identity in 
climate security. This project contributes to bridging this empirical gap with study of 
how concepts of American nationhood are constructed in climate security. As 
McDonald (2013: 46) writes of national security and climate change: ‘a national 
security focus encourages viewing climate change as a threat to the extent that it 
precipitates military threats, undermines national economic growth or undermines the 
national ‘way of life’.’ This suggests that in climate security debates, here interpreted 
in a national security orientation, ideas of what constitutes ‘American-ness’ and the 
American ‘way of life’ are interesting and important to examine. As such, and explored 
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in collaboration with racialized Othering practices, I examine constructions of 
American nationhood in US climate security discourse.  
 
These research questions provide a comprehensive basis through which to explore 
constitutions of racial and national identities in climate security discourse. I use the 
words ‘in and through’ in each to suggest that not only are racialized and national 
identities constructed in moments of climate security discourses, but also that they 
carry effects beyond their representation. Gregory (2004a: 18, original emphasis) 
enunciates this point eloquently: ‘the citationary structure that is authorized by these 
accretions is also in some sense performative. In other words, it produces the effects it 
names.’ As such, the thesis studies the unequal power relations and identity 
constructions in US and EU climate security as well as the inequalities and exclusions 
these are linked to. This trajectory is also pertinent to my research objectives. 
Alongside an investigation of connections between anti-Muslim racism and climate 
change, one of my initial objectives was to explore possibilities for a more progressive 
environmental politics. As the project has evolved, I have increasingly thought about 
this not in terms of a single understanding of a ‘progressive environmental politics’, 
but instead possibilities for multiple, context-dependent and environmentally just 
securities. These ideas are underpinned by an anti-essentialist ethos (grounded in 
Edward Said’s (1994) ideas) and are critical of the exclusionary implications that racial 
Othering and national subjectivities suggest in climate security discourse. I conclude 
the thesis by reflecting on how these ideas, by bringing environmental justice and 
progressive, plural conceptions on security (Koopman’s (2011) ‘alter-geopolitics’) into 
conversation, could contribute to this research objective on environmental politics and 
more rigorous analytical accounts of climate security. As such, my research objectives 
have moved away from an explicit focus on anti-Muslim racisms and a general 
aspiration towards ‘a more progressive environmental politics’. They focus specifically 
on how racial and national identities are constituted in US and EU climate security 
discourses, and how can we think about possibilities for multiple, situated, 
environmentally just securities. To flesh out how these research questions and 
objectives are tackled in the thesis, section 1.5 introduces the dissertation’s structure 
and chapter outlines.  
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1.5 Thesis structure 
 
I start with chapter 2, which outlines the project’s methodology. It introduces critical 
discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews as the key methods. The chapter 
first outlines a conceptual justification for critical discourse analysis (a concern with 
unequal power relations and the politics of representation) and provides a detailed 
reflection of the process and challenges I encountered along the way. I try to be 
critically reflexive with regards to my own positionality and imbrication in the unequal 
power relations of climate security discourse. Subsequently, the chapter outlines the 
process of conducting semi-structured interviews and their limitations. This is and will 
always remain an unsatisfactory, incomplete account, but the chapter tries to sketch 
out how I’ve attempted to reflect on these experiences throughout the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines a theoretical framework for an exploration of the unequal power 
relations of racial and national identity construction in US climate security discourse. It 
is grounded in a conceptualization of biopolitics that critiques Foucault’s (2009 (1977)) 
focus on the rationalities and technologies of power – the ‘how’ questions and security 
apparatuses through which power relations are instantiated – and centres on 
discursive appropriations of valued lives and populations in possible climate-insecure 
futures. I take inspiration from Fassin’s (2009) concepts of ‘bio-legitimacy’ and ‘bio-
inequalities’ to construct this argument. Unequal valuations of lives and populations 
are grounded in racial and national identity constructions in climate security. The 
chapter continues to develop the concept of essentializing logics to examine how racial 
and national identities in context-specific moments of US climate security discourse – 
essentialized identities – are held in discursive relation to possible climate-insecure 
futures (grounded in Stuart Hall’s (1996) and Ben Anderson’s (2010a) 
conceptualizations of ‘logics’). The project’s  understanding of ‘race’ is developed from 
David Theo Goldberg’s (1992) definition, and of ‘nationhood’ from Angharad Closs 
Stephens’ (2013) work. The chapter concludes by introducing environmental justice 
perspectives as a means to challenge essentializing logics and think about alternative, 
multiple conceptions of securities (grounded in Koopman’s (2011) ‘alter-geopolitics’).  
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Chapter 4 is an empirical examination of essentializing logics in the production of a 
racial Other in context-specific moments of climate security discourse. I use the term 
racial logics to foreground the particular forms essentializing logics take in relation to 
racialized identity constructions in climate security. Specifically, the chapter’s empirical 
focus is on representations of possible climate-induced migration from the MENA 
(Middle East and North Africa region) to the European Union. I argue racialization 
functions in these representations through three tropes. The first is naturalization: 
repeated associations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations with a latent tendency 
towards terrorism and racialized violence, and of inherent cultural incompatibility with 
European societies. Second is dehumanization: the use of geopolitical metaphors that 
diminish possible climate-induced migrants’ agency and reduce their status to the 
‘interests’ of receiving nation-states. Finally, I focus on a compulsive determinism, the 
idea that, presented with a range of adaptive strategies in climate-insecure futures, 
‘African’ populations will inevitably or are very likely to turn to acts of violence and/or 
disruptive migrations. I argue that collectively these tropes contribute to the 
production of a racial Other in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security 
discourse.  
 
Chapter 5, in accordance with the thesis’ second research question, explores discursive 
constructions of terrorism in US and EU climate security discourses. The first third of 
the chapter introduces conceptual debates on climate change-terrorism 
interconnections and the historical context to these debates. Subsequently, I focus 
specifically on how multiple identity constructions are co-constituted in these 
moments of climate security discourse. First, I examine how biological and fertility 
metaphors are adopted to describe terrorism and climate change and argue these are 
underpinned by racialized, dehumanizing assumptions. The chapter then touches on 
constructions of gendered and racialized identities in context-specific moments of 
climate security, particularly the construction of young Muslim masculinities in 
climate-insecure futures. Finally, the chapter concludes by exploring how racialized 
assumptions about Muslim populations (in particular a capacity for 
radicalization/terrorism) are constituted in relation to ideas of anti-Americanism in 
climate security discourses. I focus on the motivations for American humanitarian 
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intervention following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami as an instructive example to 
highlight these debates.  
 
The final empirical chapter, 6, investigates representations of American nationhood in 
US climate security discourse and the role of essentializing logics in orienting 
American-ness towards possible climate-insecure futures. Firstly, I focus on 
representations of American exceptionalism in US climate security. The chapter argues 
that in earlier climate security documents (2003-10), representations of an isolationist, 
fortressed America are prevalent. These are based on an exceptionalism grounded in 
relative adaptive capacity: that because the US has more sufficient resources and 
relative adaptive capacity in neo-Malthusian climate-insecure futures, the American 
state will build defensive walls to protect its own population/territory first. Second, the 
chapter argues that universalized accounts of American ‘leadership’ and ‘values’ are 
constructed in moments of US climate security discourse, alongside increased 
consideration of human security concerns among American defence actors. Finally, I 
focus on the development of a discursive strand of climate-resilient American 
nationhood and the unequal biopolitics of valued lives this suggests. Throughout the 
empirical chapters, I attempt to demonstrate the role of essentializing logics, 
discursive situations of racial and national identities in relation to pos sible climate-
insecure futures, in constructing multiple, uneven biopolitics of unequally valued lives 
in US and EU climate security discourses. 
 
To conclude, I reflect on the thesis’ three research questions and what the 
dissertation’s analysis suggests about responses to these (and brief remarks about 
their current situation in American and EU political contexts). Additionally, the 
concluding chapter reflects on the thesis’ contribution wider geographical literature 
and possible avenues for future research. In particular, the chapter elaborates on the 
project’s second research objective: the imperative to think about tentative 
possibilities for multiple, context-dependent and just environmental securities. I reflect 
on what work from feminist geopolitics and environmental justice can offer to this 
objective and the need to challenge reductionist, essentializing logics and their 
delimitation of multiple, possible environmentally-secure futures. 
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Chapter 2:  
A methodological framework to study climate 
security discourses 
 
2.1 Introduction and research questions  
 
1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security 
discourse?  
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed 
in and through US and EU climate security discourse?  
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security 
discourse? 
 
Before introducing the project’s theoretical framework and empirical chapters, I first 
outline and reflect critically on the methodology used for this research and challenges 
encountered along the way. This provides an important platform to explain the 
project’s practical underpinning and its historical evolution. I begin the chapter by 
describing the conceptual basis for the primary method, critical  discourse analysis 
(CDA) (section 2.2). This is followed by an appraisal of my experience with CDA and 
difficulties encountered with understanding power relations underlying discursive 
phenomena (section 2.3). I move on to reflect on semi-structured interviews as a 
supporting method. The chapter notes their application alongside CDA and unequal 
power relations embedded in this process (section 2.4). Finally, the chapter reflects on 
the process of conducting semi-structured interviews and fieldwork in a EU context 
(section 2.5).  
 
2.2 Critical discourse analysis – justification and conceptual basis  
 
As the dissertation explores identity construction in climate security discourse, this 
infers questions of symbolic meaning, contingent and varied representations, textual 
genres, and underlying political contexts. Howarth (2000: 10) identifies discourse 
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analysis as ‘the process of analyzing signifying practices as discursive forms’; analysts 
‘treat a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic material – speeches, reports, 
manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even organizations and 
institutions … as ‘texts’ and ‘writings’ that enable the subject to experience the world 
of objects, words, and practices.’ Discourse analysis thus approaches cl imate security 
as a historically and geographically situated system of meanings, representations, 
practices and texts, all underpinned by unequal power relations (Howarth 2000). A 
Foucauldian inspired discourse analysis investigates power-knowledge relations: the 
rules and mechanisms governing the production and circulation of knowledge (Jäger 
and Maier 2009). Discourses demarcate which statements about ‘reality’ or ‘the world’ 
count as ‘say-able’ or ‘true’ (Waitt 2010). Fairclough (2003: 2) argues this approach 
relies on an abstract conception of discourse and doesn’t account for the linguistic, 
material moorings of texts. Both approaches are necessary: no textual analysis is 
sufficient without a theory of ‘discourse’, and no understanding of the soc ial and 
political effects of discourse is possible without close examination of language-in-use 
(Fairclough 2003).  
 
I follow Fairclough’s (2003: 124) identification of language as a fundamental 
constituent of social life. Whereas he (2003: 124) understands discourses as ‘ways of 
representing aspects of the world’ or ‘different perspectives on the world’, I adopt the 
definition of Bialasiewicz et al (2007: 406): ‘Discourse refers to a specific series of 
representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities 
constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more 
or less possible.’ This pertains to representations, practices, meanings and identities, 
all materially grounded cornerstones of what I seek to analyze. Importantly, texts, 
defined by Fairclough (2003: 3) as ‘any actual instance of language in use’, are 
embedded in sociopolitical contexts. As unequal power relations constitute climate 
security discourses, I argue critical discourse analysis, a method committed to 
contextualization of linguistic phenomena, practices and representations, is 
appropriate for this project. The ‘critical’ of CDA signals its orientation towards 
challenging discursive privileges that ‘enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore 
social inequality and injustice’ (van Dijk 1993: 252). This disavows a distanced, value-
free and objective scholar (Harraway 1988), and recognizes the researcher as  socially 
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situated and imbued in power-knowledge relations. As one of the project’s central 
objectives is to explore initial possibilities for just environmental securities in the US, 
CDA is an apt methodological vehicle to contribute to this objective.  
 
With its focus on texts (and the representations produced in texts), CDA is limited in 
the degree to which it can understand the material, exclusionary effects of racialized 
and national climate security discourses. This claim is not to reinforce a binary 
between ‘language’ and materiality’ (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015), or to 
suggest that discourse analysis – and, by extension, the concept of ‘discourse’ (a more 
extended critical discussion of the concept of ‘discourse’ is  provided in chapter 3, 
section 3.5) – is not grounded in material realities, but to focus on the limits of a  
methodology committed to specific analyses of texts. While this can render it difficult 
to understand the grounded, materially situated contexts behind documents’ 
production (Gill 1996), an overreliance on texts could also neglect analysis of the 
political and material effects of unequal, exclusionary climate security discourses. To 
tackle this limitation, this project explores material implications of racialized and 
national climate security discourses in several respects. This includes the examples of 
‘sedentarist’ (Bakewell 2008) or ‘containment policies’ in response to climate-induced 
migration (see chapter 4, section 4.3.4), and discursive strands of anti-Americanism 
connected to humanitarian intervention following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
(chapter 5, section 5.7). Throughout the thesis, I try to use contextual analysis to 
emphasize the unequal power relations undergirding representations of racial and 
national identities in climate security and what the political implications of such 
representations are (and could be in climate-insecure futures).  
 
My positionality, as a critical discourse analyst of texts and discursively constructed as 
a particular subject (‘researcher’) (Jäger and Maier 2009), is interwoven into the 
research process. This position risks contradiction. It assumes I as the researcher and a 
particular ensemble (of texts, practices, representations etc.) label led ‘climate security’ 
can be isolated and held in relation. However, as Rose (1997) identifies, the complexity 
of power relations in the research process renders it impossible for a scholar to 
completely and reflexively identify their ‘position’. To assume so would replicate the 
‘god-trick’ that Harraway (1988) dispels in her account of situated knowledges (Rose 
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1997). But, to deny any possibility of situating ‘positionality’ also replicates the circular 
contradiction Hammersley (2003) identifies in CDA. If any text, including the 
researcher’s analysis, can be deconstructed, what Hammersley (2003: 765) calls the 
‘reflexive application of DA [discourse analysis] to itself’, analysts are forced into a 
position of perpetual backtracking and are unable to settle at a point of explanation, 
both of the texts and their positionality. An infinite regression of discursive 
deconstruction ensues. I try to find a middle ground along this conceptual tightrope. 
This accepts it is impossible to fully locate one’s research position, but still allows for 
reflexive identification of contested moments, groups or texts (published by think 
tanks and government departments), and points of departure for analysis.  
 
This position resonates with Edward Said’s anti-essentialism introduced in chapter 3 
(section 3.2). It recognizes cultural boundaries are permeable, contingent and never 
fully knowable (the impossibility of an autonomous ‘researcher’ or ‘discourse’), but 
does not reduce them to the extent that analysis becomes impossible. Within the 
‘milling mass of discourse’ (Jäger and Maier 2009: 35), there is a constant, irresolvable 
negotiation of positionality, power relations and analytical possibilities. In this case, 
Said’s (2003 (1978): 23) method of postcolonial analysis, of analyzing texts from 
imperial, metropolitan centres to highlight essentialized identities and Eurocentric 
assumptions, is an important starting point for the CDA. It focuses on documents 
produced by American institutions (and to a lesser extent the EU) and comprises of 
interviews with professionals in Washington, D.C., London and Brussels. One weakness 
of this approach is that with a sole focus on elite texts and the actors producing these 
texts, this reinforces unequal power relations in climate security and doesn’t allow 
space for alternative voices or perspectives. Additionally, there is a risk that in 
highlighting the role of Othering processes in context-specific moments of climate 
security discourse, this re-essentializes that which the project seeks to critique. With 
these risks in mind, I discuss alternative voices on climate security and environmental 
justice in several chapters, including religious environmental groups in chapter 4 
(section 4.5), environmental justice campaigners in chapter 6 (section 6.5.1), and 
discussions about possibilities for more just, situated environmental securities in 
chapter 3 (section 3.9) and conclusion (section 7.3). This is not an attempt to ‘speak 
for’ or ‘on behalf of’ alternative actors, but to respect and recognize the complex, 
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multifarious constitution of climate security discourses beyond a national security 
frame. Additionally, whenever I refer to interpretations of racialized populations in the 
thesis, specifically ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations, these descriptors are qualified by 
quotation marks.4 This decision does not diminish the fact that, by reiterating these 
labels in a discussion of racialization, this reiteration in part reinforces the 
essentialization of such identities. However, while this strategy is fundamentally 
limited in this respect, it does provide one practical means of highlighting the 
constructed, essentialized condition of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ racial Others in climate 
security. Furthermore, I research as a white, male, heterosexual British geographer 
researching at an elite UK university. This dictates the project in myriad ways, for 
example the research topic (from a department with a strong political geography 
tradition), selection of case study (the Euro- and Anglo-centric fascination with 
American politics), and methodology (a personal interest in language and its political 
appropriation). My whiteness – as well as its unequal positioning of me as a British 
researcher at Durham University – also delimits the extent to which I can comprehend 
the cultural nuances of American national and racial identities. These facets are 
explored in more depth throughout the chapter.  
 
An epistemological rift rests at the project’s heart. The semi-structured interviews 
derive from a constructivist perspective that rejects a singular, objective reality and 
encourages participants to construct narratives of their own social worlds 
(Fotheringham 1998). To an extent, this support’s the research’s historically situated, 
specific analysis. However, as the semi-structured interviews and CDA are required to 
help explain the surrounding political backdrop of American climate security, the data 
they provided must be cross contextual and stretch beyond individual accounts of 
social realities. Fairclough (2003: 14) writes: ‘the position I take is a realist one … both 
concrete social events and abstract social structures  … are part of reality … Reality (the 
potential, actual) cannot be reduced to knowledge about reality, which is shifting, 
contingent, and partial … we should not assume that the reality of texts is exhausted 
                                                 
4 Importantly, this does not mean that I employ quotation marks every time the words ‘Muslim’ or 
‘African’ are used. For example, if referring to ‘North African countries’ or ‘Green Muslims’ (a religious 
environmental organization) descriptively, I do not use quotation marks. They are used for specific 
instances where racialized interpretations of populations are described, e.g. a racial ‘Muslim’ and 
‘African’ Other, or racialized ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations. 
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by our knowledge about texts.’ This highlights a clear methodological contradiction 
between a constructivism committed to socially constructed realities and a critical 
realist account that accepts a contingent external reality. Although this can only be 
bridged to a certain extent, I propose an interpretivist perspective as a partial solution 
(Greener 2011). This perspective accepts climate security discourses are historically 
contingent and contextualized, but this does not render them inaccessible – subject to 
mediation by cultural values, political beliefs and sensory perception – to a complex 
external reality (Greener 2011). Therefore, whilst climate securities are complicated by 
contextual idiosyncrasies and individual interpretations, they exist nonetheless as part 
of a multifarious external reality. This approach respects the situated individual 
histories and geographies that semi-structured interviewees construct, whilst 
facilitating for the contextual crossover and textual indices a CDA requires. Thus, an 
interpretivist perspective is employed as a partial resolution to this epistemological 
contradiction. With these tensions in mind, I now outline the CDA.  
 
2.3 Practical implementation 
 
2.3.1 The CDA sample and political context 
 
Dittmer (2010) points out discourse analyses contain textual and contextual 
dimensions. Textually, the aim is to explore linguistic nuances in documents, whereas a 
contextual investigation analyses the power relations underpinning a text’s production 
and reception (Sharp and Richardson 2001). To respond to Dittmer’s (2010) guidance, 
texts were purposively sampled (more information on this process is provided below). 
The majority (96%) originate from US or EU-derived sources. The only exceptions are 5 
publications by UN agencies (the UN Security Council, UNEP, General Ass embly and 
IPCC), which are important international statements on climate security and crosscut 
the American and EU contexts (a full list of the number of documents per organization 
is provided in Appendix A). This does not mean climate security is limited to these 
contexts. But, given that the US and EU are prominent producers of climate security 
literature, these were the institutional contexts selected for the CDA.  
 
 
 
 
34 
34 
I concentrated on documents produced by US and EU government departments and 
institutions, publications by think tanks working on climate security or with 
programs/publications dedicated to the topic, academic articles with a policy/national 
security leaning, and relevant reports by NGOs. The sample was restricted to policy 
literature and omitted other receptacles of climate security discourse, e.g. media 
outlets (a full list of the number of documents from each organization is provided in 
Appendix A). With the substantial size of the policy literature and time and resource 
constraints of the project, this was deemed to be an appropriate analytical cut-off 
point. The analysis begins in 1994 for the US (with Robert Kaplan’s article The Coming 
Anarchy) and 1999 for the EU (a report on the environment, security and foreign policy 
by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security, and Defense 
Policy). I start with these documents because they are important contextual 
precedents to climate security (grounded in environmental security debates). Although 
the timespan was initially left open (1994-present), the CDA stopped in mid-2015. This 
was for the pragmatic reason that, as my 2nd year finished in September 2015 and this 
necessitated analysis/writing-up, I was unable to continue on the CDA. Whilst this 
limits the analysis – particularly as it doesn’t incorporate outputs related to the 2015 
Paris UNFCCC COP – it nonetheless provides a broad coverage of climate security 
publications.  
 
Although the sample does not focus primarily on media sources, it does include 
testimony from publicly available interviews (for example with Barack Obama and John 
Kerry) in media outlets. As high-ranking figures in American climate security discourse 
– e.g. the US President – I argue that these represent important sources for the critical 
discourse analysis. Furthermore, although they do not form a part of the primary CDA 
sample, the documents subjected to descriptive and analytical coding, I also draw 
upon various media sources as part of the contextual analysis. These include, for 
example, the use of newspaper sources to discuss the political contexts of ‘Muslim 
rage’ concepts (in chapter 5, section 5.7), or online media sources, e.g. Breitbart 
(Martel 2014), for a discussion of the politics of attribution and complex causality with 
climate change and the Syrian Civil War (chapter 5, section 5.4).  As Schafer et al 
(2015) note, media sources are significant mediums through which climate security 
discourses circulate. Therefore, as well as important sources of public testimony from 
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politicians involved in US climate security debates, media outlets also provide 
fundamental sources for the CDA’s contextual analysis and situation of analytical 
themes – e.g. terrorism-climate change interconnections – in relation to broader 
political developments.  
 
Moreover, although the overwhelming majority of the thesis’ data are comprised of 
textual materials, I also draw upon an image (in chapter 4, section 4.3.4) from Werz 
and Conley (2012: 13) to analyze a geopolitical imaginary termed ‘the arc of tension’. 
The CDA follows Manzo’s (2010: 96) study of the iconography of climate change and 
focuses on the ‘geopolitical visions of the world’ reproduced in images of climate 
insecurities. In this sense, the CDA does not focus on the public reception of the image, 
but instead I explore the geopolitical imaginaries exhibited by Werz and Conley’s 
(2012: 3) ‘arc of tension’ and situate these within the broader trends identified in the 
CDA. In sum, notwithstanding the fact that textual, written materials constitute the 
majority of the CDA’s material, the analysis also consists of a visual image in the 
discussion of climate-induced migration (chapter 4).  
 
I followed Waitt’s (2010) advice to select texts that would be meaningful and 
justifiable for my research topic. The analysis comprised of not only documents 
directly related to climate security, but also broader strategies which cite climate 
security or are relevant for the context of American security and climate change 
politics. Genres varied, from policy reports, executive memos, security strategies and 
think tank analyses to political speeches and Congressional testimonies. All were 
available online and in most cases downloadable as PDFs. Document lengths ranged 
from single webpages to hundreds of pages. After a rigorous search of academic 
literatures/bibliographies, online sources (Google searches and government website 
searches/archives) and think tank archives (for example the Center for Climate and 
Security’s ‘Resource Hub’ (2016)), I compiled the sample. Over the course of the year 
(from October 2014 to September 2015), this was added to as new reports were 
released or found online. The final sample is 155 documents, indexed by organization. 
This programme (numbers of documents per organization) is shown in Appendix A. Of 
the 155 documents, 91 derive from US-based sources and 59 from EU-derived sources. 
48 originate from US government departments or agencies, 32 from US think tanks, 
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and 11 from other sources (academic articles with an affiliation to US national security 
(for instance if written by employees of security think tanks or government 
departments), or NGO publications). From the EU, 40 documents originate from EU 
institutions and agencies, 9 from government departments of EU Member States, 2 
from the G7 (one of which is a report compiled by several think tanks), 1 from an NGO, 
4 from think tanks (two from the German organization Adelphi in collaboration with 
the German Federal Foreign Office), and two from academic/online sources.  
 
The sample is limited in several respects. Firstly, it is Anglo- and Eurocentric and 
doesn’t take account of climate security discourses outside of these contexts (see, for 
example, Israeli climate security publications (Weinthal et al 2015)). This is 
symptomatic of climate security more broadly; Diez et al (2016:11) note the literature 
is ‘highly uneven’, ‘with a heavy focus on the US’. To contest this unevenness, Diez et 
al (2016) conduct a comparative study of climate security debates in the US, Germany, 
Turkey and Mexico. Given differences in my dataset, e.g. the numbers of texts in the 
sample and between different organizations, this project does not employ a 
comparative, quantitative approach. Instead, I focus on US data and use segments 
from the EU dataset where they are appropriate and contribute to important 
themes/arguments. Additionally, although the project is Anglo-centric, American 
actors are the largest and most powerful producers of climate security discourses (Diez 
et al 2016). Accepting the influence American actors carry (e.g. the Department of 
Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Reviews) and the possible exclusions or inequalities 
this suggests for climate-insecure futures and interventions, I argue it is important to 
study the US as a discursive context.  
 
Another limitation of the sample is its limited coverage of the diversity of American 
climate security politics. Firstly, whilst this project’s focus is climate security discourse 
at the national level in Washington, D.C. (though with documents reporting most often 
on international geopolitics), there have been state actions to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change, e.g. in California (California Climate Strategy 2016). Additionally, this 
research does not account for climate security debates and legislative proposals in 
Congress (the Senate and House of Representatives). To date, no comprehensive 
federal legislation has been passed on climate change (Diez et al 2016). However, 
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there have been several bills proposed and Congressional debates. For example, 
Bernie Sanders introduced the ‘Global Warming Pollution and Reduction Act’ in 2007 
which cites climate change as a national security issue; the Liebermann-Warner 
Climate Security Act was also proposed in 2007; and the Waxman-Markey American 
Clean Energy and Security Act was introduced in 2009 (Diez et al 2016). Although all of 
these bills utilize language couched in climate and energy security, none were passed 
into law. A successful example of legislation was the 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act (the legislative tool governing the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 
expenditures (US Congress 2008)). This includes a mandate for military planners to 
consider the implications of climate change for DOD facilities, capacities and missions, 
as well as a requirement to include information in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review and other proximate national security strategies (e.g. the 2010 National 
Security Strategy) about the consequences of climate change for DOD missions and 
plans (US Congress 2008: 288). In these two respects – state-level policies and 
Congressional debates and legislation (even if very little legislation has been passed) – 
the dissertation is restricted in its consideration of US climate security politics.  
 
As such, the sample is fundamentally limited in the extent to which it can cover the 
diversity of American climate security politics. As Diez et al (2016: 51) note, and as is 
reflected in the sample, ‘think tanks dominate the debate’ (more so than 
environmental NGOs and climate science bodies). This is for multiple reasons. One is 
that think tanks, for example the Center for Naval Analyses’ Military Advisory Board 
(CNA 2007), are often staffed by high-ranking military or governmental personnel and 
it is not uncommon for political officials to move between government and think tank 
positions. Also, often think tanks have good connections with politicians and the media 
and can provide an effective platform with which to promote a particular issue (Diez et 
al 2016). Crucially, this is not to draw political equivalence between different climate 
security actors in the unequal power relations of US climate security discourse. In a 
network analysis, Diez et al (2016: 55-6) find that US climate security discourses are 
primarily targeted at the defense sector and security-oriented think tanks (with the 
CNA, Center for a New American Security, DOD, Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy and 
Air Force all highly cited). Environmental organizations, for example the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), receive far fewer 
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citations. Congress and the White House receive many citations, but these are 
restricted to security policy; the UN and IPCC are also cited to a large degree, but 
primarily because climate security reports often contain a section on climate science 
(Diez et al 2016: 55). Particular individuals, e.g. Sherri Goodman, former Executive 
Director of the CNA’s Military Advisory Board (‘discursive entrepreneurs’ (Diez et al 
2016: 26)), are also important actors in the production of US climate security 
discourses. Given the unequal power relations these analyses suggest, the sample’s 
orientation towards think tanks and national security institutions does capture 
something of how powerful actors appropriate climate security. But, it is still limited 
(its Anglo-centrism and Eurocentrism, and lack of consideration of Congressional or 
state debates). These limitations hinder the project’s scope and coverage of climate 
security politics, but were based on pragmatic decisions about which 
organizations/institutions to cover and the research’s time constra ints.  
 
With these limitations in mind, the sample has provided for a productive CDA. Because 
it includes a large number of publications, this limits the extent to which I can provide 
an ingrained, detailed analysis of the production and reception of each individual 
report. Instead, I focused on landmark reports for contextual depth and otherwise 
tried to locate discursive trends (e.g. resilient American nationhood) within the 
political contexts of US and EU climate security. As the sample is restricted to a 
particular empirical backdrop, generalization is difficult if not impossible (Hammersley 
2003). A quantitative analysis – through comparison of a chosen example with a 
different linguistic corpus (group of texts) to test the statistical significance of above-
chance combinations of words (‘collocations’) – may produce more generalizable 
conclusions, but holds back qualitative examination of sociopolitical contexts (Baker et 
al 2008). Whereas the relative size of my sample means I could not pursue an in-depth 
investigation of each document’s provenance, it did facilitate for a contextual analysis 
of climate security discourse overall.  
 
2.3.2 Descriptive coding 
 
In October 2014, I started analyzing documents. This commenced until March 2015 
and EU documents were analysed from March-June 2015. They were ordered 
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according to organizations of authors and, within each of these clusters, analysed 
chronologically. First was descriptive coding. Cope (2003) recommends an inductive 
immersion into the texts (a ‘grounded theory’ approach unencumbered by prior 
hypotheses or preconceptions (Waitt 2010)). However, in practice a purely inductive 
approach is very difficult and the analyst always enters the process with some 
assumptions (Greener 2011). In my case, some descriptive codes emerged from the 
texts (e.g. ‘science’). Mostly, they were related to research questions (for example 
‘migration’, ‘determinism’ and ‘generalization’) and influenced by reading 
(‘geopolitics’). I read each text closely (several times where there were 
ambiguities/difficulties in understanding) and copied and pasted sections pertaining to 
these codes into Word documents. This meant that as I continued to read publications, 
long Microsoft Word files developed which catalogued highlighted excerpts from 
individual reports. For many excerpts, multiple codes overlapped (‘discursive knots’ 
(Jäger and Maier 2009)). In this scenario, the same excerpt would be copied into the 
corresponding file for each respective code. On occasion, this meant that several 
descriptive code files contained the same excerpts; although repetitive, this ensured 
every documentary reference to particular codes was accounted for. Descriptive code 
files were archived in a folder entitled ‘US discourse analysis’. A full list of US 
descriptive codes is provided in Table 1: 
 
Code name and Word 
file length 
Description 
Civilization-progress 
(17 pages) 
Refers to points in which a civilization narrative is 
adopted, references to ‘civilized’ or ‘uncivilized’ parts of 
the world, teleological narratives of civilization etc. 
Concept of 
security/anarchy (69 
pages) 
This code referred initially to moments in which 
conceptualizations of security were cited (definitions or 
typologies of security, e.g. ‘human’ or ‘environmental 
security’). This also includes  conceptions of ‘anarchy’, 
‘absences’ of security and changes to the ‘security 
environment’, as well as security and anarchy held 
together dichotomously.  
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Environmental 
determinism (16 
pages) 
Refers to moments where climatic changes are linked to 
changes in human behavior (through direct causation), 
e.g. violence/conflict, protest, or migration. It later 
evolved into an analytical, interpretive code (based on 
certainties about how people will react in climate-
insecure futures) described as a ‘compulsive 
determinism’ in Chapter 4 (section…). 
History-context (28 
pages) 
Used to describe citations of authors and organizations, 
legal and political contexts, and documents’ historical 
situation. 
Humanity (25 pages) Used to describe moments where ‘humanity’, 
‘humankind’ or ‘human beings’ are referred to as a 
collective. It is also linked to ‘human security’ concepts. 
Latent threat to the 
West-fortress 
metaphor/geopolitics 
(53 pages) 
Originally, this was used to describe a trend whereby the 
US is articulated in terms of external threats that could 
impact its interests or territories. It also encompassed 
representations of the US as an isolationist, defensive 
country: as ‘walled’, ‘fortressed’ etc. Later, this 
contributed to an analytical code to describe variations 
of ‘American exceptionalism’ (see Chapter 6, section 
6.2). However, as the analysis evolved, it gradually came 
to represent American ‘geopolitics’ more broadly; the 
United States’ position in a world of climate insecurities, 
possible world orders etc. 
Migration (54 pages) Refers to moments where human migration is discussed, 
including references to internal displacement, ‘climate 
refugees’, and international migration. 
Conflict (47 pages) Notes descriptions of climate change and conflict, 
historical relationships, resource scarcity, and relations 
between migration, livelihoods and conflict. 
Intervention (48 
pages) 
Documents moments where interventions are noted; it 
includes the need for military intervention, humanitarian 
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aid, financial commitments etc. 
Religion (20 pages) Refers to evocations of religions, religious activities, or 
religious identities.  
Othering (29 pages) Refers to specific instances of ‘Othering’ practices, 
whether of populations or explicit ‘Us/Them’ divisions. 
Overlaps with ‘civilization/progress’ and 
‘racialization/generalization’. 
Racialization/generali
zation (43 pages) 
Documents (interpreted) cases of 
generalization/naturalization of particular traits with 
certain population groups, e.g. of Muslim or African 
populations with terrorism.  
Science (15 pages) Notes references to climate science, especially in relation 
to the security implications of climate change impacts. 
Terrorism (32 pages) Refers to moments in US climate security where 
documents discuss terrorism and radicalization. Includes 
specific connections between climate change and these 
issues, and how climate security is situated in the War on 
Terror. 
US National Security 
(49 pages)  
Refers to US national security. This includes definitions, 
threats to national security, and actions taken to ensure 
national security in the face of climate change impacts. 
 
 
Table 1: US descriptive codes 
 
 
Descriptive codes changed as the CDA progressed and different themes became more 
or less prominent. For example, whereas ‘civilization’ discourses are referred to in 
earlier climate security literature (prior to 2011), this decreases in later documents. 
Similarly, the generalization/racialization themes are mainly found from 2003-10, as 
are narratives of American isolationism. This resulted in changes to some codes. For 
example, the ‘latent threat to the West’ expanded to encompass ‘geopolitics’: this 
reflects the fact that concepts of a defensive ‘America’ in climate-insecure futures 
remain important, but the range of representations diversifies over time. The most 
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consistent, enduring descriptive codes are those with the longest Microsoft Word files 
(e.g. ‘latent threat/geopolitics’, ‘migration’, ‘conflict’, ‘concepts of security/anarchy’ 
and ‘US national security’, see Table 1). Another reason for these variations relates to 
my practice with CDA and exposure to the data. Both Potter (1996) and Dittmer (2010) 
caution that discourse analysis is a difficult approach to use initially, with very few 
signposts. I found that as I continued to read publications and codes developed, this 
helped establish a more rigorous, consistent descriptive coding scheme. When it came 
to the EU discourse analysis (March 2015), the process was much smoother and this is 
reflected in Table 2:  
 
Code name and Word file 
length 
Description 
Civilization/progress (10 pages) Describes narratives of ‘civilization’, of 
‘civilized’ or ‘uncivilized’ parts of the world, 
and of ‘progress’. It also includes  teleological 
accounts of these themes. 
Concept of security/insecurity 
(41 pages) 
Refers to concepts of ‘security’ and 
‘insecurity’, definitions of ‘climate security’ 
etc. 
Environmental determinism (9 
pages) 
Describes deterministic language, e.g. drawing 
direct causal relations between climate 
impacts and violence. 
EU supranational security (39 
pages) 
Refers to concepts of ‘European’ or ‘EU’ 
security. This could be in relation to a 
collective notion of EU security, threats to EU 
security, its relationships with other securities 
(e.g. US national security or human security) 
etc.  
Generalization (13 pages) Notes moments where traits about 
populations appear to be naturalized, 
essentialized or generalized. It is broader than 
generalizations based on racialized identities. 
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Geopolitics (28 pages) Refers to ‘geopolitical’ themes in EU climate 
security documents, discussions about how 
the EU is seen in international politics, its place 
in ‘world orders’, etc. 
History-context (19 pages) Refers to moments where dimensions of 
historical or political contexts are raised, e.g. 
authorship, organizations’ ideologies , 
information about the production and 
reception of the text, or about the broader 
political context.  
Humanity (11 pages) This refers to collective representations of 
‘humanity’, ‘humankind’ etc. It ties in to 
concepts of ‘human security’. 
Migration (34 pages) Cites climate-induced migration, migration in 
general, ‘climate refugees’, internal 
displacement, international migration etc.  
Conflict (17 pages) References to climate change and conflict. 
Intervention (23 pages) Refers to discussions of intervention, e.g. 
humanitarian intervention, diplomacy, or 
military interventions. 
Othering (12 pages) Refers to evidence of ‘Othering’, drawing 
‘Us’/’Them’ divides between different groups . 
Religion (8 pages) Describes different religions, religion as a 
category, or religious identities. 
Science (12 pages) Notes discussions of climate science and its 
connections to climate security. 
Terrorism (11 pages) Refers to terrorism, both in terms of its 
connections to climate change and the 
broader political context, e.g. the War on 
Terror. 
 
Table 2: EU descriptive codes 
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Many EU codes are similar to US counterparts, e.g. ‘religion’, ‘migration’ and 
‘intervention’, but more coherently delineated as my practice with CDA as a method 
improved. For example, ‘concepts of security/anarchy’ became ‘concepts of 
security/insecurity’ to reflect the broader conceptual scope of ‘insecurity’. ‘Latent 
threat to the US’ becomes ‘geopolitics’ to mirror the variety of geopolitical 
representations. ‘Racialization/generalization’ becomes ‘generalization’ to indicate the 
multiple ways in which populations can be generalized in climate security. The smaller 
sample explains why less time was devoted to the EU CDA (March-June) than the US 
CDA (October-March). Whilst my method of archiving codes did create cumbersome 
Microsoft Word files, it did help spot trends in the data. To investigate this further, and 
as a stepping-stone between descriptive and analytical codes, I conduced a textual 
analysis of the data in each Microsoft Word file (each file representative of a different 
descriptive code). This was done as I read the reports and they were descriptively 
coded. If I found a relevant segment in the report, I would copy and paste this into the 
Word file for the corresponding code(s) and read this more closely to examine its 
linguistic features. The textual analysis is described in further detail in section 2.3.3. 
 
2.3.3 Textual analysis 
 
For the textual analysis, I utilized Norman Fairclough’s (2003) guidance of what to look 
for in how language is used. This involves semantic relations between words and texts: 
how do word meanings change? How do particular meanings (e.g. ‘climate security’) 
change in different contexts? Grammar, for example sentence structure or verb tense, 
is also important. Pragmatics and sub-textual relations are also significant, including 
arguments’ underlying assumptions, inconsistencies or contradictions, implicit 
statements and inter-textual correspondences in meaning (Fairclough 2003). 
Underlying assumptions could refer to value systems or assertions of ‘objectivity’, 
representations about what is ‘true’, what is possible, or what is axiomatic or 
necessary. For representations of social actors, Fairclough (2003: 145) suggests several 
useful features for investigation. First are mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion (with two 
types of exclusion (‘suppression’, in which an actor/subject is not in the text at all, or 
‘backgrounding’, where they are mentioned, but need to be inferred more regularly in 
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the text)). Waitt (2010: 236) seconds this, noting the importance of ‘silences’ and 
which voices are heard/not heard. Second are pronominal choices: is the actor realized 
as a pronoun (‘I’, ‘we’, or ‘you’) or as a noun? Does pronoun usage indicate an 
Othering or ‘Us/Them’ dynamic? Third are grammatical roles in which actors are 
referenced, the active or passive tense. This relates to the active/passive positioning of 
the social actor: are they the person with agency, or affected by others’ actions? Are 
actors classified and are there hierarchical designations within these classifications, or 
between them? Modality is also important (Fairclough 2003). Are modal verbs used to 
indicate strength of commitment to statements or possibilities (‘may’, ‘might’, ‘could’ 
or ‘should’)? Are modal adjectives used (e.g. ‘possible’ or ‘probable’)? The genre of 
text matters too, with different textual choices for a political speech, policy report, 
webpage etc. Hammersley (2003: 763) argues discourse analysis is too preoccupied 
with rhetoric to the extent the author is reclassified as ‘Homo Rhetoricus’. However, 
US and EU climate security discourse stretches beyond political speeches or policy 
reports to incorporate academic texts and other forms. I argue these are all relevant 
questions and investigative tools to explore the unequal power dynamics of US and EU 
climate security discourses and their relations to possible climate-insecure futures.  
 
For each copied-pasted excerpt from the texts in the CDA sample (pasted into its 
respective Word file for the relevant code), I read through it several times. I noted 
arguments and assumptions, significant linguistic features (and their 
meanings/arguments), and whose voices are present in the text (including authorial 
voices) and whose may be absent/excluded. If any patterns developed, I noted these 
down and references to any academic/theoretical literature that could inform the 
analysis. For relevant methodological points, I typed these up in a separate Word 
document akin to a computerized research diary. As a brief example, I include an 
excerpt from The Age of Consequences: The Foreign and National Security Implications 
of Climate Change (Campbell et al 2007). Stylistically, this is one of several long quotes 
used as evidence in the thesis. Whilst burdensome at times, I argue it is an important 
strategy to include detailed quotations in order to more accurately contextualize and 
situate the authors’ claims and my interpretations of these claims. The Age of 
Consequences is a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the 
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Center for a New American Security. Speculating on connections between climate 
change and terrorism, Campbell et al (2007: 82 and 87) write: 
 
‘Another growing threat also holds out the possibility of mass 
damage and loss of life in this century: religiously-rooted 
terrorism. The scope of death and destruction sought by the 
perpetrators of this sort of terrorism is also something most 
people find difficult to envision. This chapter later addresses 
terrorism (a “malevolent” rather than “malignant” problem such 
as climate change) because of a somewhat surprising confluence: 
the aspects of our energy systems that help create the risk of 
climate change also create vulnerabilities that terrorists bent on 
massive destruction are likely to target.  
 
‘Our society, our way of life, and our liberty face series current 
challenges beyond the infrastructure fragility exacerbated by 
climate change. The most salient is attack by terrorist groups or an 
enemy state, or a combination thereof, aimed at massive damage 
and massive casualties. These are not unintentional “malignant” 
results of our habitual behavior but are rather “malevolent” and 
planned carefully by those who want to do far more than many 
terrorist groups in the past: namely, to destroy our entire 
civilization and way of life.’ 
 
 
In both of these segments, collective pronouns are used repeatedly to show the threat 
of climate change and terrorism to the American nation. A range of semantic 
constructions is also used to reinforce this connection, e.g. ‘our society’, ‘our way of 
life’, ‘our liberty’ and ‘our entire civilization’. The repetition of the collective, 
possessive pronoun ‘our’ and semantic choices associated with American nationhood 
(e.g. ‘way of life’ and ‘liberty’) construct an image of a collective American nation 
threatened by terrorism and climate change. The lexical choices in these excerpts are 
also informative. For example, the physical geographic term ‘confluence’ reinforces 
the notion of two ideas from different sources intersecting in potentially dangerous, 
surprising and processual ways. The modal noun ‘possibility’ also orients climate 
change and terrorism linkages to climate-insecure futures. Fascinatingly, whereas the 
label ‘malevolent’ endows terrorism with a particular evil intent, ‘malignant’ suggests 
something developing incrementally and could be ‘unintentional’. The term 
‘malignant’ also carries connotations  of biological contagion or virulence, linked to the 
use of racialized fertility metaphors to describe terrorism in moments of climate 
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security discourse (see chapter 5, section 5.5). As this brief example shows, I explored 
a range of textual features (modality, lexis, semantics etc.) in relation to how American 
nationhood and racialized metaphors are constructed in climate security. By no means 
were all excerpts as detailed as this (and some were more instructive), but it does 
reflect on the productiveness of a textual analysis to understand the grounded 
linguistic, material forms which make discursive representations, rules and meanings 
possible.  
 
2.3.4 Analytical coding and contextual analysis 
 
The textual analysis took varying amounts of time for each excerpt. At the end of the 
process for both US and EU sources (June 2015), I had compiled 15 long Word 
documents, one for each descriptive code. Within these documents were all of the 
excerpts for these codes alongside information from the textual analysis. From June-
mid November, I worked on the ‘analysis’ stage of the CDA and produced analytic 
codes. This involved reading through the Word files in more detail to investigate 
emergent trends/themes. There were two important facets to this. First was that 
documents were read together and collectively. This meant that descriptive codes 
weren’t treated as isolated discursive silos, but in relation to one another, with many 
crosscutting themes. Second is that the reading was selective. With a large amount of 
material (545 pages for US codes, and 287 for EU codes (832 in total)), although I read 
through the data several times, focus was directed towards the most prevalent trends, 
those codes most relevant to my research questions, and interesting, unexpected 
findings with analytic promise.  
 
First, I focused on questions of racial identity and Othering and amalgamated elements 
from several codes, including ‘Othering’, ‘determinism’, ‘religion’ (all small codes), as 
well as ‘generalization’, ‘migration’, ‘geopolitics’ and ‘terrorism’. Several things stood 
out. First is that ‘migration’ and ‘terrorism’ are key themes for racialization in US 
climate security. Geographically, climate-induced migration from Africa to the EU is a 
prominent example in earlier publications (2003-10). From this analysis, I produced a 
series of analytical codes under the heading of ‘racial logics and climate-induced 
migration’. These included racialization based on a latent tendency towards radicalized 
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violence and inherent cultural incompatibility, discussions of climate-induced 
migration in terms of dehumanizing geopolitical labels (‘waves’, ‘reverberations’ etc.), 
and a trend towards determinism governed by assumptions about certainty or near 
certainty in climate-insecure futures. Second, I analysed American nationhood in 
climate security and produced several analytic codes. These include a discursive strand 
of ‘climate resilience’, another towards  defensive US nationhood, and a trend towards 
human security. Working from the racial logics chapter, I also decided to focus on the 
theme of terrorism/radicalization in climate security. From this, analytic codes of anti -
Americanism (and its relationship to humanitarian intervention), a terrorism and 
climate change binary, and narratives of complex causality emerged. At the end of 
November 2015, I produced a full plan for the thesis. It would include three empirical 
chapters, one on racial logics and climate-induced migration, one on US nationhood, 
and a bridging empirical chapter between racial and national identities on terrorism in 
climate security discourse.  
 
Throughout the CDA, two important methodological limitations persisted. One relates 
to an unequal alignment of power relations in my favour throughout the research 
(Jäger and Maier 2009). Throughout the CDA, power relations gravitated unequally in 
my favour as the researcher. I selected the sample and chose which descriptive codes 
would be used to organize the analysis. After this, I decided which theoretical tools to 
utilize – e.g. critical race studies and critical nationalism scholarship – and on the 
particular interpretation of different quotations and underlying assumptions of 
documents. My position as a sole English speaker limited the extent to which I could 
engage with texts from climate security contexts outside of the US and UK/EU. This is 
reflected in the strong contingent of UK government departments and organizations in 
the EU CDA (e.g. E3G and the Ministry of Defense). CDA also risks the positioning of me 
as a researcher ‘outside’ of the texts, able to ‘survey’ climate security discourse from a 
distanced position, ‘select’ texts for analysis, ‘choose’ the interpretive lens applied to 
these, and ‘write up’ the analysis in ‘my own’ words, what Paasi (2006: 217) terms 
‘geopolitical remote sensing’. He (2006: 217) writes of an emerging tendency in critical 
geopolitics to ‘accentuate the value of deconstruction, discourse analysis, or the 
critical analysis of representations so that the use of these textual strategies often took 
place “at a distance” and “out of context.”’ This distance, with its assumptions of a 
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‘here’ (my position as a researcher ‘outside’ of the texts), ‘there’ (the ‘texts’ or ‘field’) 
and autonomous researcher capable of understanding their ‘position’, risks evacuating  
‘the field’ of power relations and situated-ness altogether and, as Rose (1997) argues, 
replicating Harraway’s (1988) ‘god-trick’.  
 
It could be that CDA is particularly susceptible to this problem because the research 
subject does not refer to specific individuals, but instead to texts. It could be that if 
unequal power relations are more readily apparent in methods involving interpersonal 
interactions, this is less the case with CDA where the research subjects/objects are 
texts and the closest alternative is their ‘author’. The distance this creates – between 
the researcher, the text (with its multitude of possible interpretations), and the 
author/organizations behind the text and potential readers – influences power 
relations in several ways. In one way, it highlights a particularly acute inequality in 
political dynamics, where I as the researcher exercise unchallenged control over the 
selection and interpretation of texts (with a greater distance between the producer of 
the data and I as its interpreter and no immediate ‘right of reply’ on behalf of authors). 
However, in another way this replicates the distance critiqued above and obfuscates 
the power dynamics behind texts and my implication as a researcher in this process.  
 
As a partial solution to this, Dittmer (2010) notes it is important to situate texts in their 
political contexts. As with textual analysis, there is little guidance about how this is 
conducted. Gill (1996: 155) writes that ‘all discourse is occasioned: there are no trans -
historical, transcultural, universal accounts except those that might be produced by 
the ‘universality’ of the research context.’ However, she provides no information about 
how to investigate the ways in which all discourse is ‘occasioned’. I followed Waitt’s 
(2010: 225) technique of ‘familiarization’. This involves conducting background 
research on the texts, their authorship, their technological medium, audience and 
reception. Key questions include: when and how were the texts produced? Does the 
author have a particular ideological perspective? How does the audience engage with 
the text? How is it stored? For these questions, the ‘history-context’ descriptive code 
proved to be invaluable (see Tables 1 and 2). It provided me with a direct source of 
information about the authors and their in-text biographies, links to think tanks and 
departments producing reports, and information about the political and legal contexts 
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behind each report’s mandate. Contextual analysis also operates at multiple scales. As 
well as background information for each report, I attempted to situate it in its broader 
political and historical context. This involved examination of reports in relation to 
broader shifts in US climate security, for example a shift from defensive 
representations of American nationhood (2003-10) to an emphasis on climate 
resilience and human security (2010-15). Contextual analysis also required situation in 
US political debates related to but distinct from climate security, for example highly 
polarized Congressional climate politics and the geopolitics of the War on Terror. For 
the chapter on climate-induced migration, it required broader situation in the politics 
of migration from Africa to the EU and academic debates on climate-induced 
migration, for example the ‘climate refugee’ and ‘migration-as-adaptation’ discourses.  
 
Throughout the CDA, I tried to emphasize the situation of US climate security both at 
the level of background to individual publications and the broader historical and 
geographical context of American politics. However, although this larger scale and 
‘meso-scale’ of contextual analysis can be approached in CDA, it is more difficult to 
ascertain the micro-scale politics of each text’s production and reception. This includes 
debates among authors about which aspects to prioritize, omissions and 
administrative procedures of drafting/editing/finalizing the report. How is the 
readership(s) targeted? What are the outcomes of dissemination? These contextual 
questions are difficult to reach with CDA, a method dominated by interrogation at the 
scale of the text. To assist with this limitation, I used semi-structured interviews as a 
supplement to the CDA.  
 
2.4 Semi-structured interviews 
 
2.4.1 Methodological justification  
 
Semi-structured interviews were used for two reasons. First is as a more detailed 
means to support the CDA’s contextual analysis. To illustrate this point, I draw upon an 
example. Although the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA 2007: 3) report lists individual 
members of the Military Advisory Board, there is relatively little information provided 
about how the MAB was initially formed (e.g. the role of former MAB Executive 
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Director and DOD employee Sherri Goodman (Diez et al 2016)). Whilst it is possible to 
find information about the MAB’s historical context from online sources (e.g. CNA 
2016), there are few details about specific mechanisms (meetings, forms of 
communications etc.) Interviews with climate security professionals based in 
Washington, D.C. provided a partial means through which to address this problem and 
gain a more detailed contextual insight. Although brief and partial, this example 
indicates means through which semi-structured interviews provided important and 
supporting contextual depth to the CDA. Indeed, though the thesis does draw on 
interview testimony in relation to Hurricane Katrina and American national identity 
(chapter 6, section 6.5.1), all but one of the citations from the dataset originates from 
the CDA. As such, this contextual role for the semi-structured interviews – for situation 
of the project in American climate security politics – was a fundamental underpinning 
justification for this methodology. One limitation to using semi-structured interviews in 
this manner – and, by implication, to my research timetable – was that in conducting 
semi-structured interviews before the CDA (September 2014), this constrained the 
extent to which I could follow up with contextual questions arising from the CDA. 
However, whilst this question of timing did hinder contextual analysis, I had already 
engaged in readings of important climate security publications beforehand (when 
applying for the ESRC scholarship, during my Masters course, and during the first year 
of the PhD). This preparation helped to provide some contextual questions and 
mitigate the scheduling limitation to a certain extent.  
 
As a rich and revelatory method (Winchester 1996), one which allows participants to 
explicate their own social circumstances, opinions and lived worlds (Kvale 2006), I also 
deemed interviews to be an instructive means to build an ingrained, proximate picture 
of climate security politics. Semi-structured interviews also provided a means of 
‘triangulating’ my findings (Baxter and Eyles 1997): they would add an extra source of 
information to the overall dataset and means to corroborate/dispute results from the 
CDA. This is not to argue that the CDA and interview data fold seamlessly into one 
repository of information. Although the same descriptive codes were applied to 
interview transcripts, they are a fundamentally different kind of linguistic data (one 
textual, the other conversational) with unique sociolinguistic characteristics 
(Fairclough 2003). As such, whereas I explored discursive representations/meanings 
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for both types of data, I did not apply the same rules of textual analysis to the 
interview transcripts.  
 
2.4.2 Sampling procedure for semi-structured interviews 
 
I adopted a purposive sampling strategy to select potential interviewees. Whilst this 
doesn’t subscribe to a positivist ideal of random population selection (Greener 2011), 
the research required pragmatism. McDowell (1998: 2315) acknowledges this, and 
writes that ‘the reality … is a lot messier. A great deal depends on luck and chance, 
connections and networks, and the particular circumstances at the time.’ Initially, I 
drew up a list of potential interviewees. These were from government departments 
and think tanks, environmental justice organizations, environmental NGOs and 
religious groups. For large organizations with no contact details, I used the ‘Contact us’ 
section on their websites. For think tanks, I focused on those with staff linked to 
climate security debates, with climate/environmental security divisions, and those 
devoted entirely to environmental or climate security concerns. Similarly, I contacted 
government offices on the basis that their competencies related to climate 
security/environmental/climate change issues. The reason for contacting 
organizations/individuals outside of ‘climate security’ was to build a wider coalition of 
perspectives on constructions of American identity and climate change. In May/June 
2014, as my Progression Review was completed, I emailed prospective participants. 
With a US fieldtrip in September 2014, establishing contact 3-4 months in advance was 
an important step. Cormode and Hughes (1999) agree, arguing that professional 
interviewees often have busy schedules. I sent out an initial scoping email and 
interview request. In general, I received a positive response, with most respondents 
open to an interview. I travelled to the US for a three-week fieldtrip from 1st-22nd 
September 2014. The first week (1st-8th) was spent in New York (with several 
environmental organizations and think tanks based there). However, with a majority of 
think tanks, government departments and NGOs headquartered in Washington, D.C., I 
spent two weeks there (8th-22nd September). 21 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in total. 3 took place in New York and 18 in Washington, D.C. (a full list of 
anonymised US and EU interviews, including interviewees with pseudonyms if cited in 
the thesis, is provided in Appendix B).  
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15 interviews took place in person (in locations chosen by the interviewee), 5 by 
telephone, and 1 as an email discussion (I distributed a Word document to the 
interviewee with questions and she completed this before emailing back). Interviews 
ranged in length from 30 minutes to just under 3 hours. With the exception of 
telephone interviews (with a poor loudspeaker the Dictaphone could not capture), all 
interviews were recorded. 19 of 21 interviews were conducted with a single person; of 
the others, 1 was conducted with 2 people and the other with 3 staff members. I also 
kept notes of interesting developments in interviews, e.g. shifts in tone/body 
language, and used ‘snowballing’ to ask interviewees for any individuals they 
recommended I get in touch with.  
 
2.4.3 The interview process 
 
I drew up a list of general themes but kept this as open as possible to allow 
interviewees to freely construct their own accounts of US climate security. The 
purpose of a thematic list was to guide the discussion and ask interviewees about 
particular dimensions of climate security, but not prescribe a set of closed questions. 
This allowed interviewees to reflect on specific questions, draw up their own detailed, 
subjective accounts, and for complementary, follow-up questions to interesting points 
(Rapley 2001). Following Dexter’s (2006) advice, I started each interview with a broad, 
general question to situate the discussion. This asked interviewees to describe the 
‘current landscape of climate change politics in the US as they see it’. The second 
question would locate the research specifically, asking respondents ‘what the  term 
climate security means to them’. After these questions, although there were some 
themes I tried to discuss in each interview, e.g. migration, American nationhood and 
climate security politics, themes were based on preparatory research. A fuller list of 
themes raised in interviews is provided in Appendix C. Before each discussion, I would 
spend several hours reading up on interviewees’ career biographies and writings 
(academic articles, newspaper pieces, online blogs etc.) and select relevant topics to 
include. Overall, this meant that the list of questions/themes tended to differ 
depending on individual meetings.  
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Interviews are laden with unequal power relations (Tarrant 2014). Researchers often 
determine the scope and content of the project, direct the trajectory of interviews, 
control interpretation of findings and dissemination outlets (Kvale 2006). For the most 
part Washington, D.C. based professionals employed by national or international think 
tanks, NGOs or federal government departments, it could be argued my interviewees 
constitute ‘elite’ informants. Whilst power relations lean towards the researcher in 
some respects (e.g. management of the project), it is a case of ‘studying up’ in others 
(Smith 2006). However, the term ‘elite’ should be approached with caution. Smith 
(2006) argues it depends on a structural concept of power ‘possessed’ by elite actors. 
This assumes first that elites are discrete categories of ‘powerful people’ 
distinguishable from ‘non-elites’, and second it presumes that power bestowed upon 
professionals will transfer into the interview space (because they ‘hold’ and can 
inscribe power as such) (Smith 2006). Woods (1998) shares this critique, underlining 
that a structural conception of ‘elites’ depends on a clearly stratified, vertical model of 
society, doesn’t account for the shifting power relations and multiplicity of elites 
(changing members, boundaries, social status etc.), and doesn’t take note of the 
discursive/social construction of particular elite groups. For these reasons, I follow 
Smith’s (2006: 646) lead in not using the term ‘elites’ to describe the project’s 
interviewees. They are referred to as ‘climate security professionals’, ‘climate change 
professionals’ or ‘environmental activists’ throughout; this recognizes their 
occupational status (often embedded in influential networks), but refuses to 
pigeonhole individuals into a homogenized category of ‘elite’ or ‘elite actors’.  
 
Largely, interviewees occupied research or policy positions in Washington, D.C. Many 
had rotated professional positions in their careers. Power dynamics were in their 
favour in choosing to grant me an interview and the opportunity to share their 
expertise. However, in most cases, interviewees made no explicit attempt to enforce a 
hierarchical position or superiority. Often with backgrounds as researchers, with 
Masters or PhD qualifications and cognizant of current academic literatures, 
interviewees would frequently attach value to academic research and empathize with 
the idiosyncrasies of fieldwork (Herod 1999). Some interviewees sympathized with the 
more monotonous features of academic work (e.g. transcription), and others asked if 
they had provided sufficient answers to questions (e.g. ‘I don’t know if that’s what you 
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wanted’ or ‘I don’t know if that answers your question’). While this contributed to a 
more relaxed, equitable exchange as researchers, it also reinforced an unequal power 
relation in my favour: interviewees might have perceived the discussion as an 
instrumentalized process about what they could give me as the PhD researcher (Kvale 
2006).  
 
Along with academic status, McDowell (2010) highlights that identity markers, e.g. 
gender or age, can inflect an interview’s power dynamics. In the US, cross -cultural 
Anglo-American identifiers became an interesting marker of difference. This wasn’t 
only related to differences in national identity – between the US and UK – but more 
specifically the nuances of Washington, D.C. politics. For example, prior to traveling to 
Washington, D.C., although I had read about American politics, I was relatively 
unfamiliar with terms such as ‘the Beltway’, and the wide range of acronyms, e.g. ‘EJ’ 
for environmental justice, used in environmental policy circles. In all cases, 
interviewees were warm and engaging. This dynamic also applied to interviews with 
multiple participants. Although both discussions could be considered too small to be 
focus groups (with 2 and 3 discussants respectively (Pratt 2009)), there is relatively 
little research on the dynamics of group interviews (Heaphy and Einarsdottir 2013). At 
risk of one participant leading the conversation and unsettling the interview’s power 
dynamic, Bjørnholt and Farstad (2012) dispute this and argue a group interview can 
enrich conversational output as each participant adds to the other’s commentary. In 
practice, both group interviews were convivial encounters. The first, with three 
respondents from an environmental NGO, was constructive with each interviewee 
taking turns to elaborate their views on a particular theme and follow this up with 
comments to corroborate/contest their colleagues’ answers. The second, with two 
climate security interviewees at a Washington, D.C. think tank, operated in a similarly 
collegiate manner.  
 
Whilst my original intention was to transcribe all interviews in October after returning 
to the UK, the timescale required for this and a range of other activities (the CDA, 
teaching responsibilities etc.) made this ambition unrealistic. Instead, I committed to 
spend 2 hours of every working day on transcription and the remainder on other tasks. 
Although I didn’t always meet this target, it remained largely consistent throughout 
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the academic year (2014-15). I used F5 transcription software that, with its integrated 
audio-transcription mechanism and ‘pause’ button, made the process more efficient. 
The same set of descriptive codes was utilized as for the CDA (see Tables 1 and 2), and 
I read each transcript several times in the coding process. Transcripts, with full stops 
enclosed by brackets ‘(.)’ to indicate pauses and two dashes ‘//’ for an interruption, 
were saved as Word documents and the Tracker function was used to highlight 
relevant segments of transcripts, code these and make accompanying notes. These 
were read alongside the CDA’s analytical codes from June-November 2015 to identify 
common points of interest, disagreements, and important contextual details.  
 
2.4.4 Interpretation of interview data 
 
As Kvale (2006: 485) states, interviewers conventionally hold a ‘monopoly of 
interpretation’ over interviewee statements. This means that while there may be 
contestation over truth claims, the researcher maintains privilege over how this is 
interpreted and which theoretical schemas attend to it (Kvale 2006). Hammersley 
(2014: 530) cautions that this is especially acute for critical research, where ‘what 
those informants say who are regarded as representing, or being implicated in … 
dominant practices is especially likely to be subject to negative evaluation in terms of 
its veracity, implications, functions, etc.’ I agree with Hammersley (2014) that critical 
research can lean towards an especially critical take on datasets, and that it is selective 
(necessarily so as it focuses on social inequalities (Fairclough 2003)), but I disagree that 
it is always preoccupied with ‘dominant practices’, or that criticism is invariably 
distorted towards a negative evaluation. Critical research is undertaken with a wide 
range of inequalities and injustices, and is not always committed to critiquing every 
aspect of established social systems and ideologies. In this project, I have always 
attempted to include a substantive amount of contextualized evidential sources and 
theoretically rigorous interpretations to support my arguments. There are no claims to 
generalization – the phrase ‘context-specific moments of US climate security discourse’ 
is a frequent fixture of the thesis – and I stress these are partial, specific strands in 
limited time periods of American climate security discourse. My argument is about 
how naturalized assumptions are constructed in relation to climate-insecure futures. 
This is especially pertinent in a supposedly American ‘postracial society’, in which the 
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‘key conditions of social life are less and less predicated on racial preferences, choices, 
and resources’, despite the continued persistence of racism, racist expressions and 
racialization (Goldberg 2015: 1). In this context, of a ‘postraciality’, a social condition 
‘close to, or ought to be living outside of debilitating racial difference’ (Goldberg 2015: 
2-3), it is especially important to study the underlying logics through which racial 
identities are essentialized and racial inequalities persist. I argue logics help explain the 
ways in which underlying, hidden assumptions, premises and associations facilitate 
construction of naturalized racial and national identities. They provide an additional 
analytic through which to challenge essentialized identities  in context-specific 
moments of US and EU climate security discourse. 
 
As a final precaution in the interview transcription and interpretation/analysis stages, I  
have tried to ensure that interviewees’ identities remained anonymous and their data 
is treated confidentially throughout. Transcripts are stored on a university computer 
and a memory stick, both password-protected. Each (cited) interviewee is accorded a 
pseudonym and this is applied accordingly in the thesis. Aside from using relatively 
well-known English language names (in the US and UK), there are no specific rules or 
strategies for anonymization. Referring to interviewees’ contexts, I have tried to keep 
this as general as possible without hampering necessary contextual information. As 
such, respondents are referred to as ‘climate security professionals’, ‘environmental 
activists’ and so forth. Pseudonyms are not watertight, especially with a specific, well-
networked group of individuals and the sophistication of online search engines (Tilley 
and Woodthorpe 2011). However, I have always referred to individuals with generic – 
if not completely decontextualized – labels and also interpret the dataset as a 
collective, historically situated corpus at different points in the thesis. Before 
concluding the chapter, I discuss briefly the EU segment of fieldwork.  
 
2.5 EU fieldwork and semi-structured interviews 
 
One of the methodology’s focal points in the Progression Panel Review (June 2014) 
was the need to think about more ingrained, experiential methods beyond textual 
materials. My reviewers suggested a period of ethnographic fieldwork with a climate 
security-focused institution to address this limitation. Because the fieldtrip in the US 
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was already in motion at this point, I decided to use the period for semi-structured 
interviews with EU representatives, in March-April 2015, to scope possibilities for 
ethnographic fieldwork. Kuus (2013) is skeptical of such possibilities for foreign 
policymakers and civil servants. Whereas it is possible to examine the impacts of 
foreign policies, she (2013) remarks it is much more difficult to study the dynamics of 
institutions in which they are formed. Public relations departments are well versed in 
how to deal with researchers, they will often only be provided with surface glimpses or 
the ‘party line’ of institutions, and forging relationships with employees is very difficult  
as they are constantly on rotation (Kuus 2013). Kuus (2013) concludes that 
ethnographic fieldwork may not be the most appropriate approach for foreign 
policymakers, and in fact that most work (with foreign policymakers) described as 
‘ethnographic’ is predominantly interview and documentary analysis based.  
 
Mindful of Kuus’ (2013) contentions, I began to contact EU institutions and think tanks 
in October-November 2014 about a fieldwork period in March-April 2015. Whilst most 
institutions did reply and couldn’t accommodate this type of fieldwork – citing lack of 
office space and staff – the majority offered an interview with a staff member in 
replacement. However, one organization offered me the opportunity to work from 
their office, interview staff members, and collaborate in organizational activities. I 
wouldn’t be allowed to take ethnographic notes of institutional politics and meetings, 
but would be allowed to use their office as a base to complete the EU CDA and 
interview climate security professionals from EU institutions, agencies and affiliated 
think tanks. In total, this resulted in one month resident with the think tank as an 
‘intern’ (18th March-20th April) and a three-day trip to Brussels in April 2015 to conduct 
interviews. In total, I conducted 17 interviews in this period (listed anonymously in 
Appendix B).  
 
My positionality differed with EU interviewees. Nationality was an important feature, 
especially in discussions of British Euroscepticism and the (then) forthcoming ‘Brexit’ 
referendum (23rd June, 2016). Often, this led to interviewees asking for my thoughts 
on the UK context, the referendum, and its relations with climate security (especially 
as the UK is an important site of climate security discourse). As with the CDA, I was 
limited by a lack of linguistic diversity. With English as my first language, I was unable 
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to carry out interviews in other European languages. It could be that some of the 
intricacies of climate security politics in different Member States, e.g. Germany, France 
or the Netherlands, were lost due to my lack of ability to converse in more than one 
language.  
 
After returning to the UK, I followed the same procedure of transcribing interviews for 
a few hours each day. EU derived interview transcripts were coded using the same 
descriptive codes as the EU CDA. As I carried out the analys is and analytical codes 
emerged, I decided to move away from EU identity – itself too broad a topic for a 
single empirical chapter – and focus instead on a single theme, terrorism in climate-
security discourse. Consequently, the EU dataset is only used in limited, very specific 
capacities in the thesis. This is as a support for the chapters on terrorism and climate-
induced migration. The primary case study for the latter is climate-induced migration 
from North Africa to the EU and the analytical codes ‘geopolitics’ and ‘migration’ have 
been very important for this section. However, this leaves a whole tranche of EU 
material unused. In one way, this is inevitable: given the substantial size of the dataset 
and millions of words involved, any write-up is only going to draw upon a small 
percentage of available materials. The internship also proved to be an immensely 
valuable experience. It provided an excellent platform to better comprehend the 
complexities of climate security politics in a think tank context and its interconnections 
with other institutional backdrops. Despite its limited uptake in the dissertation’s 
output of empirical chapters, EU fieldwork contributed substantially to its 
development.  
 
Overall, I hope this chapter has provided some methodological, personal and political 
contextual details (both the power relations of climate security and my imbrication 
within these as a researcher) to situate the thesis’ questions and objectives. Working 
from these methodological foundations – a critical discourse analysis grounded in a 
material, embedded concept of discourse, and semi-structured interviews with climate 
change professionals in the US and EU contexts – the thesis next illustrates their 
application to the project’s theoretical and empirical contexts. I begin by outlining a 
theoretical framework grounded specifically in the contingent constitution of racial 
and national identities in climate security discourse, essentializing logics held in 
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relation to possible climate-insecure futures and constitutive of unequal biopolitics. 
Subsequently, chapters 4 (on racial logics and climate-induced migration), 5 
(interconnections of terrorism and climate change), and 6 (representations of 
American nationhood) explore the interrelations of these methodological and 
theoretical frameworks with the project’s empirical contexts.  
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Chapter 3: 
Essentializing logics in US and EU climate security 
discourse: a theoretical framework 
 
3.1 Introduction and research questions 
 
1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security 
discourse?  
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed 
in and through US and EU climate security discourse? 
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security 
discourse?  
 
Following from the broad contours of the project’s methodology and historical 
development, I now move on to introduce the theoretical and empirical analyses that 
define the thesis. To begin, this chapter outlines an overarching theoretical framework, 
inspired by several strands of social theory, used to interpret and understand my 
empirical data. Most fundamentally, the theoretical framework is grounded in anti-
essentialist cultural identities – framed through Edward Said’s (1994) work (section 
3.2). I then develop a particular, context-specific interpretation of American climate 
security that is biopolitical, grounded in discursive power-knowledge relations, and 
incorporates essentializing logics that orient racial and national identities towards 
possible climate-insecure futures. The biopolitical is inspired by Foucault’s biopolitics 
and Didier Fassin’s (2009) ‘bio-legitimacy’ (sections 3.3 and 3.4). I focus on discursive 
constructions in which particular lives and populations, delimited by nationhood and 
racialization, are valued differently to others in climate-insecure futures. Power-
knowledge is situated in Foucault’s (1977) conceptualization of power relations and a 
conception of discourse adapted from Bialasiewicz et al (2007) and David Campbell’s 
(1998 (1992)) understanding of security (sections 3.5 and 3.6). Subsequently, I argue 
essentializing logics (bringing together different frameworks from Stuart Hall’s (1996) 
and Ben Anderson’s (2010a) works in a particular, limited way (see sections 3.7 and 
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3.8)) provide an appropriate analytics to explore how biopolitical climate securities – in 
particular, partial and context-specific moments – discursively appropriate racial and 
national identities in climate-insecure futures. Finally, the chapter reflects on how Sara 
Ahmed’s (2002) work on ‘otherness’ and Sara Koopman’s (2011) ‘alter-geopolitics’ 
could contribute to more situated accounts of environmental justices and securities 
(section 3.9). First and foremost, however, I begin with Edward Said’s theorizations of 
anti-essentialist cultural differences. 
 
3.2 Said’s anti-essentialism 
 
There are many traditions of anti-essentialist thought. Writing from a cultural studies 
and critical race studies perspective, Stuart Hall (2002: 145) postulates that 
essentialized, fixed logics of identity are ‘for good or ill, finished’. He (2002: 145-146) 
contends that ideas of a continuous, self-sufficient ‘self’, and of collective, 
homogenous identities (‘race’, ‘class’, ‘gender’, ‘nation’, etc.), spatially organized and 
differentiated by boundaries of self and other, inside and outside, are being ‘de-
centred’ by critical social theories (e.g. psychoanalysis), technological change, 
neoliberal globalization and porous national boundaries. Exploring situational 
understandings of Blackness and British identity, Hall (2002) argues that there is no 
single, general politics around which anti-essentialist ideas of identity as composed in 
relation to Others and in opposition to closed totalities, can gather. This project 
subscribes to Hall’s (2002) conclusions about essentialized collective identities and the 
difficulties of a general politics to challenge these. I adopt a vision of anti-essentialism 
garnered from Edward Said’s (1994) work. This is not only because the CDA follows 
Said’s (2003 (1978)) method of analysing elite texts, but also because Said (2003 
(1978); 1994) articulates a critique of essentialism specifically grounded in the 
geographies of essentialized identities. Williams (2004: 69) writes that, for Edward 
Said, ‘concepts of unitary, essentialized or monolithic identities, not least in the form 
of racist or xenophobic nationalisms, were at the root of much suffering and 
oppression.’ These essentializations (e.g. ‘nations’, ‘mentalities’, ‘races’, ‘the Orient’, or 
‘Europe’) produce what Said (2003 (1978): 71) terms ‘imaginative geography’. He 
argues that if human beings make their own history, geography is also socially 
constructed. Portions of space are constructed to house (essentially) different groups 
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and demarcate boundaries between ‘Us’ (imperialist powers in Europe and North 
America) and ‘Them’ (‘the Orient’). Once this partition is established, it becomes 
possible to make political claims about the superiority of colonizing societies (modern 
and scientifically advanced), and the inferiority of colonized societies (supposedly 
culturally backward) (Gregory 2004a). Said’s (2003 (1973); 2004) critiques are 
undergirded by the humanist contention that human action drives historical and 
geographical change; Said (2004:11) writes (following Italian philosopher Giambattista 
Vico): ‘the core of humanism is the secular notion that the historical world is  made by 
men and women, and not by God’. In this project, I argue that Said’s (2004) secular, 
active human agent, the contention that human beings make their own geographies , 
does not necessarily presuppose an autonomous, a priori subject or agent in the sense 
of ‘intentional creation, re-creation and transformation of discourse … while limited by 
the restraining features of a discourse’ (Müller 2008: 236). Whilst drawing on Said’s 
critiques of cultural essentialism, the thesis subscribes to Spivak’s (2012(1987): 204) 
observation that a ‘subject-effect’ – a sovereign, determining and operating subject – 
is produced by ‘heterogeneous determinations’ and discursive ‘knottings’ of politics, 
ideology, economy, etc.  
 
Said (1994: 36) writes: ‘If at the outset we acknowledge the massively complex and 
knotted histories of special but nevertheless overlapping and interconnected 
experiences – of Women, of Westerners, of Blacks, of national states and cultures – 
there is no particular intellectual reason for granting each and all of them essentially 
separate status.’ Recognizing intermingled cultural geographies, it is possible to 
challenge the non-porosity of essentialized, fixed identities. However, Said (1994) 
relies on a delicate balance: cultural identities are irretrievably contingent, but this 
does not dissolve cultural differences to the extent that analytical distinctions become 
impossible. A key limitation of Said’s work is that he does not always manage to 
maintain this balance: at points Said risks re-essentializing as part of his critique of 
cultural essentialism (Jasanoff 2006). For example, in Covering Islam, Said (1997 
(1981): xxxv) reflects on Islamism: ‘by surreptitiously justifying a policy of single-
minded obduracy that links Islamism, however lamentable it is, to a strategically 
important, oil-rich part of the world, the anti-Islam campaign virtually eliminates the 
possibility of any sort of equal dialogue between Israel and the Arabs, and the West 
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and Israel.’ By talking about ‘the West’ as  a single actor capable of holding an ‘equal 
dialogue’, Said (1997 (1981)) reduces the immense political complexity of these groups 
to single labels. To a certain extent this is  very difficult to avoid (with terms needed to 
analyze and describe generalized phenomena), and it demonstrates a precise politics 
of bordering practices. However, permeable differences do exist and are subject to 
geographical scrutiny. This overarching, nuanced critique of essentialism informs the 
thesis’ analytics of essentializing logics (racial and national) in climate-insecure futures. 
A subtle anti-essentialist critique, one in recognition of the permeable, contingent and 
constructed composition of cultural differences, underpins the critiques of imaginative 
geographies and essentializing racial and national logics in the thesis (chapter 3, 
sections 3.2, 3.7 and 3.8). It also underlies my understandings and interpretations of 
environmental justice and securities (chapter 3, section 3.9 and chapter 7, section 7.3), 
the means through which racial and national identities intersect (chapter 5, section 
5.6), and the conceptual foundations for my critical discourse analysis and 
methodology (see chapter 2, section 2.2). Importantly, I contend the inequalities 
suggested by essentializing logics in climate-insecure futures involve multiple, context-
specific valuations of ‘lives’ and ‘populations’ in racial and national terms, what are  
termed ‘biopolitics’ in this  project.  
 
3.3 Biopolitics 
 
Reflecting on the diversity of the concept, Coleman and Grove (2009) note biopolitics 
could be conceived as any ‘postsovereign’ account of power. Whereas ‘bio-power’ can 
denote a mode of power with life as its object, biopolitics refers to specific rationalities 
and technologies employed to secure and develop collective life (Grove 2014). 
Anderson (2012: 30) identifies two characteristics of bio-power: it involves a referent 
object (either living beings or life itself), and aims to optimize some form of valued life 
against a presumed threat, ‘to make life live’. I argue biopolitics are enmeshed in 
unequal power-knowledge relations and subscribe to Lemke’s (2011: 31-2) argument 
that ‘the meaning of biopolitics lies in its ability to make visible the always contingent, 
always precarious difference between politics and life, culture and nature’. Biopolitics 
emphasize the contingent, shifting relations of ‘politics’ and ‘life’. In order to elaborate 
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a context-specific theorization of biopolitics, I turn first to Michel Foucault’s variegated 
writings on this subject.  
 
Foucault (2009 (1977): 1) defines bio-power as ‘the set of mechanisms through which 
the basic biological features of the human race become the object of a political 
strategy, of a general strategy of power, or … how, starting from the eighteenth 
century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that 
humans are a species.’ He (2004 (1976): 240-1) identifies that in the 19th century the 
sovereign right to kill, ‘the right to take life or let live’, is joined by a new right, that of 
bio-power: ‘the right to make live and let die’. Sovereign power is embodied in the 
monarch’s absolute authority and is exercised over territories (Foucault 2009 (1977)). 
Its essential power relation is between the sovereign and his/her subjects, one reliant 
on ‘the subject’ as endowed with natural rights, founded in legal systems, and 
attempts to unify and centralize power (Foucault 2004 (1976)). In contrast, the new 
politics of life functions at two scales. First, an ‘anatamo-politics’ of discipline exercises 
power over bodies and utilizes technologies of surveillance to increase the productivity 
of individual bodies in systems of ‘enclosure’ (e.g. schools, prisons, army barracks or 
hospitals). Second is a ‘biopolitics of the human race’, focused on political technologies 
at the scale of ‘population’ or ‘man-as-species-being’ (Foucault 2004 (1976): 242-3). 
Three aspects characterize Foucault’s biopolitics. First is a focus on population as an 
object of power. Second, biopolitical phenomena are ‘aleatory’ (uncertain events 
measurable only at the level of population). Finally, biopolitics, as a power regime that 
‘makes life live’, is exercised through security mechanisms designed to filter random 
elements of populations and establish ‘homeostasis’ (Foucault 2004 (1976): 246-7). 
However, despite Foucault’s focus on mechanisms through which lives are ‘made to 
live’, Weheliye (2014: 4) argues  that Foucault’s biopolitics does not adequately address 
the centrality of race (especially in a colonial context) in determinations of ‘humanity’  
or ‘the human’. As such, Foucault’s (2004 (1976); 2009 (1977) emphasis on 
technologies, rationalities and mechanisms of biopolitical security do not sufficiently 
encompass the political subjections, violences, or processes of heirarchization of 
human lives in biopolitical securities (Weheliye 2014).   
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Foucault’s biopolitical mechanisms are clarified (Foucault 2009 (1977): 6) as an 
‘apparatus (dispositif) of security’ with four dimensions. Firstly, the ‘space’ of the 
security apparatus is a ‘milieu’: a series of uncertain elements and events within which 
security regulates flows and circulations (of materials, human beings etc.). Apparatuses 
of security also operate with an orientation towards the ‘aleatory’ (risky, uncertain 
etc.); they accept uncertainties, filtering beneficial circulations from detrimental flows. 
For this second dimension, Foucault links biopolitics to the emergence of liberalism in 
the 18th century, not as an ideology but instead an ‘art’ of governing human beings 
(Foucault (2008 (1978)); Lemke 2011). Liberal governmentality organizes around 
principles of laissez-faire freedom and security (facilitated by freedoms of movement 
and circulation of goods and flows). Thirdly, whereas disciplinary normalization posits 
an optimal model and works to achieve conformity to this, ‘normalization’ in security 
operates along ‘different curves of normality’, moving between multiple distributions 
of normality to construct ‘the norm’ as ‘an interplay of differential normalities’ 
(Foucault 2009 (1977): 63). Finally, apparatuses of security witness the emergence of 
‘population’ as an issue of government. I argue Foucault’s preoccupations with 
‘population’ and ‘aleatory futures’ are important constituents of context-specific, 
multiple biopolitics of US climate security. However, I also contend that Foucault 
doesn’t account for the contingent ethical and political implications of biopolitical 
security apparatuses (what Weheliye’s (2014) critique highlights in the specific 
contexts of racist dehumanization and political subjection), the ‘content’ of 
government in Didier Fassin’s (2009: 52) terms.  
 
In this regard, Foucault conceptualizes biopolitics in relation to the emergence of 
modern racism in 19th century Europe (Venn 2009; Rasmussen 2011). Prior to this , 
emergent in 17th century European countries, Foucault (2004 (1976): 65-6) identifies a 
binary discourse of ‘race war’ that separates European societies: a social ‘struggle’ of 
‘political-historical’ divides challenging dominant discourses of sovereign right, power 
and victory. However, this concept assumes formerly cohesive, autochthonous 
European populations within which fissures develop (Weheliye 2014). Importantly, 
Foucault’s account neglects the importance of colonization to biopolitics: ‘Colonialism 
was clearly outside Foucault’s analytic concern, to him clearly a byproduct of Europe’s 
internal and permanent state of war with itself’ (Stoler 1995: 28). Foucault does note 
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the importance of colonialism, but his is ‘a historiography so locked in Europe and its 
discursive formations that colonial genocide and narratives about it could only be 
derivative of the internal dynamics of European states’ (Stoler 1995: 57). As such, 
although Foucault discusses the role of colonial and imperialist violence in the 
constitution of modern racisms, this is only as a secondary influence to his Eurocentric 
accounts of ‘race war’ and subsequent biopolitical racisms. This negation thus 
constitutes a fundamental omission in his historical account. 
 
In the specific European context in which he writes, Foucault (2004 (1976)) contends 
modern racism emerges in the 19th century. For Foucault, different modes of power 
are interrelated; sovereignty, discipline and governmental management do not replace 
one another, but constitute a ‘triangle’ (Foucault 2009 (1977): 107). Informed by 
appropriations of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, modern racism emerges at the 
point at which bio-power, concerned with how to ‘make life live’, confronts the 
question of sovereign power’s right to take life (Foucault 2004 (1976)). Racism has two 
functions. First is to separate groups within the population into ‘races’, a way of 
introducing a partition between which human lives must live and which must die 
(Foucault 2004 (1976): 245-5). Racism’s second function is a positive relation whereby 
the more lives one takes – those deemed ‘abnormal’ or ‘inferior’ – the healthier the 
population will be overall. ‘Killing’ or ‘taking lives’ is not restricted to murder, but also 
includes political expulsion, rejection and subjugation. Broadly put, ‘racism justifies the 
death function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the 
death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or 
a population’ (Foucault 2004 (1976): 258). Therefore, modern racism enables 
sovereign power’s capacity to ‘take lives’ in order to ‘make the population live’ as a 
whole. Racism is not bound up with ideologies of rule – although this is also 
undoubtedly the case – but is a technology of power: racism is a horrific technique of 
biopolitical government and exercise of sovereign power (Foucault 2004 (1976): 258; 
Stoler 1995). In Foucault’s account, racist technologies are realized most vividly in the 
totalitarianisms of Nazi Germany and USSR, where violence and murder were 
normalized throughout society (against ‘inferior races’ in Nazi Germany and ‘class 
enemies’ in the Soviet Union) on the justification that this increases the general health 
of the social body (Foucault 2004 (1976); Weheliye 2014).  
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Stoler (1995) critiques Foucault’s account for its lack of consideration of interactions 
between race, imperialism, citizenship and nationhood. These relations suggest that 
not only is racism a product of nineteenth-century biopolitics and sovereign power, 
but also of nationalism (nationalists distinguished between those deemed citizens and 
those not, were assisted by prescripted hierarchies of moral conduct, and by racial 
politics of exclusion) (Stoler 1995). Nor does Foucault address the gendered 
characterization of racisms: ‘gendered assessments of perversion and subversion are 
part of the scaffolding on which the intimate technologies of racist policies meet’ 
(Stoler 1995: 93). His genealogies of biopolitics and biopower (Foucault 2004 (1976); 
2008 (1978); 2009 (1977)) are also critiqued for rigid periodizations between 
‘sovereign power’, biopower’, ‘discipline’ and ‘race war’ grounded in relatively 
imprecise empirical foundations (Collier 2009; Rutherford and Rutherford 2013). 
Furthermore, Foucault’s attribution of racism to biological imperatives also lacks 
consideration of cultural racisms, for instance racialization of religious identities or 
racial exclusions governed by cultural incompatibilities (Meer 2013).  
 
However, Foucault’s biopolitics does provide several assets for study of US climate 
security. First is that ‘population’ is not only an object of government, but a subject: 
‘The population as a political subject, as a new collective subject … is appearing here in 
its complexity … You can already see it appearing as an object … towards which 
mechanisms are directed in order to have a particular effect … as well as a subject 
since it is called upon to conduct itself in such and such a fashion’ (Foucault 2009 
(1977): 42). Populations are not only incorporated into possible climate-insecure 
futures as ‘objects’ (for example suggested outcomes of containment for ‘African’ 
climate-induced migrants), but also as collective subjects, e.g. a ‘climate-resilient’ 
American nation. Secondly, Foucault locates biopolitical security in conditions of future 
uncertainty and riskiness (‘the aleatory’). Given that many US climate security 
documents (e.g. Schwartz and Randall 2003 or Campbell et al 2007) speculate on 
uncertain future scenarios, this corresponds to mechanisms of a biopolitical strategy. 
Thirdly, Foucault is concerned with the regulation of milieu; here, an objective of 
biopolitical management is the filtering of positive and negative circulations. In 
context-specific moments of US climate security discourse, I argue this biopolitical 
 
 
 
69 
69 
technique infiltrates discourses of climate-induced migration through racial logics 
associating ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations with radicalized violence. At this point, 
climate security becomes a task of ensuring beneficial circulations of human mobility 
whilst denying those constructed as dangerous or risky. Each of these points is 
elaborated in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
Fourthly, and most significantly, Foucault’s conclusions imply an unequal valuation of 
lives and populations in regimes of biopower and sovereign power. Questions arise as 
to which lives are taken, which lives are made to live, and which lives are left to die. 
Subsequently, these questions of value raise further questions of subjectification and 
Othering of valued lives. Two contradictions arise at this point. First is that Foucault 
(1982) does not engage with questions of values and inequalities in his  work on 
biopolitics. However, if biopolitics imply unequal governmental management of 
populations, these are crucially important questions. Foucault focuses primarily on 
‘how’ questions: specific technologies, rationalities and techniques of modes of power 
(Foucault 1982). He (1982: 786) imagines a conception of power uniting questions of 
why, what and how: ‘I would say that to begin the analysis with a “how” is to suggest 
that power as such does not exist … “How,” not in the sense of “How does it manifest 
itself?” but “By what means is it exercised?”’ As such, Foucault is not dismissing the 
ethics of biopolitics, but seeks a theory of power that does not reinforce it as an 
essential property to be controlled or held.  
 
The second contradiction concerns subjectification and identity construction in 
biopolitics. Weheliye (2014: 4) argues bare life and biopolitics overlook theorizations of 
the ‘human’ and racism and depend on an indivisible, absolute and universal biological 
substance anterior to subjectification. He (2014: 7) writes: ‘Bare life and biopolitics 
discourse … is plagued by a strong ‘anti-identity politics’ … as uncontaminated by and 
prior to reductionist or essentialist political identities such as race or gender.’ 
Contrastingly, Weheliye (2014: 4) formulates ‘racializing assemblages’ as sets of 
sociopolitical processes dividing humanity into ‘full humans, not-quite-humans, and 
nonhumans.’ In line with a concept of biopolitics as different or prior to, or 
incompatible with subjectification, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2009) introduce a 
‘political imaginary of species-being’ (p.2) as a biopolitical imaginary with life as its 
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object of governance. This involves contestation over which life counts as valuable, 
measurable, and livable. The moment life ‘exceeds or fails the grammars determining 
what it is to be a living thing’ sets ‘the biopolitical grammar of enmity going’ (Dillon 
and Lobo-Guerrero 2009: 7). However, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008) also 
differentiate between sovereign (geopolitical) and biopolitical modes of security. 
Geopolitical security emerged following the Peace of Westphalia (1648); it revolves 
around preventative measures and interests to preserve an a priori subject or object 
from external threats (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). Biopolitical security functions 
as a ‘game’ through which radically contingent, emergent life is secured through 
promotion of its transactional capacities (Dillon 2008: 315). Life constantly in 
transformation is not amenable to ‘inscription within the bounds of an identity, a 
territory or the cogito’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 271), or discursive 
construction as a Self-Other dialectic (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 268). This does 
not mean identity construction does not feature, but is only one possible set of effects 
(‘cogito-effects’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 271)) to emerge from biopolitical 
circulations. Therefore, discursive identity constructions are not integrated into 
mechanisms of biopolitical security and this is problematic for a concept of biopolitics 
underpinned by discursive appropriations of valued – racial and national – lives.  
 
Whilst Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero’s (2008; 2009) argument is persuasive, I argue it is 
limited in several respects. They recognize ‘grammars of enmity’ and acknowledge 
Foucault’s work on race (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009: 71), but there is little 
explanation of which forms of subjectification inform these valuations. Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero (2008) claim biopolitical securities exist in correlative – but distinct – 
relation with discursive identifications, but do not provide a detailed explanation of 
how these connections work, how ‘cogito-effects’ emerge in security apparatuses 
(Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 271). Despite these limitations, Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero (2009) argue ‘contingency’ and ‘circulation’ have emerged as ‘quasi-
transcendentals’ in contemporary biopolitical security. This is supported by Dillon’s 
(2008: 314, original emphasis) assertion that ‘contingency … becomes the epistemic 
object for biopolitics of security in the 21st century.’ These claims – about contingency 
in situated biopolitics – are important for understanding current security practices. 
However, their generalizing tenor detracts from the fact they rely on a context-specific 
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understanding of ‘life’ grounded in late 20th/early 21st century science. As such, their 
claims about life and life processes do engender a particular ontological conception – 
discursively articulated – of what ‘life’ is (‘connected’, ‘contingent’ etc.). This is 
subsequently used to generalize and make claims about contemporary biopolitics. This 
analysis does not rely on a particular delimitation of life working to define biopolitical 
security in general (or a separation of biopolitics from racialization dependent on a 
universalized biological substrate (Weheliye’s (2014) critique)). Instead, I argue that 
biopolitics of climate security are multiple, context-specific, and moulded through 
contingent discursive appropriations of what counts as ‘valued’ lives  and populations 
in possible climate-insecure futures.  
 
3.4 Biopolitics of unequally valued lives 
 
My starting point is Didier Fassin’s (2009) claim that ‘another politics of life’ is possible. 
Fassin (2009: 48-9) notes: ‘My idea is similarly not to give a definition or even a 
delimitation of life. It is to render its full meaning and its multiple senses when it is not 
confined to a biological phenomenon … It is to consider how life can be grasped by a 
political and moral anthropology, how it simultaneously shapes and is shaped by the 
political choices of contemporary societies.’ Fassin understands morality and ethics not 
as the establishment of values or distinction of right from wrong, but rather how 
norms develop in specific historical and geographical contexts (Lemke 2011: 48-9). This 
is intended to deepen political analysis and ask which normative value systems guide a 
politics of life (Lemke 2011: 86-7). Fassin (2009: 48-9) is concerned not only with 
normalizing practices and technologies of bio-power, but inequalities (‘bio-
inequalities’) governing which lives may live and those neglected, subjugated or left to 
die. At this point, Fassin (2009: 50) introduces the concept of ‘bio-legitimacy’, not so 
much power over life, but the power of life: discursive claims to the ‘right to life’ or the 
‘sacredness of life’ in its own terms. Fassin (2009) situates these claims in a critique of 
humanitarianism and its presumed ‘higher mission’ to ‘save lives’. Using the example 
of French migration policy, he (2009: 50-1) writes that since 1974 it has become 
increasingly restrictive against migrants, their families, asylum seekers and refugees. 
During the 1990s, the number of adults granted asylum decreased six fold as a 
consequence of punitive deterrence policies and rejection of asylum claims (Fassin 
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2009). Simultaneously, under pressure from NGOs, the French state created a new 
criterion whereby undocumented immigrants could be legalized if suffering from a 
severe illness untreatable in their home country (Fassin 2009). This clause (known as 
‘humanitarian’) works as an exception to the rule and the number of beneficiaries 
multiplied by seven during the 1990s. Consequently, Fassin (2009: 51) questions which 
‘sort of life’ is valued by the French state: the life of the refugee is marred by the label 
‘false refugee’, whereas that of the ill migrant is in need of ‘humanitarian’ aid. With its 
inferred bio-inequalities, Fassin (2009: 52) contends bio-legitimacy emphasizes the 
production of meaning and values of life, not just strategies of control; it is ‘moving 
from the ‘rules of the game’ to its stakes. These perspectives are not contradictory: by 
analyzing the new forms of the art of governing, one may apprehend what its political 
content is … Who should live and in the name of what it definitely a political question.’  
 
Fassin (2009) acknowledges Foucault (2004 (1976)) comes closest to ‘bio-inequalities’ 
when distinguishing between bio-power (that which ‘makes life live’ and ‘lets die’) and 
sovereign power (that which ‘takes life’). He (2009) also acknowledges bio-inequalities 
function – partially – through a lens of population, e.g. nutrition programmes, public 
health and social security. ‘Bio-inequalities’ and ‘bio-legitimacy’ not only refer to 
specific ‘forms’ of power, but also contestation over what constitutes life (p.57). Fassin 
(2009) affirms the importance of subjectification for these differences, noting the 
biopolitics of racial segregation in Apartheid South Africa. He (2009: 57) concludes that 
bio-legitimacy not only raises questions about technologies of power, but about ‘the 
concrete way in which individuals and groups are treated, under which principles and 
in the name of which morals, implying which inequalities and misrecognitions.’ 
Processes of exclusion, Othering and inequality are thus central to Fassin’s (2009) ‘bio-
legitimacy’. With this in mind, I argue that key to studying the unequal, multiple 
biopolitics of climate security is not to posit a single definition of ‘life’, but to explore 
the situated valuations of lives and populations in context-specific moments of US 
climate security discourse. This approach necessitates conceptualizing biopolitics as 
plural: the research’s focus is not a question of what biopolitics is (a strategy, regime 
or mode of power), but of what biopolitics are (multiple, situated and unequal 
discursive articulations of valued lives and populations). Following Fassin (2009), this 
theorization involves consideration of the power-knowledge relations underwriting 
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discursive appropriations of life and the inequalities bound up in these processes 
(Lemke 2011). It also involves analysis of how power-knowledge relations are 
intricately embedded in subjectification and Othering: which living beings and 
populations are valued in possible climate-insecure futures, and which Others are 
deemed security threats?  
 
3.5 US and EU climate securities as ‘discourses’  
 
3.5.1. Conceptions of ‘discourse’  
 
In making an argument that multiple biopolitics of US and EU climate securities are 
grounded in discursive articulations of unequally valued lives, I contend that US and EU 
climate securities can be conceptualized as discourses. For Foucault (1972 (1969): 37), 
a discourse is loosely categorized as a ‘group of statements’. This is clarified with the 
notion of discursive formation (Foucault 1972 (1969): 37, original emphasis): 
‘Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of 
dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts or thematic 
choices, one can describe a regularity … we are dealing with a discursive formation.’ 
Despite this definition, discourse remains theoretically ambiguous, with uncertainty as 
to where practices, materiality and language belong within the concept’s remit (Müller 
2008). Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams (2015) critique IR theorists’ adoption – 
including David Campbell, a contributing author to Bialasiewicz et al (2007), used in 
this chapter – of a restrictive conception of discourse premised on meaning-making 
and representation (if incorporative of non-linguistic phenomena). This restriction risks 
relegating ‘’the material realm’ of social life to the status of an inert or apolitical 
backdrop, which can only acquire political significance via linguistic or visual 
representation’ (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015: 5). This move negates the 
material constitution of politics and premises political meaningfulness on discursive 
articulation. By extension, it also constructs a hierarchical dichotomy between 
‘materiality’ (as an apolitical backdrop) and ‘discourse’ (as politically constitutive). In 
this sense, discourse theory assumes that ‘all objects are objects of discourse, as their 
meaning depends on a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences’ 
(Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 2, original emphasis).       
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Such an expansive constitutive role (discursive production of identities, subjects, 
objects, social relations etc.) does not capacitate for the constitution of discourses by 
embodied materialities. In her study of University of Edinburgh students’ perceptions 
and fears of crime, Mehta (1999: 69) introduces the concept of ‘embodied discourses’ 
to articulate how living bodies and recurrent everyday practices (e.g. routes to walk 
home) constitute discursive norms (for example ‘public safety’). Furthermore, 
Hyndman (2004) articulates a feminist geopolitics aimed at challenging embodied 
(re)productions of geopolitical orthodoxies and critical geopolitics’ concern with elite 
texts. Whilst it is crucial to understand the embodied, material and affective registers 
of imaginative geographies, I agree with Sharp’s (2011: 298) statement that ‘discursive 
analysis is important. Geographical imaginaries are transmitted through institutions of 
the state, education and media and … these representational schemas provide the 
language through which understandings of the world are communicated, understood 
and contested.’ I do not argue for a disembodied, omnipotent conception of discourse 
as a monopolized provider of meaning. I contend discourses are thoroughly material: 
the materiality of bodies, language, texts (‘language in use’ (Fairclough 2003: 3)) and 
policies constitute climate security discourses (Jäger and Maier 2005).  
 
However, it could be that broader concepts, e.g. ‘assemblage’, can help to better 
encapsulate climate securities. Weheliye (2014: 46), following Deleuze and Guattari, 
writes of assemblages: ‘Assemblages … constitute continuously shifting relational 
totalities comprised of spasmodic networks between different entities (content) and 
their articulation within “acts and statements” (expression).’ Assemblages have two 
axes: a horizontal axis moving from ‘content’ (machinic components) to ‘expression’ 
(enunciative statements), and a vertical axis between ‘territorialization’ and 
‘deterritorialization’. The vertical axis refers to the delineation of an assemblage from 
others (which components work to stabilize or ‘territorialize’ the assemblage, and 
which are moving away or ‘deterritorializing’ from the assemblage) (Dittmer 2014). 
Anderson et al (2012) contend ‘relations of exteriority’ characterize assemblages: 
entities are affected by their relations with other components, but not fully 
determined by these terms. Importantly, assemblages are emergent and 
heterogeneous, ‘entering into polyvalent becomings to produce and give expression to 
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previously nonexistent realities, thoughts, bodies, affects, spaces, actions, ideas, and 
so on’ (Weheliye 2014: 46; Müller 2015). Assemblages are a potentially productive 
means through which to explore US climate security. US climate securities are 
composed of many different elements, e.g. human beings, legal statutes, publications 
and think tanks, for which ‘assemblage’ could provide a more dynamic perspective. 
However, I argue that because the project’s specific focus is representations of US 
climate security, discourse represents the most targeted, appropriate concept for this 
analysis.  
 
In doing so, I argue that variants of assemblage theory (specifically Dittmer’s (2014) 
‘geopolitical assemblages’) risk a theoretically underdetermined conception of 
discourse. Following DeLanda (2006), Dittmer (2014: 387-8) notes that one means of 
(de)territorialization is ‘coding/decoding’, mechanisms (linguistic or generic) that 
solidify assemblages’ identities. He (2014: 387-8) writes: ‘This process has been known 
in critical geopolitics as discourse; however, in this more materialist, embodied form of 
geopolitics we must also include non-linguistic forms of coding, such as DNA’. Whereas 
Dittmer (2014) locates ‘discourse’ in ‘assemblages’, this is associated with ‘linguistic’ 
entities in particular and Dittmer differentiates discourse from ‘more materialist’, ‘non-
linguistic forms of coding’. Although Dittmer (2014) situates discourses in geopolitical 
assemblages, this is still associated with linguistic entities and presumed different to 
materialist, embodied forms. I argue this represents a limited conception of discourse. 
Müller (2008) proposes an expanded concept of discourse inclusive of linguistic 
phenomena, representations and non-linguistic phenomena (concrete practices). In 
line with this, I adopt the definition of Bialasiewicz et al (2007: 406): ‘Discourse refers 
to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are 
produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical 
outcomes made more or less possible.’ Because discourses lean towards constitutions 
of meanings and identities (‘representations’ and ‘practices’), they are important 
conceptual cornerstones for the thesis.  
 
Discourses’ capacity to orientate conditions of possibility for political and ethical 
outcomes is a crucial tenet of how American identities are situated in climate-insecure 
futures. Discourses thus mediate between present significations of identity and what 
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these meanings render possible in uncertain futures. Bialasiewicz et al (2007: 406, 
following Butler (1990)) submit that imaginative geographies in US national security 
publications are ‘performative’: they perform the effects they name and subjects and 
objects of which they speak. Through iteration and citation, constrained by cultural 
and historical meanings and realities, discourses give rise to new possibilities and 
formations (Bialasiewicz et al 2007). In this ‘performative geopolitics’, previous 
articulations are reworked to ‘provide the conditions of possibility for current and 
future action’ (p.417). Thus, as  geopolitical discourses, US and EU climate securities are 
comprised partially of representations and political practices/power relations, 
manufacture identities and subjectivities, and are performatively constitutive of future 
possibilities.  
 
3.5.2 ‘Representations’ and ‘text’ 
 
In arguing that US and EU climate securities are geopolitical discourses comprised of 
‘representations’ and ‘practices’, I do not contend that ‘representations’ are restricted 
to ‘texts’ (understood in a narrow sense as linguistic representations of ‘language-in-
use’ (Fairclough 2003: 3)). Whilst the CDA focuses primarily on excerpts from 
publications (for example think tank reports or testimonies to the US Congress), I also 
draw upon interview testimony – predominantly from publicly available sources – and 
images (from Conley and Werz (2012: 3), see chapter 4, section 4.3.4). As ensembles of 
representations and practices, US and EU climate securities are intertwined with and 
indissoluble from their material composition: both as constituted from material 
realities, and as performative of material effects. This conceptualization resonates with 
Butler’s (2009) theorization of ‘frames of war’ (in the particular context of the US-led 
‘War on Terror’). As Butler (2009: 26) writes: ‘such frames do not merely reflect on the 
material conditions of war, but are essential to the perpetually crafted animus of that 
reality.’ Thus, ‘frames’ portray the material realities of war, but also actively contain, 
selectively interpret, produce and enforce what will count as ‘reality’ (Butler 2009). 
‘Frames’ are an operation of power; they work to delimit visual fields of ‘perceptibility’ 
and ‘representability’ on the basis of normative assumptions about which lives and 
populations count as ‘grievable’ or ‘livable’. Butler (2009: 74-5) writes that ‘there are 
norms, explicit or tacit, governing which human lives count as human and as living, and 
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which do not. These norms are determined to some degree by the question of when 
and where a life is grievable and, correlatively, when and where the loss of a life 
remains ungrievable and unrepresentable.’ Importantly, Butler (2009: 74-5) contends 
that norms can be enacted through both ‘narrative’ and ‘visual’ frames. Therefore, 
‘frames’ are comprised of both ‘textual’ – e.g. poetry – and ‘visual’ (for instance 
photographs) representations, are founded in material, affective resonances, and are 
implicated in unequal political delimitations about which lives count as ‘livable’ or 
‘grievable’.  
 
In common with Butler’s (2009) conceptualization, I argue that US and EU climate 
security discourses are grounded in unequal relations of power. As noted, although the 
CDA focuses primarily on linguistic representations and ‘texts’ (interpreted in a strict 
sense here), this analysis, following from Butler’s (2009) application of ‘frames’, utilises 
a broadened understanding of representations as comprised of ‘textual’ materials, 
interview testimonies and images. Butler (2009) contends that ‘frames of war’ are 
implicated in divisions between which lives are considered to be ‘livable’ or ‘grievable’ 
in conditions of war and US state violence. Although this analysis is grounded in an 
understanding of biopolitical inequalities, I contend that these, for US and EU climate 
security discourses, are based on a delimitation of unequally valued lives in possible 
climate-insecure futures. ‘Valuation’ is not based in this case on ‘grievability’ according 
to specific norms, but specifically on situated, context-specific racialized and national 
identities and the possibilities these circumscribe in conditions of future climate 
insecurity. Thus, whereas this analysis shares Butler’s (2009) broader understanding of 
representations, their material ‘animus’ and performative power, and their saturation 
in unequal operations of power, I locate inequalities in terms of racialized and national 
biopolitical identifications. This project’s theoretical framework is also oriented 
specifically towards a conception of identity constructions in possible futures. I also 
explore the role of essentializing logics – located at the scale of underlying 
assumptions and argumentation – as an important concept for analysing the 
performative constitution of outcomes in climate-insecure futures. However, before 
outlining these claims in more detail, the next section explores the understanding of 
‘power relations’ underpinning the project. 
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3.5.3 Power-knowledge relations and climate security 
 
To outline these aspects in more depth, Foucault (1991 (1977): 27) contends power 
and knowledge are interconnected: ‘We should admit that … power and knowledge 
directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations.’ His (1991 (1977): 26) ‘micro-physics’ of 
power is circuitous: it is an omnipresent, circulatory phenomenon (the ‘capillary 
model’) and manifests as unequal relations between subjects. Power is exercised 
rather than possessed; it is ‘not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved of the dominant 
class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions’ (Foucault 1991 (1977): 26).  Said 
(1986) rebukes Foucault’s conceptualization and offers four possibilities for how power 
can be imagined. First is to imagine what you could do with power; second is to 
speculate about what you would imagine if you had power; third is to assess what 
power you would need to remove present power; and fourth is to postulate a list of 
eventualities or things that cannot be imagined or commanded using present power. 
Said (1986) argues that because Foucault is preoccupied with the first two 
imaginations, about how power operates and is employed, he does not account for 
how it can be challenged. Said (1986: 152) writes: ‘Foucault’s imagination of power 
was by his analysis to reveal its injustice and cruelty, but by his theorization to let it go 
on more or less unchecked.’ Said’s (1986) critiques suggest a negative conception of 
power that can be owned and allied to domination. Power is something that can be 
‘needed’, something that can be ‘used’ to do things with, and something that 
somebody could ‘have’ (Said 1986). These imaginations all imply ‘power’ as an entity 
that can be possessed. Additionally, Said (1986: 152) identifies the ‘injustice’ and 
‘cruelty’ of power. In Culture and Imperialism, Said (1994) writes that ‘domination and 
inequities of power and wealth are perennial facts of human society’ (p.20), and that 
‘the twinning of power and legitimacy, one force obtaining in the world of direct 
domination, the other in the cultural sphere, is a characteristic of classic imperial 
hegemony’ (p.252). As such, in both of these instances, Said equates power with 
‘domination’, ‘inequities’, and ‘direct domination’. These brief examples suggest that 
Said’s (1986; 1994) important critiques of Foucault’s power relations are underpinned 
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by an understanding of power as characterized by domination and inequalities, and as 
something that can be ‘used’ or ‘possessed’.  
 
However, I argue that, although Said’s (1986) critiques are fundamentally important to 
highlight the injustices of unequal power relations, he does not account for the range 
of enabling possibilities that Foucault’s conception of power capacitates for. If power is 
equated only with ownership, centralized domination and inequality (something which 
is used for repression or, conversely, is to be resisted and fought against), this reduces 
the possibilities of relations of power. Importantly, Foucault (1982) distinguishes at this 
point between relations of power and of violence. A power relation acts upon others’ 
actions: ‘an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in 
the present or the future’ (Foucault 1982: 789). A relation of violence ‘acts upon a 
body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes 
the door on all possibilities’ (Foucault 1982: 789). As such, power relations are not 
univocal, absolute or co-terminous with domination: they consist of ‘strategies’ and 
‘tactics’ to influence the field of possibilities and actions.  
 
Significantly, power relations ‘can neither be established nor function unless a true 
discourse is produced, accumulated, put into circulation, and set to work. Power 
cannot be exercised unless a certain economy of discourses of truth functions in, on 
the basis of, and thanks to, that of power’ (Foucault 2004 (1976): 24-5). Power 
relations involve constant classification and monitoring of individuals and populations; 
relations of power are ‘truth-effects’, and discourses of truth ‘power-effects’ (Foucault 
2004 (1976): 24-5). Each society has its politics or ‘regime of truth’: ‘the types of 
discourse it harbours and causes to function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true from false statements, the way in which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures which are valorized for obtaining truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true’ (Foucault 1977: 13). 
In this understanding, ‘truth’ refers to the systems implicated in the regularization, 
circulation and production of statements (Foucault 1977: 14). As such, discourses as 
regularities of statements, representations and practices are imbued with regimes of 
truth that maintain this regularity. Discourses function to establish – in US climate 
security – which lives are discursively constructed as valuable: allocations of 
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membership to a collective national (American) subjectivity, and which possible 
climate-induced migrants are cast as racially Other. Climate security discourses are 
also oriented towards future risks of climate impacts. Building on a conception of 
discursive power-knowledge relations as operative within a field of possibilities, and as 
shaping future outcomes based on a performative iteration and citation of historic and 
current significations of cultural identities, I argue US climate security is premised on a 
risk calculus of ‘possible’ futures.  
 
3.6 Climate securities and possible climate-insecure futures 
 
At this point it is important to distinguish between ways of understanding ‘the future’. 
Massumi (2002) distinguishes between ‘potentiality’ and ‘possibility’. Potential is 
defined as ‘the multiplicity of possibilities materially present to one another … 
Potential is like a motor force, a momentum driving a serial unfolding of events’ 
(Massumi 2002: 136). Potentiality is engrossed in a field of perpetual emergence, 
dynamic thresholds and phase shifts, with no boundaries of interiority or exteriority. 
Naturalization in this sense cannot refer to a constructivist account where the natural 
becomes the cultural; instead, ‘nature’ is about the ‘universal tendency for arising 
events to strike with a force of indeterminacy’ (Massumi 2009: 163). Potentiality is 
prior to signification, territorialization, essentialization and discurs ive naturalization 
and constitutes an ontogenic field that cannot be pre-scripted (Massumi 2002; 2009).  
Possibility, in contrast, is ‘back-formed from potential’s unfolding … implicit in the 
determination of a thing’s or body’s potentiality is a certain set of transformations that 
can be expected of it by definition … These possibilities delineate a region of nominally 
defining – that is, normative – variation’ (Massumi 2002: 9-10). Whereas potentiality is 
about conditions of emergence, possibility is about re-conditionings of the emerged. 
One is ontologically at one with becoming, the other sets the normative parameters 
for history: ‘the possible interactions of determinate individuals and groups’ (Massumi 
2002: 9-10). Possibility thus has a complicated temporality: it is both about the 
possible transformations a body or thing can undergo, but as it ‘positions’ or 
‘prescripts’ the parameters of normative variation, it feeds back against the 
unbounded immanence of potential. It is conceived as a ‘combinatoric’, a series of 
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possible ‘solution-cases’ analyzable and amenable to quantitative probabi lity 
(Massumi 2002: 113; 135).  
 
Massumi (2002: 7) postulates signification is located in a zone ‘of arrest’, a derivative 
‘second-order movement between back-formed possibilities’. In terms of cultural and 
social determinations of position (e.g. gender or race), Massumi (2002: 8) notes these 
are secondary in the sense that they back-form their reality. This does not establish an 
ontological separation from potentiality: Massumi (2002: 8) maintains cultural 
determinations feed back into their processes of emergence. They are inseparable, but 
there is nonetheless an ontological difference between the field of emergence and 
positionings emergent from this. Importantly, Massumi’s (2002) concepts of 
‘possibility’ and ‘potentiality’ are grounded in a universalized reading of futurity, one 
that (arguably) does not account for the historical, contextualized means through 
which bodies – racialized, gendered, sexualized, etc. – relate to differentiated, unequal 
futures. This echoes Tolia-Kelly’s (2006) critique of Western-centric emotional and 
affective geographies literatures (at that time): they can imply a ‘universalist’ impulse 
that negates the historically specific, material and uneven geographies through which 
bodies affect and are affected. To resist a universalizing tendency, this project focuses 
on the situated instantiations of futures in relation to context-specific moments of US 
and EU climate security discourses. Based on his theorizations of signification and 
social and cultural determinations of position, Massumi’s (2002) conceptualization 
suggests that racial and national identities are oriented towards possible climate-
insecure futures. As such, in the context of this dissertation, I argue that racial and 
national identities – in specific moments of US and EU climate securities – are 
constructed in relation to discursively rendered possibilities.  
 
In contemporary US security practices, Amoore (2013) notes ‘low probability, high 
consequence’ events are a key part of sovereign decision-making in the War on Terror. 
She (2013: 1) writes: ‘From terrorist attacks and cybercrime, from flood risk to the 
crisis of inadequately-priced finance, the idea of uncertain futures – however 
probabilistically unlikely – has captured the Zeitgeist.’ This is at heart a technology of 
‘risk’, about managing uncertainty and rendering the future knowable (Amoore 2013). 
Whereas insurance-based risk models calculate future likelihoods based on 
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probabilistic reasoning (Aradau and van Munster 2007), possibility-based risk analysis 
is more speculative and incorporates anticipation of uncertain futures through 
techniques of imagination (e.g. scenario-planning). It is still a technique of risk, based 
on differing degrees of safe or dangerous, vulnerable or adaptable, but exceeds strict 
probabilistic reasoning to preempt unknowable futures in their conditions of 
emergence (Amoore 2013). Amoore (2013) contends this new risk calculus has four 
characteristics. First, it is grounded in a temporality that imagines a population not yet 
known, seeking to act preemptively to render uncertain futures actionable in the 
present. Second is that it functions according to circulatory ‘mobile norms’ subject to 
deviation in aleatory populations (Amoore 2013: 65). The spatiality of this risk calculus 
arrays series of possibilities to be acted upon: ‘it allows for multiple possible sequences 
of events to be held together horizontally within a single purview’ (Amoore 2013: 68). 
Finally, security embraces positive dimensions of risk; securing becomes about 
facilitating beneficial circulations and opportunities. Amoore (2013: 157) calls for a 
critical politics to sustain conditions of potentiality and open windows that are 
indeterminate, creative and unexpected. 
 
A ‘politics of possibility’ is  also affiliated with what Corry (2012: 246) terms 
‘riskification’ in environmental security. Corry (2012) maintains an idea of 
securitization inherited from the Copenhagen School. In this reading, Buzan et al 
(1998) argue that securitization operates through discursive speech acts: once a 
‘security threat’ is named, this justifies exceptional, emergency measures to mitigate 
the problem. Boas (2015) contends that the Copenhagen School situates securitization 
in the realm of ‘high politics’ (both the declarers of securitizing speech acts and 
institutions mobilized to mitigate security ‘threats’, e.g. judges, governments or 
bureaucracies). The Copenhagen School theorizes securitization as dependent upon 
‘friend-enemy’ logics, a politics of exceptionality, and uncertainties about what the 
‘audience’ of securitizing speech acts may be (Boas 2015). Contrastingly, Corry (2012) 
argues discursive constructions of risk follow different logics. Whereas security leans 
towards specific, identifiable threats to be defended against, targeted and overcome, 
riskification points to ‘the existence of conditions of possibility or ‘permissive causes’ of 
future possible harmful events’ (Corry 2012: 246, original emphasis).  As such, ‘risk-
security’ operates on a basis of ‘conditional causality’, ‘a second-order security politics 
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that directs attention to the level of conditions of danger or harm’ (Corry 2012: 246-7). 
Risk-securities are future-oriented and suggest interventions to ‘govern’ and ‘manage’ 
risks, not defend against or eradicate ‘threats’. They do not depend on a ‘friend-
enemy’ grammar or externalizing ‘Othering’ implied by security logics, but focus  
instead on the referent object itself and its conditions of possibility (Corry 2012). Risk 
management interventions can still suggest exclusionary profiling strategies, but not 
defined as an existential Other (Corry 2012). Corry (2012) argues that to the extent 
climate solutions are long-term, attempt to mitigate its causes and depend on global 
cooperation and international governance, climate change is a ‘riskified’ issue. 
Solutions suggested by military actors, e.g. the Center for Naval Analyses, are more 
often linked to mitigation and adaptation, not militarized defense strategies (Corry 
2012). In Corry’s (2012: 248) terms, climate change is only securitized to the extent 
‘that the precautionary principle is replaced with a ‘no holds barred’ logic of 
exceptionality in relation to an existential threat, as identified by the Copenhagen 
School’. Mayer (2012) agrees, arguing that climate change is increasingly framed in 
termed of risk as opposed to security.  
 
However, in making these claims, Corry (2012) depends on particular conceptions of 
‘securitization’ and ‘security logics’ against which he can juxtapose ‘risk’ (or ‘risk-
security’ in Corry’s (2012) broadened terms) and diagnose current climate security 
practices. I agree with this expansive concept of security (Diez et al 2016), and argue 
accordingly that a risk calculus of a ‘politics of possibility’ (Amoore 2013) and 
‘riskification’ are central constituents of contemporary US climate security discourses. 
However, the project departs from Corry’s (2012) rejection of Othering processes in 
the riskification of climate security (and his (2014) discussion of resilience, see chapter 
6, section 6.6), or his emphasis – derived from a particular, Copenhagen School based 
reading of securitization – that security practices are grounded on that which is 
‘existential’ or ‘present’. Instead, I argue that Othering processes are contingent and 
discursively constituted (in context-specific moments) in possible climate-insecure 
futures. This is not to deny that climate change impacts are existential or presently 
serious in many instances, but to talk about particular discursive constructions in 
moments of future-oriented US climate security. 
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Indeed, as Anderson (2010b) notes, an ambition of security is to manage the future – 
to ensure threatening events do not come to pass and ‘valued lives’ are preserved and 
protected. Security can be conceptualized as a ‘condition’, the condition of being safe 
and free from danger (Barnett 2003). It can also be a ‘process’, the continuous 
processes of securing life (Anderson 2010b). As Aradau et al (2008) state, security is 
conventionally about the production, interpretation and management of threats, 
dangers or risks; it relies on binaries of ‘Self’/’Other’, ‘friend’/’enemy’, 
security/insecurity. Indeed, Campbell (1998 (1992): 1) writes: ‘Danger is not an 
objective condition … danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, 
necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to 
derive.’ This conceptualization is connected to a conception of difference and identity 
in security discourse which ‘contains … no foundations that are prior to, or outside of, 
its operation … the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of 
boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from an 
“other,” a “domestic” from a “foreign”’ (Campbell 1998 (1992): 9). I work from this 
understanding of US climate security discourse, embedded in unequal power-
knowledge relations and oriented towards possible futures. US climate securities are 
located at the intersections of present and future: futures are rendered knowable 
discursively (as ‘possibilities’) in current and historical articulations of climate security. 
I argue the concept of essentializing logics provides a productive analytic to explore 
how these present-future relationships – discursive framing of national and racial 
significations in climate-insecure futures – operate in context-specific moments of US 
climate security discourse.  
 
3.7 Essentializing logics of US and EU climate securities  
 
The term ‘logics’ is widely utilized in critical race studies and critical security studies, 
but often goes undefined. In a 2010 exploration of ‘race logics’ in global geopolitics, 
Zimmerman (2010: 1) classifies a ‘logics’ as: ‘a manner of thinking and acting’. His ‘race 
logics’ are sovereign exception (the ability to define international norms and laws, to 
exempt oneself from adherence to those norms, and to determine non-sovereign 
actors marginalized from these legal norms); political economic logics of racism, 
exploitation and inequality internationally; and a kinship logic which attaches different 
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‘races’ to particular patterns of descent. In White Logic, White Methods, Bonilla-Silva 
and Zuberi (2008) challenge racialized epistemological foundations and methods of 
social research. They (2008: 17, original emphasis) write: ‘By speaking of logic, we refer 
to both the foundation of the techniques used in analyzing empirical reality, and the 
reasoning used by researchers in their efforts to understand society. White Logic … 
assumes a historical posture that grants eternal objectivity to the views of elite Whites 
… and classifies “others” as people without knowledge.’ In an analysis of the 
securitizing practices used in climate-induced migration discourses, Boas (2015: 19) 
defines logics as ‘that which determines or endorses the types of security measures 
induced or endorsed by the securitization process … The logic of security measures 
thus suggests how to handle a security issue’. Boas’ (2015) interpretation suggests 
reasoning processes by which particular measures are justified. Building on these 
critiques, David Theo Goldberg’s work also offers insights on ‘logics’.  
 
Susan Searls Giroux interviewed Goldberg (2014) about ‘the raciologics of militarizing 
society’. However, ‘raciologics’ remains undefined. Similarly, David Theo Goldberg’s 
(2015: 60) book Are we all postracial yet? contains a chapter on ‘postracial logics’, but 
the term ‘logics’ goes  without definition. In 2009, Goldberg published a critique of 
methodological comparativism in critical race studies. Acknowledging the important 
insights of case study research, he contends the field is preoccupied with an 
assumption that racisms are context-dependent and existent independently of multi-
scalar relations. Goldberg (2009) argues that, although emergent in particular 
localities, racisms are relationally constituted and imbued with multi-scalar political, 
economic and social processes. The ‘logic’ of this perspective is ‘this abstract 
methodological form of relationality’, which ‘may be common across cases’ (Goldberg 
2009: 1281). These disparate conceptions suggest ‘logics’ share several commonalities: 
1) they are rooted in abstract ideas of reasoning, justification and epistemology, 2) 
they are interwoven with unequal (racialized, gendered, militarized, securitized etc.) 
power relations, and 3) they are cross-contextual. To delve into these questions 
further, histories of ‘Logic’ as a branch of philosophy are briefly discussed.  
 
As a philosophical tradition, ‘Logic’ stretches back at least 3000 years. Phillips (2006: 
97) understands it as ‘the rules according to which we use our understanding in 
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thought and knowledge.’ Conventionally, ‘logic’ is argued to originate with Aristotle 
and his attempts to find common strands between all branches of knowledge – 
episteme (science), praxis (action) and poesis (production) (Phillips 2006). However, as 
Turner (2006) points out, ‘logic’ symbolized a variety of ideas in Aristotle’s works, 
including abstract reasoning, deduction, explanation, and the rule of law. In the 9 th 
century, Greek interpretations of logic were translated by Islamic scholars, garnering 
new insights about relationships between logic and language, as well as logical 
applications of Islamic law (Turner 2006). In spite of these developments, a parochial, 
Eurocentric reading has reduced Islamic scholarship to the status of a ‘conduit’ 
between Greek and Renaissance philosophy, excluding the profound achievements of 
these scholars (Turner 2006). Modern formal logic developed in the 17th and 18th 
centuries with the writings of Locke, Leibniz and Descartes. Further standardized by 
Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell in the 19th and early 20th centuries, formal logic 
seeks to explain logical principles (rules of deduction, inferential reasoning, 
contradiction etc.) using symbolic, algebraic formulae (Turnbull 2006). A cornerstone 
of this is unearthing necessary rules of ‘Logic’ – contra ‘logics’ – that are universal and 
applicable outside of empirical data or content. As Darity (2009: 479) writes: ‘Logic is 
logic … The principles of valid reasoning are the same no matter what the subject, and 
are expressible in symbolic notation that is concerned only with the form, rather than 
the content, of what is uttered.’ Presumably, this also empties logic of its politics: the 
unequal power dynamics with which ‘logic’ and ‘reason’ are deployed, and the visage 
of an autonomous, objective actor conducting pure logic ‘from an armchair’ (Darity 
2009: 479).  
 
To situate a critical theoretic understanding of ‘logics’, I argue the above account is 
limited in several respects. First, it provides a Western-centric reading of ‘logic’ and 
marginalizes alternative schools, e.g. Buddhist logicians in India (contemporaneous 
with Aristotle) (Priest 2000). This negates the intermingled, multifaceted histories of 
logic and reduces its ‘inherent richness … to a singularity’ (Turner 2006: 87). Secondly, 
the notion of an autonomous, a priori producer of logical arguments runs counter to 
the discursive construction of human subjectivity, saturated with unequal power 
relations. Working with both initial conceptualizations from critical race studies, and 
the critiques of Western rationalism proffered here, I now consider two more in-depth 
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theorizations of ‘logics’ from different areas of critical theory: Stuart Hall’s (1996) 
conceptualization of ideology, and Ben Anderson’s (2010a) critical account of 
anticipatory action and future geographies.  
 
Whereas Hall (1986) writes from a materialist, cultural studies perspective and seeks 
an anti-essentialist, non-determinist ‘Marxism without guarantees’, Anderson’s 
(2010a: 778) viewpoint is grounded in a Foucauldian analytic of how uncertain futures 
are governed. Hall (1986) critiques poststructuralists – including Foucault – for 
promoting discursive construction, leading to an unmooring of ideologies from their 
material, historically specific contexts. Importantly, this is not to argue that post-
structuralist theories do not involve political or ideological claims (for example the 
importance of deconstructing binaries, or an ethics of openness to the Other) 
(Murdoch 2006). However, as Jäger and Maier (2009: 37) point out: ‘contrary to a 
common misconception … discourse theory is not an idealist theory … Discourses may 
be conceived as societal means of reproduction.’ Discourses, in a Foucauldian sense, 
are not separate from society, but are active, material constituents of social change 
(Jäger and Maier 2009). Foucault does not deny ideological production coexists with 
regimes of power, but that the key points of intersection are between power relations 
and regimes of knowledge production (instruments of recording, measurement, 
verification etc.), the regimes of truth governing which statements are ‘true’ and 
‘valid’. I argue it is at this scale that Hall’s and Anderson’s (Foucauldian-inspired) 
different accounts can be read together in a productive way. In Hall (1996), before 
ideological consensus stabilizes, logics at the level of statement, assumption and 
proposition naturalize particular assertions as ‘true’. Similarly, although Anderson’s 
(2010a) piece draws upon a wider assemblage of elements, of which ‘statements’ form 
an important component of ‘styles’, discursive significations are significant for his 
account of anticipatory action. Thus, although Hall’s and Anderson’s accounts are from 
radically different schools of critical thought and cannot be simplistically equated, I 
contend there are some instructive points of intersection in their respective works.  
 
Stuart Hall (1986: 29, original definition) theorizes the problem of ideology. This is how, 
within a materialist Marxist framework, social ideas arise and are contested within 
social formations. Hall (1986: 29) defines ideology as ‘the mental frameworks – the 
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languages, concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and systems of representation – 
which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, 
figure out and render intelligible the way society works.’ His account is built around 
the concept of ‘articulation’, the ‘non-necessary conditions that create structural 
unities among linguistic and historical conditions’ (Makus 1990: 496). Such structural 
unities are implicated in the struggle over meaning, and it is important to situate 
specific connections between ideological elements and social, political, economic and 
technological practices or structures (Makus 1990). Hall (1996: 131, original emphasis) 
argues meaning is socially constructed: ‘the active work of selecting and presenting, or 
structuring and shaping: not merely the transmitting of an already-existing meaning, 
but the mere active labour of making things mean. It was a practice, a production, a 
meaning: what subsequently came to be described as a signifying practice.’ 
Contestations over meaning are part of a broader shaping of ideological consensus, the 
winning of universal validity for partial worldviews (Hall 1996), or what Makus (1990: 
498) describes as ‘that part of the truth which takes it for the whole truth.’ 
 
In this sense, ideological constructions tender whole ‘logics’ as ‘the common sense’ of 
a culture: they rely on a whole series of taken-for-granted assumptions about what is 
known about reality, the ‘reality effect’ of ideology (Hall 1996: 141). As Makus (1990: 
499) states: ‘When events and practices are represented as if they were ahistorical 
truths, problematic events or situations get cast unproblematically into the terms of 
what appears as “natural” within a society. Losing their propositional status, premises 
are transformed into narrative statements that are resistant to alternative 
interpretations of events.’ As such, these premises – and the ‘logics’ they comprise – 
are essentialized as natural narratives and truths: ‘not grounded in nature, but 
producing nature as a sort of guarantee of its truth’ (Hall 1996: 144). Crucially, logics 
are not considered as a chain of necessary, valid premises; indeed, they are only one 
possible form of discursive arrangement. Hall’s (1996: 140) definition of ‘logic’ is ‘an 
apparently necessary chain of implication between statement and premise.’ The 
‘apparently’ is a key ingredient: it is not that premises must pass logical rules of 
validation to affirm the statement, but rather that they are reified as externalized 
narratives or ‘truths’ that, when ordered as this chain of reasoning, represent 
ideological consensus as ‘reality’.  
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Hall adds that discourses, through processes of narration, are fundamental vehicles for 
signalling what would be ‘legitimate’, ‘natural’ conclusions to given logics (Hall 1996). 
This is connected to two important points. First is that the production of social and 
ideological knowledge functions through ‘coding’. Codes refer to the meaning signified 
by signs – they ‘refer signs to the ‘maps of meaning’ into which culture is classified’ 
(Hall 1980: 134). They have a whole range of social meanings, practices and power 
relations written into them and are the foundations for how ideology is embedded into 
culture (Hall 1980). Second, ideologies are not the manufactures of an autonomous, a 
priori agency; the ‘speaker’ or ‘author’ is also subject to ideological construction and 
‘ideologies … create the lived realities of their subjects’ (Makus 1990: 500). These 
components: of ‘logics’ as socially constructed and unattached to necessary, absolute 
rules; as embedded in processes of signification and discourse; and as formulated 
independently of an autonomous, antecedent subject, are important facets of how 
Stuart Hall’s conceptualization of logics departs from analytic philosophical 
approaches.  
 
I argue Ben Anderson’s (2010a) conception of ‘logics’ can be drawn together with 
Stuart Hall’s account (his theorization of logics as constituents of ideological  
consensus) in a limited, partial, and potentially productive way. Anderson (2010a) 
conceptualizes the assembling of various elements – statements, affects, material 
objects, policies and programmes – as modes of ‘anticipatory action’ that govern 
futures and protect valued lives in liberal democracies. There are three modes in 
particular, ‘styles’ (statements through which the abstract notion of ‘the future’ is 
disclosed and related to), ‘practices’ that give content to specific futures through acts 
of performing, imagining and calculating, and ‘logics’ which legitimize and enable 
action (Anderson 2010a: 779). ‘Logics’ are ‘a programmatic way of formalizing, 
justifying and deploying action in the here and now. Logics involve action that aims to 
prevent, mitigate, adapt to, prepare for or preempt certain futures’ (Anderson 2010a: 
778-9). Anderson (2010a) locates three anticipatory logics in particular. ‘Precaution’ 
acts upon a threat once it has been identified, accepting a degree of uncertainty but 
intervening before dangers become irreversible. ‘Preemption’ is similar, but can act on 
a threat that has not yet appeared; it is immersed in its conditions of emergence. 
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Finally, ‘preparedness’ is distinct because, whereas precaution and preemption work 
to mitigate a future before it materializes, preparedness adapts to the aftermath of a 
threatening episode and manages its effects (Anderson 2010a). In this formulation, 
‘logics’ do not have a primary actor, target or spatial form; they co-exist across 
contexts (e.g. terrorism, climate change or disease epidemics) and exceed any 
particular case. But, they are not totally detached and ‘are continually being 
reassembled in attempts to govern different domains of life’ (Anderson 2010a: 788). In 
summary, ‘logics’ in Anderson’s (2010a: 788) schema involve two constitutive 
elements: interventions to mitigate, avoid or adapt to a future that has – through 
styles and practices – been ‘rendered actionable’, and rationalizations that value some 
lives over others in liberal democracies.  
 
Working from Hall and Anderson’s theorizations, logics are argued to be contingent, 
discursively constructed series of essentializing propositions, assumptions or 
associations that rationalize and legitimize particular possible future outcomes or 
interventions. Although constructed in specific constellations of power relations, 
‘logics’ are applicable across contexts (qua Hall’s, Goldberg’s and Anderson’s 
conceptions). Moreover, they are not grounded in an a priori, autonomous agency, but 
differentially constituted in unequal power relations. Following Anderson, they are not 
only oriented towards historic or present significations, but also towards possible 
futures and interventions legitimized in connection to these futures. This relation is 
performative in the sense that current and historic significations of what particular 
populations – of ‘African’ migrants or the American ‘nation’, etc. – represent function 
to demarcate possibilities for what could happen in climate-insecure futures.  
Essentializing logics are not always explicit statements about what a particular 
population ‘is’ and how it ‘might’, ‘would’, ‘could’ or ‘will’ react in climate-insecure 
futures, but also underlying assumptions associating groups – e.g. possible ‘Muslim’ 
and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants – with particular traits, for example a latent 
tendency towards terrorism. Essentializing logics are not generalized across US climate 
security discourse, but in partial, context-specific moments in which significations of 
cultural identities – racial and national – are articulated in key publications. As 
essentializing logics refer to how particular populations are cast in uncertain, aleatory 
futures, they also infer particular biopolitics. With biopolitics conceptualized as 
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discursive appropriations of valued lives and populations in US climate security, 
essentializing logics function not only as an important conceptual crossroads between 
the present and possible futures, but also in how populations and lived are ‘valued’. I 
argue that racial and national identities (identified as ‘racial’ and ‘national’ logics, 
particular forms of essentializing logics in climate security) represent a core dimension 
of these significations and valuations in US climate security.  
 
3.8 Racial and national logics in US and EU climate security discourses 
 
3.8.1 Racial logics 
 
Working from this standpoint, I adopt Goldberg’s (1992: 553) flexible, malleable 
conception of ‘race’: ‘a fluid, transforming, historically specific concept parasitic on 
theoretic and social discourses for the meaning it assumes at given historical 
moments.’ ‘Race’ is argued to be a socially constructed, parasitic force that leaps onto 
biological (e.g. skin colour) and cultural (for example religious affiliation) traits for its 
conceptual content (Goldberg 1993). Depending on the social conditions of the time, 
‘race’ will espouse multiple meanings in different places and attribute these meanings 
to arbitrarily defined populations. Crucially, Goldberg (1992: 559-60) doesn’t vacate 
‘race’ of all theoretical weight: ‘The minimal significance that race bears in itself is not 
of biological but naturalized group relations.’ Along with other socially constructed 
identities (e.g. ‘nation’ (Campbell 1998 (1992)) or ‘gender’ (Butler 1990)), ‘race’ 
naturalizes biological and cultural traits in its name to the extent that they appear as 
innate, immutable group characteristics. This adorns ‘race’ with an image of eternality, 
of fixedness through time (Miles 2002). It is this combination of features – an explicit 
emphasis on the historically constructed, contingent status of racialized attributes, and 
on ‘naturalization’ to demonstrate the power of ‘race’ as a signifier – that defines the 
understanding of ‘race’ in this project. If ‘races’ are socially constructed, processes of 
construction are fundamental. Goldberg (1992: 561) critiques the term ‘racial 
formation’ (Omi and Winant 1987) as too concerned with the ideological, structural 
determinants of racial significations and inattentive to intersubjective constituents of 
‘race’. He (1992: 561) favours the term ‘race creation’. To maintain an overarching, 
inclusive view of these strategies, I use the concept ‘racialization’. Following Barot and 
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Bird (2001), racialization is the process whereby socially constructed racial markers are 
attached to population groups. Elaborated further in chapter 4 on climate-induced 
migration, I focus on the racialization of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations in possible 
climate-insecure futures.  
 
Anti-Muslim sentiment has generated incendiary academic discussions in the wake of 
9/11 (Hopkins 2008a). Commonly termed ‘Islamophobia’, a widely cited definition 
comes from the Runnymede Trust (1997: 4): ‘Islamophobia refers to unfounded 
hostility towards Islam. It also refers to the practical consequences of such hostility in 
unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion 
of Muslims from mainstream social and political affairs.’ To supplement this definition, 
the report’s authors offer an open/closed views typology that underpins seven 
statements to measure Islamophobia (Runnymede Trust 1997). These include whether 
‘Islam is seen as monolithic and static, or as diverse and dynamic’, whether ‘Islam is  
seen as inferior, or as different but equal’, and if ‘Islam is seen as an aggressive enemy 
or as a cooperative partner’ (Runnymede Trust 1997: 4). The report’s authors decry the 
binaries that dominate stereotypes of Islam (e.g. ‘Islam versus the West’), but in a 
sense this framework replicates the dichotomous structure they aim to criticize (Allen 
2010a). Allen (2010a: 190) defines Islamophobia as ‘an ideology, similar in theory, 
function and purpose to racism … that sustains and perpetuates negatively eva luated 
meanings about Muslims and Islam … that inform and construct thinking about 
Muslims and Islam as Other.’ Allen (2010b) contends these ideological inclinations 
contribute to exclusionary outcomes for Muslims. More specifically, Anand (2010: 265) 
classifies Islamophobia as ‘a coherent and identifiable set of prejudices and 
stereotypes that generates fear of Islam and fuels a reaction to counter it’. However, 
whilst anti-Islamic discourses are an important concern, especially the religion’s 
essentialization and reduction to singular (mis)interpretations, Islamophobia’s 
dangerous effects are felt most severely by Muslims, a trend ‘Islamophobia’ struggles 
to encapsulate (Allen 2010a). Its focus on ‘Islam’ collapses the diversity of Muslim 
cultures around the world, restricting Muslims to their religious identity (Halliday 
1999). To account for this particular problem, I treat Islamophobia as a racialized 
identity. I explore how Muslims are racialized: how naturalized, innate traits are 
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ascribed to Muslim populations, and how these essentialized identities are handled to 
instantiate racial differences.  
 
This conceptualization requires several qualifications. First is a presumed distinction 
between ‘race’, ‘racial difference’ and ‘racism’, and ‘religious difference’ and ‘religious 
discrimination’. Allen (2010a) draws this boundary to create an autonomous concept 
with analytical clarity; his intention is to ‘finally establish, better define and 
conceptualize an independent and distinct Islamophobia’ (Allen 2010a: 157). Going 
further, Kong (2001: 212) laments overlaps between ‘race’ and religion: ‘In many 
instances, in the same breath that race, class and gender are inevitably invoked and 
studies as ways by which societies are fractured, religion is forgotten or conflated with 
race.’ This division is premised on a contention that religion cannot be folded into 
‘race’. Because religious adherents can choose their faith and undergo conversion, 
their religious identity cannot be classified in terms of innate, natural ized 
characteristics, i.e. in racial terms (Meer 2013). However, empirical examples question 
the universality of this assumption. For example, as Thomas (2010) documents, Jewish 
people were considered intrinsically different to their Christian counterparts  in 13th 
century Spain; bloodlines were contaminated to the point that conversion was longer 
an adequate route to redemption. Moreover, individuals are often born into faith 
communities: they do not decide their religious identity, but are ascribed this identity 
by others (Kundnani 2007).  
 
Additionally, the race-religion distinction relies on a dubious conception of ‘race’. If 
‘religion’ is different from ‘race’ because to belong to a ‘race’ requires innate, 
immutable characteristics, this posits an essential ontology of what ‘race’ is. But, as 
critical race scholars attest to, these characteristics are not natural, but socially 
constructed as such: racialization invokes a process of naturalization whereby 
biological and cultural markers are attached to social groups as external, pre-given 
elements of their identity (Goldberg 1992). Therefore, when scholars argue religion 
cannot be associated with race because it is voluntary, this mischaracterizes ‘race’ as 
reliant on a priori natural traits, rather than seeing these traits as naturalized. Although 
this is a subtle difference, it is important. Racial traits are not natural, but are socially 
constructed to appear as natural (Goldberg 1992). Thus, abandoning the assumption of 
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‘race’ as a naturalized category that a race-religion binary depends upon, I argue that, 
in the case of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations in moments of US climate security, 
religious identity is racialized. Muslim identities are racialized across a range of 
biological – e.g. skin colour (Rana 2007) – and cultural signifiers (for example inherent 
cultural incompatibility (Kundnani 2007)).  
 
Thinking about racialization in relation to uncertain futures, Mitchell (2010) begins 
with Anderson’s (2010b) claim that security involves the protection or preservation of 
some form of valued life. Instead of those lives that are secured, she (2010) focuses on 
abandoned life, ‘surplus life’ (p.240). She starts with two understandings of risk and 
uncertain futures: ‘what/if’ and ‘when/then’ scenarios. The former attempts to predict 
the future using known or controllable factors. What/if scenarios are based on 
institutional norms, surveillance and the constant simulation of possible futures in an 
effort to shape contemporary variables (Mitchell 2010). When/then scenarios are 
predicated on an inevitable future, one that is known in advance and incorporates a 
sovereign right of political knowledge. They carry a degree of fatalism (that certain 
events cannot be stopped) with only privileged sovereign figures enabled to plan and 
manage these eventualities (Mitchell 2010). What/if scenarios are linked to a form of 
neoliberal governmentality – in liberal democracies – that tries to control uncertainty 
and promote entrepreneurial speculation in risky situations (Mitchell 2010). 
When/then scenarios depend on a ‘sovereign pre-knowledge’ that guarantees a known 
future and how devalued lives will change or behave in such scenarios (Mitchell 2010: 
243). The constitution of pre-known risk failure, with its abandonment of particular, 
devalued lives, does not have to take the form of financial capitalism, but also the 
production of other ‘surplus populations’, e.g. deported asylum seekers or 
incarcerated young people. Those ‘likely to fail’ are associated with racial formations. 
Mitchell (2010: 243-4) writes: ‘those who are perceived as able to take advantage of 
what/if scenarios and control them to privilege certain futures are or become “White”. 
Those who are drafted into when/then scenarios in positions other than state 
authority, are or become “Black”.’ If in when/then scenarios the future is inevitable, 
this invokes a situation whereby populations are ‘pre-known’ as risk failures, the 
formation of ‘pre-Black’ populations (Mitchell 2010: 244). For populations demarcated 
as ‘pre-Black’, as risk failures, this can produce anticipatory banishment and 
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dispossession. Therefore, in Mitchell’s (2010) schema, the historical and geographical 
contingencies of racialization are implicated in a risk calculus where futures are 
rendered knowable and dispossess ‘surplus life’.  
 
Baldwin (2012) identifies a ‘future-conditional’ relation between racialization and 
climate-induced migration (CIM). Although he states there are other modes of alterity 
in climate change discourse (e.g. ‘indigeneity’, ‘the Muslim’ or ‘the terrorist’ (Baldwin 
2012: 627)), Baldwin (2012) centres on a form of postcolonial alterity related to the 
future. As opposed to a dialectical different-from relation critiqued by postcolonial 
theorists, alterity in CIM discourse conceives of the Other as yet-to-come. Baldwin 
(2012: 636; 2013b, see chapter 4) defines the climate migrant in the future-conditional 
tense: ‘climate change and migration discourse expresses race not as historical 
signification, but as future-conditional potential … race … is something that bodies can 
become; it is a future-conditional attribute of bodies. Race, in this sense, is an 
emergent phenomenon’. In this dissertation, I agree with Baldwin’s diagnosis of 
racialized climate-induced migration as future-conditional, but argue it is not only in a 
condition of potentiality this is realized, but also possibility.  
 
Baldwin (2016) supplements this analysis with the concept of ‘white affect’, a form of 
affective intensity located at intersections of the actual and virtual. White affect is not 
a racism indicated by discursive significations or an exclusionary value system, but an 
affective relation felt prior to ‘cessation’ (following Massumi 2002). Affect is virtual 
intensity: it is not purely indeterminate or processual, but located in the interplay 
between process and position. Baldwin (2016: 6) defines white affect as ‘an intensity 
that prefigures and animates ‘whiteness’, an intensification or closing down of the 
myriad futures available to bodies in a way that confines them to a set of constraints 
expressed as ‘whiteness’.’ He (2016) is careful to stress this does not translate into a 
universal whiteness, but that whiteness is variegated across contexts. It is grounded in 
a premediative security apparatus that imagines multiple possible futures through 
techniques such as magical realism, scenarios and quantitative model ling (Baldwin 
2016). White affect is also situated in a context of the ‘post-racial’ (Goldberg 2015). 
This is a neoliberal racialism in which the social is supposedly shorn of racisms and race 
(or these are privatized from the public sphere to individual abuses), despite the 
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persistence of institutional racisms. Finally, white affect is based on an affective fear, 
one of the climate migrant as a potential, indeterminate threat in a world of constant 
transformations (with concomitant anxieties about the durability of white supremacy) 
(Baldwin 2016). Thus, in Baldwin’s (2012; 2013b; 2016) conceptualizations of 
racialization and futurity, climate-induced migration is articulated as a virtual, ‘yet-to-
come’ racialized figure emergent prior to (but interconnected with) discursive 
signification or dialectical identity formation, and one existent in a ‘future-conditional’ 
orientation towards potential climate changed futures.  
 
Both Mitchell’s (2010) and Baldwin’s (2012; 2013b; 2016) understandings of race and 
uncertain futures are important for essentializing logics. I share Mitchell’s (2010) 
argument that racialized inscriptions of ‘risky’ populations are cast into assumptions 
about eventualities in climate-insecure futures. Essentializing logics are also – 
following Foucault and Fassin’s injunctions about biopolitical inequalities – grounded in 
politics of ‘abandonment’ and ‘surplus life’. However, notwithstanding Mitchell’s 
(2010) recognition that White and Black individuals can switch between what/if and 
when/then scenarios, I disagree with her assumptions that those lives characterized as 
biopolitically surplus (‘Black’ or ‘pre-Black’) are situated solely in a when/then scenario 
whereby the future is absolutely knowable and anticipatory dispossession is what will 
happen. Whilst there is a context-specific trend of how ‘African’ populations will or are 
very likely to react in climate-insecure futures (what is called a compulsive determinism 
in chapter 4, section 4.5), I contend that essentializing logics also configure possible 
climate-induced migrants in terms of what they might or could do.  
 
This is more akin to Baldwin’s (2012) future-conditional orientation in climate-induced 
migration. However, whilst I agree with Baldwin (2012; 2013b; 2016) that racialized 
logics in climate-induced migration are held in a future-conditional orientation and 
invoke anxieties about climate-induced migrants, this chapter situates racial identities 
on a platform of discursively rendered possible futures, not as potential or ‘prefigured’ 
phenomena. This is not to say that ‘race’ in CIM does not take these forms, but that 
specific present-future relations exhibited by essentializing racial and national logics (in 
US and EU climate securities) are in the domain of possibilities. They are at the 
intersections where historic and current significations of racial Others inform what will, 
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is likely to, might or could happen in climate-insecure futures. In particular, racialized, 
essentializing logics operate, in context-specific moments of US climate security, 
through tropes of ‘naturalization’, ‘dehumanization’ and ‘determinism’ (explored 
further in chapter 4). In addition to racial logics, I also argue that essentializing – 
national – logics configure constructions of American nationhood in context-specific 
moments of US climate security discourse. Nationhood and national logics are 
elaborated in section 3.8.2. 
 
3.8.2 National logics 
 
Benedict Anderson (2005 (1991): 49, original emphasis) defines the nation as ‘an 
imagined political community … It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members … yet in the minds of 
each lives their image of communion … The nation is imagined as limited because even 
the largest of them … has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.’ 
The nation is imagined as sovereign because, at the time the concept emerges in late 
18th century Europe, les philosophes of the Enlightenment were challenging the notion 
of a divinely ordained, dynastic realm (Anderson 2005 (1991)). Confronted with the 
pluralism of religious differences, the nation, associated with the sovereign state, came 
to be seen as the collective subject to guarantee freedom and sovereignty over divided 
territories. Finally, the nation is imagined as a ‘community’ because, although national 
populations have been (and are) characterized in many instances by inequality and 
exploitation, nationhood is nonetheless conceptualized as a form of horizontal 
solidarity, a collective togetherness (Anderson 2005 (1991)).  
 
Anderson (2005 (1991)) notes that ‘nation’ emerged in 18th century Europe from three 
interconnected conditions of possibility. First is the notion of a particular script-
language that offered guarantees of universal truth (Latin in Medieval Europe); second 
is the idea that society was hierarchically organized around higher orders (the monarch 
under a form of divine rule). Third was a form of temporal reasoning in which history 
and cosmology are indistinguishable, grounding the origins of humankind in the 
natural order of things (Anderson 2005 (1991)). Under these conditions, two historical 
developments in medieval and early modern Europe are identified as important: first is 
 
 
 
98 
98 
the invention of the printing press in 1440 and development of a publishing and 
bookselling industry in the early 16th century. And second is the beginning of the 
Reformation, with Martin Luther’s German-language theses about the limitations of 
Catholic Christianity (published in Wittenburg in 1517 (Anderson 2005 (1991))). It was 
this combination of linguistic diversity (modifications of Latin in this period and 
publication in other European languages) and a technology of communications (print) 
that Anderson (2005 (1991)) identifies as conditions of possibility for the emergence of 
nations as imagined communities.  
 
Fundamental to the temporality of Anderson’s (2005 (1991): 52) ‘imagined 
communities’ is ‘homogenous empty time’, a notion of background, calendric time into 
which the nation’s trajectory as a collective subject is injected. This feeds into a 
national teleology in which ‘nations’ spring from an immemorial past and are destined 
to a unified, limitless future. As Anderson (2005 (1991): 51) writes, ‘it is the magic of 
nationalism to turn chance into destiny’. In his essay DissemiNation, Bhabha (1990: 
270) critiques this linear, teleological temporality and points out an ambivalent ‘double 
time’ in the Western nation. On the one hand, it is the object of a pedagogical national 
ideology that posits an origin and trajectory for ‘the people’, and on the other people 
are the ‘subjects’ of a process of signification in which the national sign is reiterated 
and reproduced in a variety of everyday situations (Bhabha 1990). There is a split 
between the continuous, linear time of the pedagogical, and the repetitive, recursive 
time of the performative (Bhabha 1990). Bhabha (1990) argues it is at the interstices of 
these temporalities a homogenous, linear nationhood can be challenged.  
 
Closs Stephens (2013: 17) contends that whilst Anderson’s ideas are important for 
demonstrating the constructed-ness of nationhood, they are characterized by a 
‘double connection’ in which a linear understanding of time not only encapsulates the 
nation-form, but also forms the grounds of knowledge for critical understandings of 
nation and nationalism. Whereas Anderson (2005 (1991)) critiques the teleological 
narrative of nationhood, he still depends upon a linear temporality charting how the 
nation ‘emerged’ historically and constitutes an important dimension of the political 
‘future’ (Closs Stephens 2013). Closs Stephens (2013: 111, original emphasis) proposes 
that whilst ‘nation’ is an important ‘tag-phrase’ to elucidate the repetition and 
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narration of nationhood, it does not account for the politics of nationalism. She (2013: 
111, original emphasis) notes: ‘it doesn’t always allow us to ask how we might resist 
the repetition of the nation-form and the persistence of nationalism in the 
contemporary world.’ Instead, Closs Stephens (2013) concludes that in order to 
imagine political futures outside of nationalism, scholars need to think in terms of 
multiple future temporalities. This understands the future as unfolding in multiple 
ways and not shackled to the nation-form. It implies ‘politics might not be understood 
as that which takes place within a common unitary framework but rather, as struggles 
over different ways of practicing political community. This does not mean a battle 
between ‘our’ community and ‘their’ community, but … struggles over the very ways in 
which political community is conceptualized, negotiated and actualized’ (Closs 
Stephens 2013: 115, original emphasis). Thus, Closs Stephens’ (2013) argument implies 
a need to pluralize ways in which the temporalities of nationhood and political 
nationhood are conceived. With this critique in mind, I adopt the concept of national 
logics (a type of essentializing logics) to understand how context-specific 
representations of American nationhood are oriented towards possible climate-
insecure futures.  
 
As such, I explore the interplay of current and historic significations of American 
nationhood with future possibilities of climate insecurity. This includes concepts of 
American exceptionalism, human security, and resilience in the construction of a 
climate-secure America (elaborated in chapter 6). Essentializing logics of US 
nationhood (termed ‘national logics’ in chapter 6) are constructed along multiple lines 
of discursive intersection between presents and futures. On the one hand, historic and 
current significations of what America ‘is’ or ‘stands for’ play into representations of 
how the United States will react in climate-insecure futures. In this sense, national 
logics of American nationhood are oriented similarly to, and in intersection with, racial 
logics in moments of climate-induced migration debates. On the other hand, the 
national logic alters so that it is not about present significations informing future 
possibilities, but instead that the outcomes of climate impacts inform future 
representations of American nationhood (for example inscriptions of a defensive 
American exceptionalism shaped by climate impacts).  
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For these multiple forms of essentializing logics – inscribed by racial and national 
identifications – inequalities are postulated in possible climate-insecure futures. These 
inequalities are not only about who has a stake in the collective subjectivity of 
American ‘nationhood’, but about which groups are constructed as racially Other – 
‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations – in climate-induced migration debates. Through a 
focus on discursive constructions of terrorism in climate security, I also explore how 
racial and national logics intersect at multiple, context-specific moments (chapter 6). 
As such, essentializing logics function to demarcate discursive, biopolitical divisions 
between particular valued lives and populations in possible climate-insecure futures. 
However, whereas these logics function to maintain or instigate inequalities in 
conditions of climate insecurities, section 3.9 explores options for an affirmative, 
critical discussion of alternative environmental securities or justices.  
 
3.9 Possibilities for environmental justices in US and EU climate securities  
 
In her reflections on the category of the ‘stranger’, Sara Ahmed (2000) warns against 
its figuration as the Stranger, a figuration that masks the social and political 
relationships of its constitution and produces a certain fetishism. She (2000: 5, original 
emphasis) writes: ‘stranger fetishism is a fetishism of figures: it invests the figure of the 
stranger with a life of its own insofar as it cuts ‘the stranger’ off from the histories of its 
determination.’ In a later piece, this theorization is scaled up to ‘the Other’: ‘To negate 
or give up on the particularity of others would involve its own violence: the 
transformation of others into the figure of the other involves its own betrayal of the 
future, as the possibility that others might be other than ‘the other’ or as the 
possibility of being faced by other others’ (Ahmed 2002: 560-1). Thus, although Ahmed 
subscribes to a notion of radical alterity and the impossibility of fully knowing the 
other – each with its own histories of determination, sociality, power relations and so 
forth – she cautions against the homogenization of particular others into the Other, a 
figuration which negates these differences. A key point in arguing that essentializing 
logics (with racial and national logics as particular forms of essentializing logics)  orient 
national and racial identities towards climate-insecure futures is that they cut off these 
histories of determination and sociality that Ahmed (2002) documents. This is not only 
to the extent that essentialized conceptions of racial and national identity circumscribe 
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contemporary discourses of US climate security, but also that they delimit possibilities 
for alternative socialities and futures to emerge. They are a ‘betrayal of the future’, 
closing off ‘the possibility that others might be other than ‘the other’’, and ‘the 
possibility of being faced by other others’ (Ahmed 2002: 561).  
 
In order to challenge this centralizing trend of essentialization – towards the figure of 
the Other – I argue situated, context-specific conceptions of environmental justice and 
securities are important. This is not to reinforce a universalized conception of social 
solidarity. For example, in his critique of a ‘futurism’ in liberal democracies prioritizing 
‘future generations’ and preserving a liberal, national ‘Same’ above actually existing 
‘Others’, Hannah (2011: 1049) argues an affirmative biopolitical solidarity should 
redefine the ‘Same’ to incorporate all currently existing lives. This translates into 
‘massive redistribution of the political, economic and environmental means for the self -
determined fulfillment of life sideaways across the globe’ (Hannah 2011: 1050, original 
emphasis). It is a biopolitics characterized by an ‘immanent or devolved futurism’, a 
‘programme of human security’ (p.1050, original emphasis). Notwithstanding the 
fundamentality of care and redistribution, I argue Hannah’s (2011) case for universal 
human security, an extension of ‘the Same’, does not recognize the multiple, situated 
ways in which environmental securities and justices are conceptualized and 
experienced in the US. Consequently, he risks reinforcing an essentializing tendency 
that engulfs or denies these differences. Consistent with Said’s (1994) anti-
essentialism, this chapter does not deny the importance of globalized identities or 
solidarities, but seeks to identify situated, context-specific and multi-scalar 
articulations of these constructions. It seeks to recognize the contingent, permeable 
boundaries signifying cultural differences – of diverse ‘others’ – without encapsulating 
these within an all-encompassing Other.  
 
I argue a decentralizing anti-essentialism in practice could take inspiration from 
environmental justice perspectives. Walker and Burningham (2011) accept there is no 
generally agreed definition of environmental justice, but that two questions are usually 
implicated: how social inequalities relate to environmental issues, and how to evaluate 
inequalities in light of just, fair outcomes (allocations of responsibility, how policy 
could change etc.). The term ‘justice’ is especially important here: it indicates a move 
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from victimhood towards citizens with rights to be asserted, claimed and protected. 
Additionally, it focuses on why inequalities exist, making connections between 
injustices and inequitable relations of power. Environmental justice focuses attention 
to the multi-scalar character of environmental injustices, with claims in local, situated 
contexts articulated across scales (Walker and Burningham 2011). Environmental 
justice (EJ) perspectives emerged in the US in the late 1970s and are concerned with 
the unequal exposure of particular communities (communities of colour and low 
income) to environmental hazards, e.g. proximity to toxic waste sites (Bickerstaff and 
Agyeman 2009). Subsequently, localized EJ struggles have highlighted the imbrication 
of environmental inequalities with racism and class injustices (Bickerstaff and Agyeman 
2009). Environmental (in)justice is preferred to the term ‘environmental racism’ in this 
instance (Pulido 2000). This is not to undermine the racialized differentiations that 
present in particular, context-specific moments of US and EU climate security 
discourses, but to recognize that environmental injustices and insecurities are also 
intertwined with other identity constructions (notably nationhood in this project) 
(Cutter 1995). Studying ‘environmental formations’ in Latin America, defined as ‘the 
historically contingent articulations between environmental imaginaries, natural 
resource allocations, and political economies’ (p.569), Sundberg (2008) argues 
racialization, alongside nation-building and legal frameworks, is central to 
environmental injustices.  
 
This project subscribes to such an environmental justice perspective. Environmental 
justice provides an important framework through which the contingent, historically 
situated struggles for environmental justice in the US can be approached without 
engulfing these in an essentializing schema of the Other. Importantly, I do not 
disregard the concept of ‘security’, but rather emphasize the interconnections 
between environmental securities and environmental justices. Although the 
centralizing, militarized practices of national security in environmental politics have 
been critiqued (Barnett 2001), Dalby (2014) points out security is a foundational 
organizing concept for many societies, including in the US. Instead of exclusionary, 
essentializing securities demarcating ‘Us’ from ‘Them’, ‘inside’ from ‘outside’, the focus 
should be on creating what Koopman (2011: 280) calls ‘alter-geopolitics’. She defines 
this as ‘a feminist geopolitics as done through action. It is people coming together to 
 
 
 
103 
103 
build alternative nonviolent securities’ (p.280). It is feminist because it targets 
inequitable relations of power: ‘alter-geopolitics’ brings people together in action, 
creating shared, multi-scalar securities (Koopman 2011).  
 
As Koopman (2011: 281) notes, ‘alter-geopolitics works to build security in a broader, 
multiple sense … It is people coming together across difference not just to stay alive 
and be safe, but to live well, with dignity and justice.’ Alter-geopolitics seeks to deliver 
multiple, shared securities across differences. It draws clear connections between 
security and justice: that the building of collective securities is co-dependent with 
‘dignity’ and ‘justice’. If geopolitics or security are not to be ‘a Great Game to be 
played by Great Men’, an alter-geopolitics ‘means not only pieces moving themselves 
on a map … but also changing who gets to move what, where, when, how and why. 
This does not mean groups doing alter-geopolitics are advocating any one set of rules, 
for these will necessarily be different across contexts’ (Koopman 2011: 281). Thus, an 
alter-geopolitics of US climate securities focuses not only on the unequal power 
relations of climate security politics, but also the need for multiple shared securi ties 
across contexts. It is this combination, of plural, situated accounts of environmental 
securities grounded in environmental justice concerns, that I argue could represent 
limited, tentative possibilities for productive critiques of essentializing US climate 
securities. After chapters 4, 5 and 6 offer empirical elaborations of essentializing logics, 
I return to a discussion of what decentralizing (anti-essentialising), justice-oriented 
environmental securities could offer to climate security discourse in the thesis’ 
concluding chapter (section 7.3).  
 
To conclude, this chapter has outlined a theoretical framework for study of racial and 
national identities in US climate security discourses. Inspired by Said’s (1994) anti -
essentialism, I contend US climate security discourses are embedded in multiple 
biopolitics of unequally valued lives (based on Foucault’s (2009 (1977)) and Fassin’s 
(2009) models). Such biopolitics are multiple and rendered discursively knowable in 
possible futures. They are valued as national and racial identities. In context-specific 
moments of US climate security, essentializing logics orient historic and current 
significations about racial Others and American nationhood towards climate-insecure 
futures (from Hall’s and Anderson’s accounts). Chapters 4 (on racial logics in climate-
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induced migration discourse), 5 (discourses of terrorism in US climate security), and 6 
(national logics and constructions of a climate-secure American nationhood) explore 
this theoretical analytic in more empirical depth.  
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Chapter 4: 
Exploring racial logics in US and EU climate security 
discourses 
 
4.1 Introduction and research questions 
 
1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security 
discourse? 
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed 
in and through US and EU climate security discourses? 
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security 
discourse? 
 
This, the first of the thesis’ empirical chapters, explores racialized identities in context-
specific moments of US (and to a lesser extent EU) climate security discourse. I argue 
essentializing logics – composed of naturalized discursive assumptions – orient a racial 
Other towards possible climate-insecure futures. First, the chapter introduces racial 
logics (a type of essentializing logics focused on racialized identities) and situates 
climate-induced migration (CIM) debates in US climate security (section 4.2). It outlines 
three modalities racial logics take. First is naturalization: (re)construction of a racial 
‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other with a latent tendency towards terrorism/radicalization 
and as inherently culturally incompatible with European societies  (section 4.3). Second 
is dehumanization: geopolitical narratives that undermine possible climate-induced 
migrants’ agency (section 4.4) Finally, the chapter touches on compulsive determinism. 
This trope builds on neo-Malthusian foundations to suggest that, presented with a 
range of adaptive strategies, ‘African’ communities are compelled towards acts of 
violence or disruptive migrations (section 4.5). These modalities are illustrated with 
reference to moments of US climate security discourse (assisted by instances from EU-
derived data) and the case of CIM from the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
region to the European Union (EU). I argue racial logics in CIM debates are 
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underpinned by biopolitics of unequally valued lives, with racialization an important 
marker of these differential valuations.  
 
4.2 Racial logics 
 
This section introduces racial logics as a particular form of essentializing logics oriented 
towards racialized identities. Essentializing logics are introduced in Chapter 3 (section 
3.7) as contingent, discursively constructed series of essentializing propositions, 
assumptions and associations that rationalize and legitimize possible future outcomes 
or interventions. Although different in each case, essentializing logics are applicable 
across contexts, do not assume prior agency, are constituted in unequal power 
relations, and are oriented towards both historic or present significations and possible 
futures. Essentializing logics are performative in that significations of what particular 
populations ‘are’ or ‘represent’ can demarcate poss ibilities for what might happen in 
climate-insecure futures. They facilitate Othering of populations and ‘imaginative 
geographies’ (Said 2003 (1978)). In moments of US climate security discourse, climate 
change is represented as a ‘threat multiplier’ that exacerbates existing threats, e.g. 
conflict and terrorism (Buxton and Hayes 2016). As climate change invokes both first- 
and second-order insecurities (Methmann and Rothe 2012), this does not mean that 
human subjects produced as Others are the ‘direct enemy’ around which security 
institutions mobilize. As racial Others, they are constituted from naturalized 
assumptions. ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations are not inherently prone to terrorism 
or cultural incompatibility, but socially constructed as such; they are ‘not grounded in 
nature, but producing nature as a sort of guarantee of its truth’ (Hall 1996: 144). 
Naturalization sediments particular assumptions or claims as  the ‘common sense’ or 
‘the truth’ of ideologies and cultures (Hall 1996: 141): identities are fixed and divorced 
from their contingent politics. I argue naturalized assumptions about a racial ‘Muslim’ 
and ‘African’ Other underwrite – in a partial, context-specific manner – possible 
climate-insecure futures. Section 4.3 discusses naturalized racial markers of a latent 
tendency towards terrorism and inherent cultural incompatibility in context-specific 
moments of climate security discourse. I follow this up with two specific 
manifestations of naturalized racial logics: dehumanizing geopolitical representations 
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(Section 4.4), and a compulsive determinism directing climate-induced migrants’ 
choices in conditions of climate insecurity (Section 4.5).  
 
4.3 Naturalization 
 
This section introduces the empirical context of climate-induced migration from the 
MENA region to the EU and naturalized, racial Others constructed in representations of 
this context. It is a partial, particular context through which racial logics function in US 
climate security: most references to racial logics and CIM occur from 2007-10. Prior to 
a discussion of naturalization as a racial trope in US climate security documents, I first 
outline histories of migration from the MENA region to the EU to situate this 
discussion before moving onto debates of climate-induced migration. 
 
4.3.1 Historical context 
 
Migration from Maghreb and MENA countries to Western Europe has been especially 
prominent since at least the 1950s. Numbers increased after Algerian Independence 
(1962) with a series of bilateral recruitment agreements; Morocco signed these with 
West Germany (May 1963), France (June 1963), Belgium (February 1964), and the 
Netherlands (May 1969) (White 2011). After the OPEC embargo and oil crisis (1973/4), 
European governments have increasingly restricted migration and drafted readmission 
agreements for irregular migrants’ repatriation. Morocco signed agreements with 
France (1993), Germany (1998), Spain (1992), and from the late 1990s readmission 
agreements have been delegated to the European Commission (El Qadim 2014). 
However, despite securitization of external borders – facilitated by the 1985 Schengen 
Agreement and establishment of FRONTEX (the EU’s border agency) in 2004 – 
migration from MENA countries to the EU continued. In 1998, 1.6 million Moroccans 
lived in Northern Europe; an estimated 300,000 Tunisians were living abroad in 2003; 
and 800,000 Algerians by 2000 (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). Most irregular migrants in 
Southern European countries overstay tourist visas (Dines et al 2015). Of those who 
arrive by boat, Spain reported an increase in interceptions from 1573 (in 1976) to 
11781 migrants in 2005, whilst the Italian Government reported 12,737 interceptions 
in 2004, most arriving to the island of Lampedusa (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). Libya, as a 
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‘transit country’, has become increasingly important to the EU. The Italian and Libyan 
governments signed an agreement (2003) whereby immigration liaison officers would 
be exchanged between the two nation-states: Libyan police would attend border 
enforcement training courses and immigration centres would be commissioned on 
Libyan territory (Lutterbeck 2009).  
 
These histories of migration became increasingly intertwined with climate change 
narratives from the mid-late 2000s. Theories connecting environmental drivers and 
migration stretch back to the 19th century; writing in 1891, Ravenstein argued that 
environmental factors (e.g. climatic changes) were one of the many causal variations 
that could influence migratory decisions (Piguet 2013). Essam El-Hinnawi brought the 
term ‘environmental refugee’ to the fore in a 1985 UNEP report as a means to grapple 
with the problems of individuals forced to leave their homes due to natural disasters 
(Weinthal et al 2015). ‘Environmental refugees’ were also later cited in the influential 
Brundtland Report (1987) (Boas 2015). Norman Myers (2005) predicted the existence 
200 million climate-induced migrants by 2050, but Methmann and Oels (2015) point 
out this figure assumes every person resident in an area with predicted climate change 
impacts, e.g. coastal erosion, would be forced to move. It takes no account of the 
complexities of migration (mediated by social, economic, political and cultural 
dynamics), or the range of adaptive strategies (for example livelihood diversification or 
flood defence investment) available in affected areas.5 From the mid 2000s, CIM 
received attention from security institutions and Boas (2015) contends the 2007 and 
2011 UN Security Council debates on climate change are key historical developments. 
In 2008, the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana and European Commission 
produced a report noting the possibility of mass migration from Africa to the EU. They 
(2008: 8) write: ‘In Southern Africa, droughts are likely to intensify … Migration in this 
region, but also migration from other regions through Northern Africa to reach Europe 
(transit migration) is likely to intensify’. This report represents one of the EU’s first 
statements on climate-induced migration (Trombetta 2014). It is paralleled by a series 
of US publications (see, for example, CNA (2007) and Campbell et al (2007), discussed 
below) speculating on mass CIM from Africa to the EU. In her analysis of CIM debates, 
                                                 
5 As Brown (2008: 8) notes, Myers admits himself that his estimate, though based on the best available 
data at the time, relied on some ‘“heroic extrapolations”’.  
 
 
 
109 
109 
Oels (2016) proposes three discourses. First is ‘climate refugees’, disseminated by 
security institutions and NGOs and which casts CIM as a security threat justifying harsh 
measures, e.g. strict border controls. Oels’ (2016) second discourse is ‘human security’: 
this looks to ‘save’ climate-induced migrants and directs attention towards risk 
management strategies, international development and humanitarian intervention. 
Finally, CIM is presented as an adaptation strategy; individuals are encouraged to 
utilize migration strategically to build resilience and economic opportunities (Black et 
al 2011; Oels 2016).  
 
Geovanni Bettini (2013) identities four discursive frames used to describe climate-
induced migration. First is the scientific frame (epitomized by IPCC reports); second is 
‘capitalist’ (for instance the Stern Review (2007)); third a humanitarian platform 
(encapsulated by NGO reports); and finally a radical Southern platform, captured by 
climate justice interpretations of climate-induced migration (Bettini 2013). 
In a later piece, Bettini (2014) differentiates between securitized ‘climate refugee’ and 
‘migration-as-adaptation’ – underpinned by ideas of human security, adaptation and 
resilience – registers in his account of the biopolitics of climate-induced migration. The 
‘security’ register symbolizes a dangerous, non-developed, ‘pathologically unfit’ 
climate-induced migrant engaged in ‘bad circulation’; conversely, the ‘migration-as-
adaptation’ register constructs adaptable, resilient and entrepreneurial neoliberal 
subjects, ‘good circulation’ (Bettini 2014: 191). Chaturvedi and Doyle (2015: 109) write 
that imaginative geographies of contemporary climate securities envision ‘millions of 
Afro-Asians being uprooted and displaced from their habitat and crossing borders in 
search of the greener and securer pastures.’ Discussing a possible convergence of 
climate-induced migration discourses around an apocalyptic narrative, Bettini (2013: 
68) warns this can produce neo-Malthusian narratives of mass migrations and conflict 
tied to ‘restrictive/xenophobic policies’, a point reiterated by Hayes (2016). However, 
whilst Bettini’s (2013; 2014) accounts touch on the biopolitics and exclusions of 
climate-induced migration discourses, they do not account for the mechanisms 
through which they are racialized and the inequalities racialized identities suggest in 
climate-insecure futures.  
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Summarizing the security, ‘threats’-based CIM narrative, Oels (2016: 192) states: ‘the 
discourse spreads fear about climate refugees. It constructs climate refugees as a 
threat to the national security of states, and mobilizes defence as the mode of 
securing.’ She (p.192) contends this is ‘undeniably racist’, and drawing upon Baldwin’s 
(2013b) analysis of Michael Nash’s 2009 film Climate Refugees, argues it draws upon 
racist stereotypes of Western experts assisting poor victims of climate impacts in a 
‘dangerous’ Global South, representing climate-induced migrants as victims and 
threats simultaneously. As described in Chapter 3 (section 3.8.1), Baldwin (2012: 627) 
identifies a range of modes of alterity in climate change discourse, e.g. ‘indigeneity’, 
‘the Muslim’ or ‘the terrorist’, but centres on a relation of postcolonial alterity 
oriented to the future. As opposed to a dialectical different-from relation critiqued by 
postcolonial theorists, alterity in CIM discourse conceives of the Other as yet-to-come. 
Baldwin (2013b) argues ‘the climate migrant’ is racialized through three tropes. 
‘Naturalization’ refers to the way climate-induced migrants are represented with 
nature idioms (e.g. migrants are forced to relocate for natural reasons and not internal 
reason). ‘Loss of status’ refers to trans-boundary migration and depictions of climate 
migrants as an excess of international political order. ‘Ambiguity’ racializes climate 
migrants as indeterminate: a product of multifactorial causality (e.g. economic 
opportunities, land tenure or conflict), and in excess of calculation (Baldwin 2013b).  
 
Baldwin (2016) also formulates the concept of ‘white affect’, an affective fear of the 
climate migrant as an indeterminate threat in a world of constant potential 
transformations and anxieties about European white supremacy. Baldwin’s (2012; 
2013b; 2016) conclusions suggest a ‘yet-to-come’ racialized figure emerging prior to 
discursive identity formation and existent in a ‘future-conditional’ orientation. 
Highlighted in Chapter 3 (section 3.8.1), this thesis also explores the racialization of 
CIM, but in the specific domain of climate security discourse. It does not locate 
racialization in a prefigured potentiality, but rather in discursively rendered 
possibilities. In this sense, I argue that Baldwin’s (2013b; 2016) accounts of racialized 
climate-induced migration debates do not adequately account for the discursive 
means through which populations are racialized in climate-insecure futures. His (2016) 
account is situated a temporality of potentiality located prior to signification, but this 
chapter contends that discursive, signified racialized identities (essentializing logics and 
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a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other) are important, context-specific constituents of 
CIM discourses. Additionally, whilst Baldwin’s (2013b) concept of naturalization 
(epitomized by the adoption of nature idioms) is important, for example biological and 
immunological metaphors to describe terrorism-climate change interactions in chapter 
5 (section 5.5), I understand naturalization in Hall’s (1996) terms as the rendering of 
statements or assumptions as inherent, ‘common sense’, decontextualized and 
temporally fixed. Naturalization is used to capture the ways essentializing  (racial) logics 
are implicated in the (re)construction of a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other in 
climate-insecure futures. 
 
 4.3.2 Racial logics and a latent capacity towards terrorism 
 
This analysis builds on Oels (2016), Baldwin’s (2012; 2013b; 2016) and Bettini’s (2013) 
concerns about racialization and xenophobia in the context of US and EU climate 
security discourses. I start with the landmark November 2007 report The Age of 
Consequences: The Foreign and National Security Implications of Climate Change 
(Campbell et al 2007). Published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
and the Center for a New American Security (two US based think tanks), this report is 
one of several seminal moments from what Liberatore (2013) calls the ‘2007 turn’. 
Alongside the UN Security Council debate on climate change (19th April (UNSC 2007a 
and b)), the Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board released their influential 
publication National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (CNA 2007). As an 
important early example from the CDA and worthy of quoting at length, Campbell et al 
(2007: 59) discuss migration from Africa to the EU: 
 
‘While most African and South Asian migration will be internal or 
regional, the expected decline in food production and fresh 
drinking water, combined with the increased conflict caused by 
resource scarcity, will force more Africans and South Asians to 
migrate further abroad. This will likely result in a surge of the 
number of Muslim immigrants to the European Union (EU), which 
could exacerbate existing tensions and increase the likelihood of 
radicalization among members of Europe’s growing (and often 
poorly assimilated) Islamic communities. Already, the majority of 
immigrants to most Western European countries are Muslim. 
Muslims constitute approximately 5% of the European population, 
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with the largest communities located in France, the Netherlands, 
Germany, and Denmark. Europe’s Muslim population is expected 
to double by 2025, and it will be much larger if … the effects of 
climate change spur additional migration from Africa and South 
Asia.  
 
The degree of instability this generates will depend on how 
successfully these immigrant populations are integrated into 
European society. This process has not always gone well (as 
exemplified in 2005 by the riots in the poor and predominantly 
immigrant suburbs of Paris), and the suspicion with which 
Europe’s Muslim and immigrant communities are viewed by many 
would be greatly intensified by an attack from a “homegrown 
terrorist.” Given that a nationalist, anti-immigrant backlash could 
result from even a small or unsuccessful attack, the risk that such 
a backlash will occur is high.  
 
If the backlash is sufficiently severe, the EU’s cohesion will be 
tested … Thus far, the EU has responded to this challenge with ad 
hoc measures, such as creating rapid reaction border guard teams. 
While the influx of immigrants from Africa – Muslim and otherwise 
– will continue to be viewed by some as a potential catalyst for 
economic growth at a time when the EU has a very low fertility 
rate, the viability of the EU’s loose border controls will be called 
into question, and the lack of a common immigration policy will 
invariably lead to internal political tension.’  
 
 
Here, Campbell et al (2007) speculate on an increase to Europe’s Muslim population in 
response to climate insecurities. Several linguistic features stand out. First is the 
negative lexis describing migration and its consequences, e.g. ‘suspicion’, ‘exacerbate 
existing tensions’, ‘internal political tension’, ‘attack’ and ‘homegrown terrorist’. 
Campbell et al (2007) make a number of assumptions about cross-border migration, 
including a ‘degree of instability’ generated by an increase in the EU’s ‘Muslim’ 
population and that, even if ‘an influx of immigrants’ acts as ‘a catalyst for economic 
growth’, this is counteracted by the claim that ‘the lack of a common immigration 
policy will invariably lead to internal political tension.’ These assumptions and lexical 
articulations are all premised on a negative view of intercontinental migration to the 
EU (‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’).  
 
There are also associations between climate-induced migration and terrorism in the 
report. This observation suggests that, in certain, context-specific moments of a 
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securitized climate-induced migration discourse, the figure of a ‘climate terrorist’ is 
discursively constructed (Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015: 135). A latent vulnerability 
towards or capacity for radicalization and terrorism is repeated multiple times in The 
Age of Consequences. In the above passage, Campbell et al (2007) assert a ‘surge in the 
number of Muslim immigrants … could increase the likelihood of radicalization’, and 
that ‘the suspicion with which Europe’s Muslim and immigrant communities are 
viewed by many would be greatly intensified by an attack by a “homegrown terrorist.”’ 
Later in the document, Campbell et al (2007: 106) also stress that ‘an influx of Muslims 
into Europe … could lead to new tensions over foreign policy priorities (e.g. towards 
Muslim countries or Islamist terrorism).’ In all of these quotations, ‘Muslim’ migrants, 
communities and minorities are linked to the possibility of radicalization and terrorism. 
It could be that repeated associations naturalize radicalization and terrorism to 
‘Muslim’ populations in particular and by extension produce a racialized ‘Muslim’ 
Other as fixed and decontextualized. Modal verbs like ‘could lead to’ or ‘would be’ 
construct ‘Muslim’ migrants in the future-conditional tense and orient a racial ‘Muslim’ 
Other towards possible futures. A naturalized tendency towards terrorism becomes an 
additional variable in climate-insecure futures: because ‘Muslims’ are associated with 
latent possibilities of terrorism, this could or might lead to radicalization and terrorism 
from ‘Muslim’ subjects in different futures. Thus, in the particular context of The Age 
of Consequences (Campbell et al 2007), I argue that a racial logic of naturalized 
assumptions (historic and current significations) could operate to delimit a ‘Muslim’ 
Other’s future possibilities.  
 
An attachment of Muslim populations to violence corresponds with histories of 
essentializing Islam and Muslims in American political and media contexts. In Covering 
Islam, Edward Said (1997 (1981): 8-9) notes: ‘”Islam” seems to engulf all aspects of the 
diverse Muslim world, reducing them all to a special malevolent and unthinking 
essence. Instead of analysis and understanding as a result, there can be for the most 
part only the crudest form of us-versus-them.’ Said (1997 (1981)) focuses on 20th 
century depictions of Islam and Muslims, for example the 1973/4 oil  crisis, 1979 
Iranian Revolution (Herzog et al 2008), and the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-81) in 
which the American embassy in Tehran was unlawfully occupied on 4th November, 
1979. Said (1997 (1981)) argues the intense media scrutiny surrounding this event is 
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connected to the (re)emergence of common stereotypes about Iran, Muslims and 
Islam as linked to fundamentalism and violence. There are also longer American 
associations with anti-Muslim sentiment (Rana 2007). In the early 20th century, a 
period of state-mandated segregation, applications for American citizenship were 
rejected on grounds that Muslim migrants’ religious identity was indicative of a non-
white background (Bayoumi 2006). Gregory (2004a) also critiques the imaginative 
geographies through which Islam – and Muslims – have been constructed as the 
United States’ inferior, violent Other during the ‘War on Terror’. In government policy, 
Bayoumi (2006) examines the ‘special registration’ programme (introduced in 2002). 
This act required all non-immigrant males in the US – from select countries – to be 
fingerprinted, photographed, and interviewed about their legal status, proof of 
identity and employment, and political and religious beliefs. With the exception of 
North Korea, all of the target countries were Muslim-majority states and, despite 
83519 registrations, not a single charge of terrorism was levied (Bayoumi 2006). These 
complex, intertwined histories demonstrate the enmeshment of racialized Muslim 
identities with American geopolitics and security institutions.  
 
However, such histories are only tendentiously related to US climate security 
discourses. The connection is not a direct association, but instead about how historic 
significations of ‘Muslim’ populations, naturalized assumptions of terrorism and 
radicalization, feed into American climate security debates. The racial logic is therefore 
about how historic and current significations of racialized ‘Muslim’ identities are 
(re)configured in a specific discursive context. Of this, Hartmann (2014) identifies a 
‘Malthusian anticipatory regime’ in US and EU climate change discourse: NGOs 
(Hartmann (2014) cites the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation as an example) are 
creating overly simplistic, deterministic relationships between climate impacts, 
resource depletion, population growth, and mass migration to the EU. Population 
growth is blamed for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
notwithstanding the fact that African countries are amongst the lowest polluters 
(between 1950 and 2000, the continent of Africa contributed only 2.5% of the world’s 
GHG emissions) (Hartmann 2014). In a visual analysis of 140 EU and US climate security 
documents, Methmann and Rothe (2014) found all images were of people of colour, 
mostly female, and portrayed (as ‘climate refugees’ and ‘victims’ of human 
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insecurities) in passive roles that diminish their agency. This contributes to a broader 
securitization of the EU’s relations with the MENA region around issues of terrorism, 
climate change and migration; Methmann and Rothe (2014) contend that the 
European border regime (e.g. FRONTEX) is noticeably absent in these images. This 
gendered and racialized imagery indicates that tropes of racial Others permeate 
context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse. Alongside racialized 
constructions of a latent tendency towards violence, I also argue that inherent cultural 
incompatibility is a component of racial logics in moments of American climate security 
discourses. 
 
4.3.3 Racial logics and inherent cultural compatibility 
 
As a starting point, Campbell et al (2007: 74) write (describing the geopolitical 
consequences of a severe climate change scenario (one in which average global 
surface temperatures rise by 2.6°C over 30 years (from 2007))):  
 
‘Environmental pressures will accentuate the migration of peoples 
to levels that effectively change the ethnic signatures of major 
states and regions. In Europe the influx of illegal immigrants from 
North Africa and other parts of the continent will accelerate and 
become impossible to stop, except by means approximating 
blockade. There will be political tipping points marked by the 
collapse of liberal concepts of openness, in the face of public 
demands to stem the tide. As the pressure increases, efforts to 
integrate Muslim communities into the European mainstream will 
collapse and extreme division will become the norm. 
 
The beginnings of these trends are present now. But severe 
climate change will cause them to become far worse. One of the 
casualties of this process may be the prospect for the cultural, 
much less the political integration of Turkey into the EU. Even if 
Turkey were to be admitted, the increasing reaction of Europeans 
against Islam may alienate the Turkish people, thereby destroying 
the hoped-for role of Turkey as a bulwark against radical Islam. At 
severe levels of climate change, civil disorder may lead to the 
suspension of normal legal procedures and rights.’ 
 
 
This excerpt draws upon the notion of ethnic divisions with the claim that 
environmental pressures ‘will change the ethnic signatures of major states and 
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regions.’ Strong phraseology such as ‘extreme division’, ‘blockade’, and ‘collapse’ 
further sediments a notion of intense, deep-seated differences between ‘Muslim’ and 
‘non-Muslim’ communities in European countries, albeit for an severe climate change 
scenario. These claims are concretised with the example of Turkey’s integration into 
the EU. Campbell et al note that Turkey’s ‘cultural’ and ‘political’ integration could be 
affected under a severe climate change scenario and state that the ‘increasing reaction 
of Europeans against Islam may alienate the Turkish people’. One consequence of this 
would be the destruction of Turkey’s role as a ‘bulwark against radical Islam’. Using the 
example of Turkey, ‘cultural’ differences between European and Turkish populations, 
articulated in the context of an ‘increasing reaction of Europeans against Islam’, are 
highlighted under a severe climate change scenario. Thus, it could be that a racial logic 
suggests that, in possible future conditions of severe climate insecurities, inherent 
cultural differences between European and non-European ‘Muslim’ populations could 
produce conditions of ‘civil disorder’, ‘extreme division’ and the ‘suspension of normal 
legal procedures and rights’. I argue that this construction, of ‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim’ 
societies as fundamentally different to ‘Western’ societies, is also partially reflected in 
limited, context-specific moments of other US national security publications. In the 
2008 Joint Operating Environment (JOE), a strategy that forecasts the future security 
environment and military requirements (US Joint Forces Command 2008), also 
discussed in section 4.4, the US Joint Forces Command (2008: 34) state:  
 
‘The problems in the Arab-Islamic world stem from the past five 
centuries, during which, until recently, the rise of the West and 
the dissemination of Western political and social values paralleled 
a concomitant decline in the power and appeal of their societies. 
Today’s Islamic world confronts the choice of either adapting to or 
escaping from a globe of interdependence created by the West … 
If tensions between the Islamic world’s past and the present were 
not enough, the Middle East, the Arab heartland of Islam, remains 
divided by tribal, religious, and political divisions, in which 
continued instability is inevitable. Combining Islamic dogma with 
the internet, intricate financial networks, and the porous 
boundaries of weakly governed states, radical Islamists have 
created a networked organization with global reach … No one can 
harbour the illusion that the developed world can win this conflict 
in the near future … What will matter most will be the winning of a 
“war of ideas,” much of which must come from within the Islamic 
world itself.’  
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In this excerpt, explicit divisions are drawn between the ‘Arab-Islamic world’ and ‘the 
West’ or ‘developed world’. It could be that this reiterates an imaginative geography in 
which ‘Western political and social values’ are cast as superior to the ‘problems’, 
‘decline’, ‘instability’ and ‘tribal, religious, and political divisions’ of the ‘Islamic world’. 
Importantly, the Joint Operating Environment does state that these differences are not 
irreconcilable, noting that the ‘Islamic world’ must ‘adapt to’ a globalized world 
created by ‘the West’. However, it could be that by constructing an imaginative 
geography of a superior ‘West’ against the ‘Arab-Islamic world’, this essentializes these 
geographical categories and reduces their heterogeneous differences and interactions. 
For example, the authors assert that a “war of ideas” (against Islamist extremists) must 
involve action from ‘within the Islamic world itself’. Through the use of the preposition 
‘within’ to describe ‘the Islamic world’, this suggests that there is an ‘inside’ to the 
‘Islamic world’ that can be distinguished from an essentially different ‘outside’. 
Additionally, it may be that the pronoun ‘itself’ implies that the ‘Islamic world’ is a 
singular, unified entity that is discernably different to ‘the West’ and ‘developed 
world’. In this excerpt, I argue that the ‘Islamic world’ is thus constructed as essentially 
different and inferior to a more advanced, globalized ‘West’. Furthermore, whilst a 
slight deviation, these constructions demonstrate that essentialized differences 
between ‘Islam’, the ‘Arab-Islamic world’ and ‘the West’ are present in broader US 
national security publications from 2007-10. Translated into the specific context of 
climate-induced migration of ‘Muslim’ populations  from the MENA region to the 
European Union, these essentializations suggest possible climate-insecure futures of 
ineffective ‘assimilation’ and ‘social disruption’. For example, writing about the 
consequences for international migration of a ‘catastrophic’ climate change scenario 
(an aggregate global temperature rise of 5.6°C by the end of the 21st century and a rise 
in global sea levels of 2 metres over the same period), Campbell et al (2007: 86) report:  
 
‘Even a Europe made colder by the degrading of the Gulf Stream 
may experience substantially increased levels of immigration from 
south of the Mediterranean, both from sub-Saharan Africa and 
from the Arab world. Many of Europe’s Muslim minorities, 
including Russia’s, are not well-assimilated today, and the stress of 
major climate change and sea-level rise may well foster social 
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disruption and radicalization. Russia and Europe may be 
destabilized, shifting the global balance of power.’  
 
 
In this quote, Campbell et al (2007: 86) reiterate a specific association of ‘Muslim’ 
communities with a possibility for ‘radicalization’. Alongside a reference to the 
European Union’s ‘poorly assimilated’ ‘Islamic communities’, Campbell et al describe 
‘many of Europe’s Muslim minorities’ as ‘not well-assimilated today’. It could be that 
the concept of ‘assimilation’ implies that ‘Muslim’ minorities or communities are 
incompatible with European societies because an assimilationist approach necessitates 
abandonment of the migrant’s culture and gradual adoption of the ‘host’ culture 
(Fekete 2004). Cast in terms of possibilities in climate-insecure futures, an 
assimilationist logic of cultural incompatibility could suggest outcomes of ‘social 
disruption’, ‘radicalization’, and a condition of ‘destabilized’ geopolitics for ‘Russia’ and 
‘Europe’. This is not to deny there are cultural differences, but rather populations are 
constructed as inherently incompatible with European societies and climate 
insecurities could generate clashes or a need to assimilate. The racial logic implies that 
with climate insecurities, existing cultural incompatibilities will produce greater 
tensions between ‘European’ populations and a racial ‘Muslim’ Other in possible 
climate-insecure futures. Conceptions of ‘poor assimilation’ of ‘Muslim’ communities 
feed into broader historical narratives about the inherent incompatibility of a ‘Muslim’ 
Other in European countries.  
 
In a comparative study of media representations of Jewish migrants to Britain in the 
late 19th century and Muslim migrants in the 21st century, Meer and Noorani (2008) 
discover many of the racialized stereotypes are similar: Jewish migrants were also 
accused of irreconcilability with ‘secular’, white Christian Brits, leading to a self -
segregating refusal to interact with the local population. Judith Butler’s (2008) 
conception of ‘secular time’ is also insightful. For Butler (2008), the progression of 
rights in European societies is measured as temporal progress. Zeroing in on Dutch 
citizenship tests and applicants shown a picture of two individuals of the same sex 
kissing and asked if this is acceptable, Butler (2008) worries that LGBTQ rights should 
not be used to discriminate against other groups, e.g. Muslim migrants. At a bigger 
geopolitical scale of ‘civilizational’ differences, Islam (and Muslim-majority 
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populations) has also been constructed as the culturally inferior, backward Other to an 
enlightened European ‘Self’ (Mamdani 2004). As these brief examples indicate, 
assumptions of a ‘Muslim’ Other as inherently culturally incompatible with European 
societies also intermingle with broader histories and geographies. In section 4.3.4, I 
argue that racialized identities (a ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other) are intertwined, in 
partial, context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse, with 
possibilities of exclusionary containment policies in climate-insecure futures. Thus, the 
racial logic connects naturalized assumptions and associations about ‘Muslim’ and 
‘African’ populations (a latent capacity for or vulnerability towards terrorism, and 
inherent cultural incompatibility with European societies), with delimitations of what 
such associations suggest for interventions in future conditions of climate insecurity 
(containment policies). This logic underpins a biopolitics of unequally valued lives in 
climate-insecure futures (Duffield and Evans 2011), a biopolitics that suggests 
demarcations about which populations are permitted access and freedom to circulate 
in European spaces (and which populations are excluded from these spaces). 
 
4.3.4 Racial logics and possibilities of containment 
 
To begin this section, I contend that racial logics are expressed in context-specific 
moments of the 2009 US National Intelligence Estimate on climate change. The 
National Intelligence Council (NIC), an interagency group that supports the Director of 
National Intelligence ((DNI), the President’s highest advisor on national s ecurity 
issues), produced this report. The NIC publish long-term analyses for the US 
intelligence community (e.g. the Department of State, CIA and National Security 
Agency) (DNI 2015). For the Estimate, the NIC also produced a series of regional 
reports and consultations about the geopolitical implications of climate change (to 
2030). Importantly, as products of consultations, these documents do not represent 
the views of the US government (NIC 2009a). In a (2009a) regional report and 
consultation about North Africa, specifically in reference to CIM, the NIC (2009a) 
observes:  
 
‘North African immigrants form a major segment of Europe’s 
Muslim population, and North Africa is the primary focus of 
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European concerns about immigration … The demographic 
ascension of Europe’s Muslim population is an increasing concern 
to European governments, both in terms of the alteration of 
European cultural, ethnic, and religious composition and the 
threat from Islamic extremism. As a result, North African 
immigration is a high-priority security and foreign policy issue for 
Europe’ (p.29-30) 
 
‘Europe seeks to build a cordon sanitaire against Sub-Saharan 
migration in North Africa. European states may be willing to turn a 
blind eye to North African human rights abuses of migrants as long 
as migration flows are kept under control’ (p.31)  
 
‘Because of the direct threat it poses to Europe, the migration 
issue could become the strongest bargaining chip for North 
African states … they might resort to outright blackmail, 
threatening to unleash unimpeded flows of migrants unless 
granted massive amounts of foreign aid. In a more general sense, 
they might play the “climate change card,” citing the threat of 
climate change-induced regional crisis to garner Western aid, as 
they have done with the “terrorism card”’ (p.34) 
 
 
In line with a trope of inherent cultural difference and incompatibility, the authors 
contest that the ‘demographic ascension of Europe’s Muslim population is an 
increasing concern to European governments’ because of the ‘alteration of European 
cultural, ethnic and religious composition.’ While ‘ethnicity’ can denote a range of 
different facets, e.g. religious affiliation, language, dress, cultural practices and 
traditions (Meer 2014: 37), it appears these aspects are encompassed by the terms 
‘religious’ and ‘cultural’. It could be that this leaves ‘ethnic’ with a more racialized 
condition of cultural difference. As such, when the NIC (2009a) argue that Europe’s 
‘ethnic composition’ is being changed by the ascension of its ‘Muslim’ population, this 
produces a binary between ‘Muslim’ ethnic identity and ‘non-Muslim’ ethnic identities 
in European countries. In lieu with previous documents, negative lexical choices are 
used to describe migration, e.g. ‘increasing concerns’, ‘unimpeded flows’, ‘high-priority 
security issues’, and ‘cordon sanitaire’. Cordon sanitaire is originally a French phrase 
describing a barrier erected to prevent the spread of infectious disease and plagues, 
with its earliest references in 1826 and 1847 (Oxford English Dictionary 2016a). It also 
denotes a geopolitical a ring of buffer states constructed to prevent invasion of a 
protected political authority. With connotations of disease control and prevention, a 
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cordon sanitaire promulgates a pernicious vision of measures to stop ‘African’ 
migrants. Its geopolitical meaning also renders an image of threats or contagion 
against quarantined, internal ‘European’ spaces.  
 
Reflecting on the racial assumptions of portraying migrants as pollutants or 
contaminants in CNN’s immigration reporting, Cisneros (2008: 591) writes: ‘Images of 
immigrants as dangerous and destructive pollutants dehumanizes immigrants by 
constructing them as threatening substances, denying them agency and reinforcing 
common stereotypes … Their brown bodies are portrayed as dirty and dangerous 
because of their ethnicity.’ These metaphorical tropes work not only to naturalize 
migrant populations according to undesirable characteristics, but also to justify 
repressive containment policies in climate-insecure futures. In a seminal 2007 report 
by the WGBU (the German Advisory Council on Global Change, an independent 
scientific advisory group established by the German Federal Government in 1992 in the 
run-up to the Rio Summit), one of a series of biennial reports on important topics of 
global change chosen by Council Members, the authors (WGBU 2007) write on the 
subject of CIM to Europe and possibilities of containment:  
 
‘With no prospects in any of the countries of the region, many 
young people see migration to Europe as their only opportunity … 
Towards the middle of the 21st century the northwards migration 
of predominantly young men from the countries of the Sahel takes 
on the proportions of a “Völkerwanderwung”, i.e. mass migration 
such as was seen in Europe during the Dark Ages. Every year 
hundreds of thousands of people from the Sahel and the tropical 
areas of West and Central Africa arrive in the North African coastal 
regions. As a result, enormous slum settlements housing stranded 
migrants arise in the urban agglomerations of the Maghreb’ 
(p.125) 
 
‘The year 2020 sees the start of serious social and political 
destabilization in all the countries affected by this migration … The 
situation of economic hopelessness generates enormous potential 
for political destabilization among young people who have no 
prospects; the urban slums threaten to become lawless areas. This 
creates a breeding ground for the further radicalization and 
spread of extremist religious movements’ (p.125) 
 
‘Developments in North Africa have a significant impact on 
Europe. The European countries that are the primary destination 
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of migrants have a need for workers, but the need is far exceeded 
by the number of illegal immigrants. Because illegal immigrants 
are not integrated into society, there is increased ghettoization of 
North African immigrants. Xenophobia increases, and the 
immigrants react to their dangerous circumstances by turning in 
large numbers to radical religious groups (a choice favoured by the 
huge popularity of these movements in migrants’ home 
countries). European countries fear that immigration from North 
Africa will allow the infiltration of more and more members of 
extremist groups into Europe, and they take steps to strengthen 
‘Fortress Europe’’ (p.126) 
 
‘The risk of destabilization applies not only within these countries 
[Maghreb countries]; the situation can have consequences for the 
stability of the entire region. One result of climate change will be 
further emigration from rural areas to cities and migration via the 
countries of North Africa to EU countries. Migration issues will 
therefore become increasingly sensitive; in Southern Europe this 
could trigger potentially violent conflicts (e.g. the youth riots in 
France in 2005)’ (p.137)  
 
 
In these excerpts, the WGBU are concerned by a picture of disruptive climate-induced 
migration from Africa to the EU. As is discussed in chapter 5 (Section 5.6), a gendered 
representation of ‘young men’ is reproduced as well as associations with a possible 
capacity for extremism or radicalization. Examples include the possibilities of 
immigrants ‘turning to radical religious groups’ inspired by similar movements in their 
home countries, ‘urban slums’ in North African cities as a ‘breeding ground for the 
further radicalization and spread of extremist religious groups’, and worries about the 
‘infiltration of more and more members of extremist groups into Europe’. Although 
not named as ‘Muslim’ in these instances (for a more detailed discussion on this 
politics of naming, see section 4.4), this reinforces a construction of young, male 
migrants with a latent vulnerability or capacity towards radicalization (Puar and Rai 
2002). Biological, fertility metaphors are also utilized to capture the capacity of 
climate-stressed populations in North African cities to turn towards radicalization and 
extremist groups, e.g. ‘breeding ground’ (for a longer discussion of fertility metaphors 
in US and EU climate security discourses, see chapter 5, section 5.5). An image of social 
tensions is reinforced by the WGBU’s (2007: 137) speculation that ‘potentially violent 
conflicts’ ‘could trigger’, as well as the example of the 2005 Paris unrest (also cited in 
the Age of Consequences (Campbell et al 2007: 59)). Thus, although these assumptions 
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are not directly associated with ‘Muslim’ populations, the WGBU (2007) still worry 
about associations of ‘African’ migrants with a capacity for radicalization and 
sociocultural tensions. The negative, disruptive effects of mass migration are 
compounded with the term ‘Völkerwanderwung’, originally a German word denoting a 
large migration of people en masse, for example in Europe during the Roman Empire 
or Middle Ages (Oxford English Dictionary 2016b). Discussing the consequences of 
these movements, the WGBU note that ‘xenophobia’ will increase, conflicts could 
arise, and European leaders will ‘take steps to strengthen ‘Fortress Europe’’. Like the 
possibilities of a cordon sanitaire envisaged by the NIC, the WGBU caution that a 
fortressed, walled EU could be a consequence of CIM from African countries.  
 
Importantly, the WGBU (2007: 126-7) do also include a positive scenario whereby 
successful adaptation policies (e.g. strategies for sustainable resource management 
and soil cultivation), assisted by international partners, could reduce social problems 
and conflicts. Under this scenario, EU states would reach agreements with North 
African states for managed quotas of possible climate-induced migrants (WGBU 2007: 
126-7). However, despite this less disruptive case, I argue that, embodied in the 
WGBU’s concerns about a negative CIM scenario, a racial logic (dependent on current 
and historic significations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations as associated with a 
latent capacity for terrorism) could suggest outcomes of containment policies in 
possible climate-insecure futures. The verbs used in the excerpts, e.g. ‘migration issues 
will therefore become increasingly sensitive’, and the claim that ‘lawless’ urban areas 
‘creates a breeding ground for … further radicalization’, as opposed to the modal verbs 
(‘could’, ‘might’ etc.) in the NIC (2009a) and Age of Consequences (Campbell et al 2007) 
reports, suggest a more certain, deterministic orientation to the racial logic. The 
chapter identifies this as a compulsive determinism (discussed further in section 4.5). 
First, however, I discuss the unequal power relations and biopolitics of suggested 
containment policies in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security 
discourses.   
 
As Duffield and Evans (2011: 94, original emphasis) state, containment policies are 
inextricable from the increasing association of development policy with security and a 
global biopolitical life-chances divide: ‘What could be called ‘underdeveloped life’ has 
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been routinely geographically contained in order to better manage the life-chance 
divide separating the Global North and South … Out of an initial concern with the 
welfare of those less fortunate, poverty and violence have reformulated themselves as 
problems to be solved locally.’ As such, a biopolitics of mobility is at play in which 
‘under-developed’ populations are contained and migration prevented. Bakewell 
(2008) terms this the ‘sedentary bias’ of development policy and locates it within 
colonial histories of European interactions with African populations. Early European 
colonizers controlled migration patterns to provide labour for mineral extraction, 
colonial administration, plantations, and most horrifically with the Transatlantic Slave 
Trade (Bakewell 2008). Attempts to control migration patterns continued into 20th 
century development policy, e.g. the promotion of remittances as a development 
strategy and negative perceptions of migration in industrialized countries (Bakewell 
2008). White (2014: 835) notes a ‘fortress mentality’ from the stigmatization of 
migration can exacerbate environmental insecurities and be built ‘upon a platform of 
state, corporate, and organized group wrongdoing and injustice.’ The representation of 
a cordon sanitaire also demarcates a hierarchy between North African states and Sub-
Saharan African migrants. As Lutterbeck (2009) and de Haas (2008) state, this feeds 
into discourses creating fear about millions of poor Africans determined to reach the 
EU’s ‘promised land’. It constructs a teleological geopolitical imag ination of the EU as 
the pinnacle or highpoint of migration outcomes. This imagination functions not only 
in terms of the EU as the ultimate destination for CIM, but also as the final arbiter of 
security policy. For example, on p.29 of the NlC (2009a) report, the authors state:  
 
‘North Africa is both a source of migrants and a transit region for 
external migrants. Both of these dynamics are likely to be 
significantly expanded by climatic stress in Africa, and both are 
directed primarily at Europe. Although migration probably will 
have less direct adverse impact on North African states and other 
climatic challenges, it is likely to be the principal manifestation of 
climate change-induced spillover into Europe … As climate change 
impacts are felt more strongly in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa 
… they will become leading drivers behind the larger African 
migration pattern northward toward Europe.’  
 
 
Here, Europe is the ‘final destination’ for presumed climate-induced migrants. By 
talking about migration as ‘directed primarily’ at Europe, ‘spillover’, and the ‘larger 
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African migration pattern’ into Europe, this portrays Europe as the primary target of 
CIM, the primary recipient of the effects of this change (‘spillover’), and as the key 
protagonist in a ‘larger’ migration pattern. I argue that this reasoning constructs a 
hierarchy in which Sub-Saharan African migration is connected – via North African 
states’ mediating transition – to the geographical ‘endpoint’ of Europe. ‘Europe’ is cast 
as the pinnacle, North African states are ‘in transit’, and ‘Sub-Saharan African’ migrants 
are at the bottom of this order. In a 2012 report by the Center for American Progress 
and Heinrich Böll Foundation, part of a series of papers exploring the climate change, 
migration and security nexus in different regions of the world, Werz and Conley (2012: 
2, original emphasis) locate an ‘arc of tension in Northwest Africa comprising Nigeria, 
Niger, Algeria and Morocco.’ The ‘arc of tension’ sits at the intersection of water stress, 
disruptive migrations, ‘climate conflicts’ and insecurities , and is represented in Figure 
1:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The ‘arc of tension’ (Werz and Conley 2012: 3) 
 
In this report and Figure 1, Werz and Conley construct a geopolitical imaginary in 
which Nigeria, Niger, Algeria and Morocco are analysed as a contiguous unit. They 
(p.18) write:  
 
‘Ultimately, the combination of climate change, migration, and 
security will pressure these states from all sides. The northward 
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movement of migrants into the Maghreb, whether driven by 
conflict, climate, or other factors, will provoke increasing pressure 
from the European Union to control illegal border crossings into 
the continent. At the same time, Algeria and Morocco will 
confront internal pressure for reform in the face of the Arab 
Spring uprisings to their east. Whether and how they manage 
these competing tensions will have important ramifications for 
regional stability and thus for U.S. security interests more broadly.’ 
 
 
Werz and Conley (2012: 18) argue a climate change-migration-security nexus in 
Northwest Africa ‘will provoke increasing pressure from the European Union to control 
illegal border crossings into the continent’. Alongside the northward facing arrow in 
Figure 1 – its severity emphasized with the red colour – this suggests a EU endpoint to 
CIM and its effects on American security interests. The phrases ‘tension’, ‘instability’, 
‘internal pressure’ and visual presence of the red arrow and red-filled countries (in 
Figure 3) adds to a geopolitical representation of dangerous, ungoverned spaces in the 
‘Global South’ threatening the EU. Similarly to the NIC  (2009a), Werz and Conley 
(2012) indicate stricter control over migration flows could be imposed as a 
consequence of threatening CIM. This implicates North African states and the EU in the 
possible construction of a cordon sanitaire (to use the NIC’s (2009a: 31) phrase) to 
restrict migration from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
In this regard, the 2003 agreement between the Libyan and Italian interior ministries 
contributes towards an externalization of EU border controls (White 2011). With CIM, 
this manifests in several respects. First is the promotion by European states of a 
narrative of migration as maladaptation or as an undesirable adaptation strategy, 
reminiscent of the ‘sedentary bias’ thesis (Bakewell 2008). In a study of 
environmentally-induced migration as an adaptive approach in the Senegal River 
valley, Scheffran et al (2012: 122, original emphasis) contend: ‘European states have 
the tendency to use development strategies to achieve immigration control following 
the adaptation-to-prevent-migration path, which can sometimes lead to cooperation 
failures’. They cite the case of Mali. From the early 2000s, the Malian government 
sought to encourage participation of emigrants in development projects to build 
networks with the Malian diaspora. In a 2002 bilateral programme with France 
(Priority Solidarity Fund Co-development Mali), the Malian government started to fund 
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co-development projects (Scheffran et al 2012). This includes education projects in the 
region of Kayes along the Senegal River valley and, through investment of $7.8 million 
between 2000-2004, nearly every village in the region had a school by 2005. 
Electrification projects have also been carried out, part-funded by the French 
companies Total and EDF (Scheffran et al 2012). However, in 2009 France discontinued 
its support for the programme because the Malian government refused to sign an 
agreement enforcing repatriation of irregular Malian migrants from France.  
 
However, several EU institutions have remained cautious about CIM from the MENA 
region. For example, in a 2013 paper produced by the European Commission to 
accompany the EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change, there is reticence about 
possibilities for mass, international migration to the EU. The Commission (2013) notes 
that migration is multi-causal and it is difficult to pinpoint the role of environmental 
factors in migratory decisions. Whilst ‘climate change is highly likely to impact on 
population movements’, interregional and international migration require substantial 
resources and the Commission (2013: 11) submit that ‘the impact of climate change on 
migration flows to the EU is unlikely to be substantial’. Similarly, in a ‘Futures of 
Borders: A Forward Study of European Border Checks’ report by FRONTEX’s Research 
and Development Unit (2011), FRONTEX construct scenarios of future migration 
patterns and implications for EU border management. Although some “environmental 
refugees” may arrive to the EU and climate change is expected to cause dis placements 
globally, this is not articulated in terms of mass, disruptive migrations to the EU. Thus, 
although direct evidence is sparse for mass migrations to the EU and enforcement of a 
‘sedentarist’, anti-migration narrative of CIM from Sub-Saharan Africa, the study of 
Scheffran et al (2012) study demonstrates such instances exist.  
 
White (2011: 74) writes that ‘transit states began to amp up the idea of climate 
refugees as a threat in the late ‘00s … CIM may be an emergent trump card that builds 
on the already powerful immigration card … CIM has been stirred into broader security 
imperatives designed to thwart irregular migration and cast as a new, deeper threat.’ 
White (2011) reveals how CIM started to be publicly enunciated as a security issue in 
2009. In September 2009, Morocco hosted the meeting of the International Union for 
the Scientific Study of Population and King Mohammed VI gave a speech directly 
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referencing CIM and its implications for food security, desertification and sea-level rise. 
He also affirmed the importance of Morocco between North and South in these 
debates (White 2011). On December 8th, 2009, Moroccan Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi 
read one of Mohammed VI’s speeches at the second EU Africa Summit in Lisbon that 
cites environmental factors as causal contributors in migration (White 2011). Although 
nascent in foreign policy discourses, these speeches indicate an involvement of North 
African governments – specifically Morocco – in CIM politics.  
 
The NIC report (2009a, excerpts on p.119-20 of this thesis) also perpetuates 
naturalized assumptions about Muslim populations and terrorism. Europe’s ‘Muslim’ 
population is again associated with ‘the threat of Islamic extremism’ (p.29-30). Talking 
about leverage North African states can exploit to garner ‘Western aid’, the authors 
coin the label “climate change card” and compare it to the “terrorism card” (p.34) 
(language also used by White (2011: 74)). By claiming a “terrorism card” is something 
that North African states are able to play, this suggests it is a part of their ‘deck’ or 
‘hand’ so to speak. The repeated use of modal verbs, e.g. ‘might’ or ‘could become’ 
(p.34), constructs a relationship between the capacities a naturalized ‘Muslim’ and 
‘African’ Other is assumed to embody, and the possibilities this suggests for what 
might happen in climate-insecure futures. As such, the racial logic combines 
naturalized assumptions about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations (a vulnerability 
towards or capacity for extremism, terrorism or radicalization), and directs this 
towards possible outcomes (containment policies or human rights abuses from North 
African states) in climate-insecure futures. Coupling of racialized characteristics (a 
latent tendency towards violence and inherent cultural incompatibility) continues in a 
2010 report by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Founded in 
1972 by a financial donation from the West German government, the organization 
seeks to embody ‘the spirit of the Marshall Plan’ and promote transatlantic 
cooperation (German Marshall Fund 2015). As part of a series about climate change-
security linkages, Joshua W. Busby, Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson 
School of Public Affairs and Distinguished Scholar at the Strauss Center of the 
University of Texas (Austin), and author of a number of important studies on climate 
security, headed a report entitled Mapping Climate Change and Security in North 
Africa. At the beginning, Busby et al (2010: 1) note:  
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‘The brittleness and weakness of regimes in the region and the 
wider continent, coupled with the low level of human and 
economic development, enhance Africa’s vulnerability to a variety 
of ills, including climate change but also terrorism, armed conflict, 
and piracy. For Europe and the United States, two problems – 
migration and terrorism – are particularly salient and potentially 
combustible, given the intersection with broader cultural and 
political currents in Europe about immigrants and Islam and 
concerns about ungoverned spaces and the rise of terrorism.’  
 
 
This excerpt makes a clear connection between ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islam and concerns 
about ungoverned spaces and the rise of terrorism’. Referring to broader ‘cultural 
currents’ in Europe, Busby et al (2010) construct dichotomies between cultural groups; 
on p.5, they write: ‘For Europe, emigration from North Africa, particularly given some 
of the emergent cultural and political fault-lines, is a specific concern.’ Given the 
relation between ‘cultural’ and ‘Islam’ in the first quotation, this suggests that the 
‘cultural fault-lines’ are between ‘Islam’ and ‘non-Muslim European’ populations. The 
phrase ‘fault-line’ designates an essentialized division between these groups. It also 
connotes vulnerability within this division, as if it were prone to faults, tensions and 
struggles. It could be that the text therefore reproduces – at the scale of underlying 
assumptions – naturalizing associations between ‘Muslim’ populations and terrorism, 
and of cultural tensions or ‘fault-lines’ between European populations and those that 
are ‘culturally’ different.    
 
The repeated co-occurrence of inherent cultural incompatibility and a latent 
vulnerability towards or capacity for radicalized violence with ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ 
populations (in particular moments of US and EU climate security discourses) 
naturalizes these traits to those populations. Naturalized assumptions associate 
violence and incompatibility with what ‘Muslim’ populations represent and how they 
act. Combined with projected climate impacts, e.g. declined food production, this 
delimits future possibilities in conditions of climate insecurity. Naturalizing racial logics 
associate ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations with a capacity for terrorism or inherent 
cultural incompatibility, but also orient this towards how they could, might, may or 
would react in possible climate-insecure futures. Racial logics function also as a form of 
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valuation of unequally valued lives in US climate security discourses. As such, 
biopolitics are not only about technologies of security to regulate population 
movements – through the construction of a cordon sanitaire in climate-insecure 
futures, for instance – but about how this inscribes racial inequalities. Biopolitical 
security is about how populations and contingent flows and circulations of possible 
climate-induced migrants are secured in aleatory, uncertain futures, but this thesis also 
explores unequal valuations of lives in biopolitical power relations. Following Fassin 
(2009: 48-9), biopolitics are also ‘bio-inequalities’, about the inequalities governing 
which lives may live, how they live, and which are subjugated or left to die. Grounded 
in ‘bio-legitimacy’, about the ‘right to life’ or ‘power of life’ in its own terms (Fassin 
2009: 50), Fassin (2009: 52) moves from ‘the ‘rules of the game’ to its stakes’. Racial 
logics suggest multiple biopolitics of US and EU climate-induced migration discourses, 
the management of population flows and biopolitical policies of containment, are 
inscribed with racial inequalities, the ‘political content’ or ‘stakes’ in Fassin’s (2009) 
terms.  
 
Therefore, in particular, context-specific moments of US and EU climate security 
discourses, a biopolitics of unequally valued lives is inscribed by racial logics . In 
suggesting ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations are characterized by a latent tendency 
towards terrorism or inherent cultural incompatibility with European societies, this 
casts them as fundamentally different to and endowed with negative characteristics  
not shared by ‘non-Muslim’ European populations. Unequal biopolitics also suggest 
that the ways in which racial logics value lives unevenly could produce exclusionary 
outcomes for ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations. It leads to possibilities of stricter 
border controls and exclusions of climate-induced migrants, of a cordon sanitaire 
erected to prevent the access and circulation of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations in 
European spaces, and differential outcomes from ‘sedentarist’ development policies 
designed to deter migration. In all of these respects, not only do debates on CIM 
suggest multiple biopolitics of US climate security discourse, but also unequal 
biopolitics inscribed by racial logics and possible exclusionary responses. Sections 4.4 
and 4.5 explore these inequalities with the tropes of ‘dehumanization’ and 
‘determinism’. 
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4.4 Dehumanization 
 
Goff et al (2008) argue dehumanization is central to European and North American 
racisms. They (2008: 293) state: ‘dehumanization is viewed as a central component to 
intergroup violence because it is frequently the most important precursor to moral 
exclusion … Groups that are morally excluded do not count in a moral sense.’ Dalsklev 
and Kunst (2015: 29-30) contend dehumanization can take various forms in which 
groups are denied human characteristics, aspects of a human “essence.” Human 
‘essence’ involves a capacity for language, cognition, complex emotions and politeness 
(Dalsklev and Kunst 2015). This chapter does not adhere to an essentialist reading of 
dehumanization predicated on an a priori ‘essence’, but refers to dehumanizing 
strategies as those which deny or negate important facets of ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ 
populations’ and migrants’ agency or cultural identity. This includes markers through 
which cultural identities are articulated, or representations that diminish their agency 
as responders to climate impacts. I argue a politics of naming is central to 
dehumanization in CIM narratives. Focusing on the labels ‘terrorist’, ‘bandit’ and 
‘rebel’, Bhatia (2005: 6-7) posits that ‘the politics of naming is about … examining how 
names are made, assigned and disputed, and how this contest is affected by a series of 
global dynamics and events.’ Naming is an exercise of power and continent 
assignations about what can be known about a subject, place or group (Nadarajah and 
Sriskandarajah 2005). In the cases discussed so far, the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ are 
linked to terrorism, cultural incompatibility and status as a ‘concern’, ‘problem’ or 
‘threat’. This is most apparent in The Age of Consequences (Campbell et al 2007: 59-
60), where the words ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ are mentioned 7 times. I argue repeated 
associations of Muslim populations with these issues contribute towards naturalization 
of a ‘Muslim’ Other. It is arguably just as important to interrogate the politics of 
refusing to name. For example, in the 2007 publication National Security and the 
Threat of Climate Change by the Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board, the 
authors (2007: 18) write:  
 
‘A third form of international migration involves not only crossing 
international borders but moving across vast regions while doing 
so. Since the 1960s, Europe has witnessed this kind of “South to 
North” migration, with an influx of immigrants from Africa and 
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Asia. The shift in demographics has created racial and religious 
tensions in many European countries, as evidenced by the 2005 
civil unrest in France.’  
 
 
This excerpt describes many of the issues in earlier examples – demographic change 
and international migration to Europe – but uses the terms ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ 
without referring to Muslims specifically. In another case from the 2010 German 
Marshall Fund report, Busby et al (2010: 6-7) chart the risks of migration:  
 
‘In the European context, whether or not migration will lead to 
violent conflict in the short run may be less important than the 
political ramifications of migrants coming from particular parts of 
the world. Not only are anti-immigrant parties gaining more of a 
political footing in Europe, the potential radicalization of diaspora 
populations from North Africa and other parts of the world have 
troubled European policymakers in countries where immigrant 
populations have been implicated in terrorist activity.’  
 
 
‘Violent conflict’, ‘radicalization’ and ‘terrorist activity’ are all stated, but not 
associated with ‘Muslim’ populations explicitly. Instead, the closest the authors come 
to geographical or cultural specificity is ‘North Africa’. Migration from ‘particular parts 
of the world’ is cited alongside ‘diaspora populations’ and ‘immigrant populations’. It 
could be that, given Busby et al (2010) refer specifically to ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ 
populations elsewhere in the report (p.1 and p.7 respectively), the authors expect the 
audience to know that these terms refer to ‘Muslim’, ‘African’ or ‘Asian’ migrants. In 
this scenario, the inferential reasoning deployed, that when we refer to ‘immigrant’ or 
‘diaspora’ populations in association with radicalization and terrorism, you will be able 
to guess that we’re referencing ‘Muslims’ or ‘Africans’, relies upon a naturalized 
interpretation of a ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ Other without having to name that Other as 
‘Muslim’ or ‘African’. Importantly, this is only one interpretation of how the excerpt 
could be read, but again associates categories found in other US climate security 
documents, of immigrant and migrant populations, with possibilities for political 
instability or radicalization. Significantly, as Busby et al (2010) clarify (p.7), this does 
not mean they are actively promoting an association of ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ 
populations with radicalization, and they note that despite rhetoric, most Africans do 
not migrate to Europe and most migration to European countries is not from Africa. 
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Thus, although there are underlying associations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations 
with possibilities for radicalization in context-specific moments of texts, this does not 
mean that authors accept, promote or endorse such associations. Instead, it highlights 
a politics of naming in which authors attempt to avoid a naturalization of ‘Muslim’ 
populations by refusing to name these populations as ‘Muslim’.  
 
Geopolitical metaphors are also employed to describe climate insecurities. In the NIC 
(2009a) report, the terms ‘flows’ and ‘spillover’ (p.34 and 28) are used to describe 
climate-induced migration. Through a diminution of climate impacts, including CIM, to 
the status of US security interests, national security threats and the interests of 
receiving nation-states, I argue that this could dehumanize climate-induced migrants 
by denying them agency. In this sense, dehumanizing narratives are similar to what 
Goldberg (2015: 48-9) terms ‘thingification’, a form of dehumanization in which human 
beings are reduced to the status of useable or discardable ‘things’: they are rendered 
‘objects of pure control rather than the interlocutors of (sometimes contentious) 
relation.’ It could be that possible climate-induced migrants’ agency as adapters to 
climate change is negated if they are conceived as ‘interests’ of receiving states.  
Although I argue geopolitical metaphors reduce the agency of climate-induced 
migrants (through a consideration of migration and migrants’ possible actions (e.g. 
radicalization) as a security threat to the US, rather than what migrants think and do in 
their own terms), in another sense geopolitical narratives do afford agency to actors 
deemed threatening to national security. The following excerpt, not from a climate 
security publication but also from the Department of Defence in the 2007-10 period, 
illustrates this point. It originates in the Joint Operating Environment (JOE), a strategy 
that forecasts the future security environment and military requirements (US Joint 
Forces Command 2008). Issued every 2 years, in the 2008 JOE the US Joint Forces 
Command notes (p.5):  
 
‘In coming decades, Americans must struggle to resist judging the 
world as if it operated along the same principles and values that 
drive our own country. In many parts of the world, there are no 
rational actors, at least in our terms. Against actors capable of 
mobilizing large numbers of young men and women to slaughter 
civilian populations with machetes or to act as suicide bombers in 
open markets; enemies willing to die, for radical ideological, 
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religious, or ethnic fervour; enemies who ignore rational borders  
and remain unbounded by the conventions of the developed 
world; there is little room for negotiations or compromise.’  
 
 
Here, explicit divisions are drawn between the US and ‘many parts of the world’ where 
actors are assumed to generate violence. This is  demonstrated by the pronoun ‘our’ 
drawing a clear distinction between the supposedly rational United States and 
irrational, ideological and violent actors in ‘other’ parts of the world. The assumption 
that ‘in many parts of the world, there are no rationa l actors’ (US Joint Forces 
Command 2008: 5) casts some human subjects as ‘rational’ and others as ‘irrational’. 
Dehumanization functions here through denial of some human subjects’ capacity for 
rational thought. This section has argued that, alongside the role of essentializing 
logics racializing a ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ Other according to naturalized markers, it is 
also important to consider that which, despite its possible contribution to 
naturalization of populations, is not included or named. Dehumanization does not 
reinforce an essential ‘humanness’ from which traits are ‘missing’ or ‘lost’, but 
suggests that discursive constructions of what populations ‘lack’ or are not ‘identified 
with’ is an important strategy through which naturalization functions in moments of 
US climate security discourse. Biopolitics of unequally valued lives do not only depend 
on essentializing, racial logics affirming how ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations could 
react in climate-insecure futures, but also on how their agency and identity is negated 
or refused in these futures. Thus, racial logics are not only about what ‘Muslim’ or 
‘African’ populations are or represent, but about the discursive politics of naming them 
as ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’, and how what they lack or do not have could influence their 
actions in climate-insecure futures. Section 4.5 explores a deterministic trend in 
particular, context-specific moments of US climate security discourse. 
 
4.5 Determinism  
 
As a particular form of argument in essentializing logics, I argue determinism reflects 
not a series of naturalized traits inflecting ‘African’ populations’ actions in conditions of 
climate insecurity, but rather a compulsion which grounds migration or acts of violence 
in a probability of high likelihood or certainty. In conditions of resource scarcity, 
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instead of adopting a wide range of adaptive strategies, e.g. cooperative resource 
allocations, education or livelihood diversification, ‘African’ populations will or are 
likely to be compelled towards acts of violence, conflict, or disruptive mass migrations. 
Determinism means that ‘African’ populations will or are likely to engage in violence 
and migrate, not that they might, could, or may act in these ways. It relies on a notion 
of compulsion: that ‘African’ populations are compelled towards violence and mass 
migrations under climate-insecure conditions. By implication, a compulsive 
determinism draws on assumptions about the direct influences of climate factors on 
adaptive choices, and is grounded in neo-Malthusian narratives about resource 
scarcities, population growth, poverty, competition, disruptive migrations and violence 
(Hartmann 2010).  
 
Verhoeven (2014) traces neo-Malthusian narratives about African populations to 19th 
century European imperialism and argues they are based on four suppositions. First is 
that African environments are overwhelmingly significant in defining human 
behaviour, acquiring an almost moral status. One example is the ‘Garden of Eden’ 
metaphor: landscapes at risk from population growth and agricultural disruptions; 
another is the ‘Heart of Darkness’ metaphor, of environments difficult to penetrate 
and threatening to European colonizers (Verhoeven 2014). Second, African 
populations are conceived of as poor stewards of these environments, resulting in 
mismanagement. Third is that this mismanagement produces infighting for resources. 
Finally, the environment is viewed as an a-political causal entity, evacuating these 
discourses from analysis of their appropriation by political elites (Verhoeven 2014). 
Hartmann (2006) traces deterministic discourses’ infusion with Malthus’ (1798) 
argument that geometric population growth – for which he blamed poor peoples’ 
excessive fertility – would outstrip arithmetic agricultural development from the 1960s 
and their adoption by population NGOs to promote reproductive health programmes. 
She (2010a and b) asserts that environmental degradation has supplemented 
demographic change in the neo-Malthusian narrative, with water and food scarcities 
contributing to resource competition, disputes, and the categories of ‘climate conflicts’ 
and ‘refugees’.  
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But, as Brown et al (2007: 1148-9, original emphasis) caution: ‘The potential impacts of 
climate change for Africa do indeed hold the potential for food and water supplies to 
become more unreliable … livelihoods may be undermined, key resources may 
become scarcer, and an overall decline in the quality of life may result … we should be 
extremely cautious before assuming a straight-line progression from scarcity to conflict 
will ensue across Africa.’ They underline a range of adaptive strategies to climate 
insecurities. This is not to deny there are possible links between climate change and 
conflict, but these should not be reduced to an automatic, compulsive tendency 
towards violent outcomes. However, although Brown et al (2007) frame the argument 
in a way as to avoid a deterministic compulsion, Verhoeven (2014) argues a 
deterministic trend contributes partially to climate conflict debates. This analysis 
argues that deterministic interpretations of essentializing logics are multi -scalar, 
framed at the levels of individual behavioural choices (compulsions) and larger 
geopolitical, regional units in context-specific moments of US climate security 
discourse. To start, I refer to Robert Kaplan’s highly influential article The Coming 
Anarchy (published in The Atlantic (1994)), an examination of post-Cold War 
geopolitics and the importance of environmental issues and resource scarcities to 
future international relations. Kaplan (1994) writes:  
 
‘It is time to understand The Environment for what it is: the 
national-security issue of the twenty-first century. The political 
and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, 
deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, 
possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the 
Nile Delta and Bangladesh – developments that will prompt mass 
migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts – will be the core 
foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately 
emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left 
over from the Cold War.’ 
 
 
Reflecting on the implications of these environmental changes for social inequalities, 
Kaplan contends that:  
 
‘We are entering a bifurcated world. Part of the world is inhabited 
by Hegel’s and Fukuyama’s Last Man, healthy, well fed, and 
pampered by technology. The other, larger part, is inhabited by 
Hobbes’s First Man, condemned to a life that is “poor, nasty, 
 
 
 
137 
137 
brutish, and short.” Although both parts will be threatened by 
environmental stress, the Last Man will be able to master it; the 
First Man will not. 
 
The Last Man will adjust to the loss of underground water tables in 
the western United States. He will build dikes to save Cape 
Hatteras and the Chesapeake beaches from rising sea levels, even 
as the Maldive Islands, off the coast of India, s ink into oblivion, 
and the shorelines of Egypt, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia 
recede, driving tens of millions of people inland where there is no 
room for them, and thus sharpening ethnic divisions.’  
 
 
In the first excerpt, Kaplan (1994) asserts that environmental issues are important 
‘national-security issues’ for the ‘twenty-first century’. Subsequently, he lists a range of 
environmental concerns, for example ‘air pollution’, ‘social erosion’ and ‘rising sea 
levels’ in regions such as ‘the Niger Delta and Bangladesh’, and notes that these ‘will’ 
‘prompt mass migrations’ and ‘incite group conflicts’. As opposed to modal verbs 
operant under a racial logic that functions to demarcate future possibilities (e.g. 
‘would’ or ‘could’), the verb ‘will’ reduces future outcomes to a condition of near 
certainty. As such, it could be that this relation – at a generalised geopolitical scale of 
‘mass migrations’ – is one that compels: Kaplan’s remarks suggest a deterministic 
relation of what will happen in possible climate-insecure futures. In the second and 
third segments, Kaplan (1994) argues that ‘we are entering a bifurcated world’ and 
differentiates between the ‘Last Man’ (derived from Fukuyama’s  (1992) ‘end of history’ 
thesis) able to survive in this world (‘healthy, well fed and pampered’), and the ‘First 
Man’ condemned to a life of Hobbesian cruelty. A range of adaptive strategies are 
possible for the ‘Last Man’ – including building ‘dikes’ and ‘adjusting’ to ‘the loss of 
underground water tables’. However, for those resident next to receding shorelines in 
‘Egypt, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia’, rising sea levels will drive ‘tens of millions of 
people inland where there is no room for them, and thus sharpening ethnic divisions’. 
In both of these excerpts, and in particular for ‘First Man’, I argue that Kaplan (1994) 
constructs a deterministic logic of what is happening or will happen in climate-insecure 
futures, one which forecloses alternative adaptive strategies (and strictly delimits 
future possibilities) for ‘First Man’ populations.  
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Interestingly, through his use of the terms ‘First Man’ and ‘Last Man’ to highlight global  
inequalities, it could be that Kaplan also touches on other multi-scalar differences. On 
the one hand, the metaphorical constructions of ‘First Man’ and ‘Last Man’ refer to 
abstracted populations; on the other, the reference to ‘Man’ could locate these 
changes at the scale of individual human beings and communities. However, I argue 
that Kaplan’s classification also masks other inequalities. His adoption of the term 
‘Man’ assumes a gendered representation of human populations more broadly. 
Furthermore, differences between ‘First Man’, condemned to a ‘short’ and ‘nasty’ 
Hobbesian existence, and ‘Last Man’, ‘healthy’ and ‘well fed’, construct a teleology in 
which ‘Man’ progresses from this ‘First’ stage to the ‘Last’ stage, analogous in Kaplan’s  
(1994) metaphor to Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ thesis. I argue that this 
teleology resonates with Goldberg’s (2002) distinction between ‘racial historicism’ and 
‘racial naturalism’. Racial naturalism assumes that human populations are inherently 
different (grounded in racial hierarchies of superior and inferior ‘races’) and leans 
towards segregationist actions to maintain a separation between racialized groups. 
Racial historicists postulate that some populations are more ‘civilized’ and ‘moral’ than 
others and posit a process of ‘development’, ‘assimilation’ or ‘integration’ to enable 
greater homogeneity between these populations (Goldberg 2002). It could be that 
Kaplan’s distinction between ‘First Man’ and ‘Last Man’ follows a racial historicist 
teleology in which ‘First Man’ occupies a less developed, more precarious position and 
‘Last Man’ is at a higher stage of this development pathway. If this is transposed to the 
context of possible climate-insecure futures, Kaplan’s  (1994) hypothesis suggests 
differing degrees of agency and determinism. Thus, although ‘both parts’ – ‘First’ and 
‘Last Man’ – will be affected by environmental stress, it is only ‘Last Man’ that will be 
able to ‘master it’. A range of adaptive strategies (and thus a  broader range of possible 
outcomes in climate-insecure futures) is available to ‘Last Man’, whereas ‘First Man’ 
‘will not’ be able to master environmental stresses (a compulsive determinism).  
With specific reference to ‘African’ populations, the CNA’s Military Advisory Board (in 
the seminal report National Security and the Impacts of Climate Change (2007: 22)), 
write:  
 
‘As climate changes and agricultural patterns are disrupted, the 
geopolitics of the future will increasingly be the politics of scarcity. 
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Potential rainfall decreases in North Africa would likely exacerbate 
the problem of migration to Europe. Reduced rainfall and 
increasing desertification of the Sub-Saharan region will also likely 
result in migrations to Europe, as well as migrations within the 
African continent.’  
 
 
Here, claims are asserted with high probability to near certainty. This includes the 
claim that the geopolitics of the future ‘will increasingly be the politics of scarcity’. The 
verb ‘will’ asserts certainty about future geopolitics. The phrases ‘would likely’ and ‘will 
likely’ referring to migration to Europe also impose migration as a likely outcome. 
Migration as a ‘problem’ repeats a key critique in Bakewell’s (2008) ‘sedentary bias’ 
hypothesis: that migration requires a solution and is better if prevented. In debates 
about determinism and ‘climate conflicts’, the Darfur Genocide represents a central 
case. In a post-conflict environmental assessment, UNEP (2007) conclude: 
‘Environmental degradation, as well as regional climate instability and change, are 
major underlying causes of good insecurity and conflict in Darfur – and potential 
catalysts for future conflict through central and eastern Sudan and other countries in 
the Sahel belt’. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (Washington Post, June 16th, 2007) 
wrote an op-ed claiming that ‘amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur 
conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.’  
 
Hartmann (2010) and Verhoeven (2011) contest these evidential claims, citing 
economic and political inequalities between Khartoum and rural populations as 
contributory causes (Hartmann 2010). When the insurgency broke out in 2003, it 
involved proxy militias with government forces in supporting roles, transfer of 
exploitative assets to government-backed militias (e.g. land and coffee), and impunity 
towards livelihood destruction for opposing Darfurians (Verhoeven 2011). Thus, the 
Darfur Conflict represents an important, contested historical moment in debates about 
‘climate conflict’. However, post 2007, (my interpretations of) deterministic 
statements diminish significantly in the CDA sample. Alongside the empirical data used 
for the naturalization and dehumanization tropes (2007-10), this coincides with a 
decline of climate security discourse from national security actors. As Diez et al (2016: 
47) write: ‘After several political setbacks at the international and domestic level [for 
example the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen COP] … from 2010 on the climate  security 
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argument gradually faded away and funding for climate security reports decreased’. 
However, in 2014, with the release of the IPCC chapter on human security in its Fifth 
Assessment (Adger et al 2014) and the National Climate Assessment (the signature 
scientific statement for climate change impacts in the US (US Global Change Research 
Program 2014)), a number of climate security reports emerged. With a 2014 
reassessment of accelerating national security risks of climate change, the Center for 
Naval Analyses’ Military Advisory Board state (p.2):  
 
‘In many areas, the projected impacts of climate change will be 
more than threat multipliers; they will serve as catalysts for 
instability and conflict. In Asia, Africa and the Middle East, we are 
already seeing how the impacts of extreme weather, such as 
prolonged drought and flooding – and resulting food shortages, 
desertification, population dislocation and mass migration, and 
sea level rise – are posing security challenges to these regions’ 
governments. We see these trends growing and accelerating.’  
 
 
The MAB no longer use the term ‘threat multiplier’ (CNA 2007), which suggests a range 
of factors climate changes might exacerbate, and declare climate change is a ‘catalyst 
for instability and conflict’. By the 2014 report, ‘we are already seeing’ these impacts in 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East, including ‘population displacement and mass 
migration’. This corresponds with Dalby’s (2016) analysis that the primary difference 
between the 2007 and 2014 reports is that, whereas the 2007 publication highlights 
future possibilities, this report locates them in the present. Barack Obama echoes a 
near certainty about climate insecurities in his West Point speech (28th May, 2014), an 
important symbolic address delivered to graduates of the West Point Military 
Academy. Discussing the collective spirit of US Armed Forces and the need to mobilize 
for 2015’s Paris COP Summit, Obama remarks: 
 
‘That spirit of cooperation needs to energize the global effort to 
combat climate change – a creeping national security crisis that 
will shape your time in uniform, as we are called upon to respond 
to refugee flows and natural disasters and conflicts over water and 
food, which is why next year I intend to make sure America is out 
front in putting together a global framework to preserve our 
planet.’  
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Additionally, in the Department of Defence’s 2014 Climate Adaptation Roadmap, an 
adaptation strategy published in October 2013, the DOD asserts in the Foreword that:  
 
‘Among the future trends that will impact our national security is 
climate change. Rising global temperatures, changing precipitation 
patterns, climbing sea levels, and more extreme weather events 
will intensify the challenges of global instability, hunger, poverty, 
and conflict. They will likely lead to food and water shortages, 
pandemic disease, disputes over refugees and resources, and 
destruction by natural disasters in regions across the globe’  
 
 
In both of these sources climate change is asserted as a problem that ‘will’ lead to 
conflicts. The use of a war metaphor (the need to ‘combat’ climate change) confirms 
the urgency of Barack Obama’s rhetoric. The collective pronouns (‘we’) and reference 
to ‘America’ as a single actor foster an image of American unity. Furthermore, he 
asserts (without empirical qualification) that climate change will affect the military 
personnel’s careers as they ‘are’ called upon to respond to ‘refugee flows’ and 
‘conflicts over water and food’. In the DOD’s climate adaptation strategy, the authors 
argue that ‘rising global temperatures’ and other climate effects ‘will intensify … global 
instability, hunger, poverty, and conflict.’ Whilst Obama treats these impacts as given, 
the DOD clarifies this with the unambiguous terminology ‘will intensify’. The language 
is less acute, but the authors maintain that these impacts ‘will likely’ lead to ‘disputes 
over refugees’. In both excerpts, about migration and conflict more generally, I argue a 
deterministic trend of compelled violence and migration is present.  
 
Deterministic compulsion narratives imply unequal power relations. As Meierding 
(2016) notes, neo-Malthusian, deterministic accounts of ‘climate conflict’ could localize 
blame for climate insecurities (conflicts and disruptive mass migrations) onto ‘African’ 
populations and away from the climate injustices of industrialized, ‘Western’ elites. 
Additionally, they can reduce the culpability of local elites in the propagation of 
violence and human rights abuses (Hartmann 2010). Finally, deterministic narratives 
also reduce the immense complexity of these issues. While there may be connections 
between climate change, socioeconomic dynamics and conflict, a deterministic logic 
stipulating that populations – especially ‘African’ – ‘will’ or ‘are likely turn to’ violence 
and mass migration rather than less costly and painful adaptive strategies does not 
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help study of these analytical complexities. Importantly, whilst it is by no means similar 
to a racial logic that naturalizes traits to ‘Muslim’ or ‘African’ populations, 
deterministic compulsion in moments of US climate security discourse continues to 
contribute towards biopolitics of unequally valued lives. Determinism implicates a 
dislocation of responsibilities for climate insecurities away from elite, wealthy actors in 
‘Western’ states and onto populations in ‘African’ countries. Populations are valued or 
devalued on the basis of their responsibility for possible conflict or disruptive 
migrations.  
 
Compulsive determinism does not racialize as naturalization tropes do, but is related 
to underlying assumptions – a key dimension of essentializing logics – that are racial. 
Part of deterministic narratives’ propagation ‘lies in the ways they draw on deep-
seated fears and stereotypes of the dark-skinned, over-breeding, dangerous poor’ 
(Hartmann 2010: 239-40). As Bettini (2015) describes, environmental discourse ‘has 
always been haunted by a fear of dangerous, unruly populations in the “global South” 
– a spectre that arguably still lingers in climate politics. This leads to apocalyptic talk, 
usually with a strong racial undercurrent, of hordes of refugees threatening “our” 
security.’ In line with Hartmann (2010) and Bettini’s (2015) conclusions, I argue that 
compulsion narratives do not racialize according to explicit traits naturalized to 
different populations, but rather at the scale of underlying assumptions and 
indications about which populations will or are likely to resort to violence. 
Deterministic, compulsion narratives are only a small, specific dimension of moments 
of US climate security discourse, but function as a modification to essentializing , racial 
logics (and the openness of the possibilities they suggest) in these specific moments. 
Thus, although they do not racialize in the same way as naturalization, deterministic 
narratives are nonetheless interwoven with underlying, assumed racial logics and 
contribute towards biopolitics of unequally valued lives in US climate security 
discourse.  
 
Importantly, although essentializing logics are implicated in constructions of racial 
‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Others in moments of US (and EU) climate security discourses 
(and the circumscribed futures these logics suggest), this does not exhaust possibilities 
for alternative Muslim or African voices in American climate change debates. Crucially, 
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I do not argue that this discussion constitutes a ‘subaltern politics’ or representations 
of ‘subaltern voices’. Spivak (2005: 475) defines ‘subaltern’ as ‘to be removed from all 
lines of social mobility’. She (2005: 476) clarifies: ‘Subalternity is where lines of social 
mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the basis of a recognizable basis of action … 
No one can say ‘I am a subaltern’ in whatever language. And subaltern studies will not 
reduce itself to the historical recounting of the details of the practice of 
disenfranchised groups and remain a study of the subaltern.’ Chakrabarty (1998) 
argues that ‘subaltern pasts’ resist attempts to incorporate marginalized groups into a 
mainstream narrative or discourse of history (e.g. ‘the nation’). This account does not 
seek to study ‘the subaltern’ or speculate on ‘subalternity’ in particular, but rather 
presents alternative Muslim and African voices in American climate change debates. As 
the example – of ‘Green Muslims’ – maintains identification as ‘Muslim’, it does not 
rest outside of identity or ‘a recognizable basis for action’ (Spivak 2005: 476). Instead, 
it could be an instance of Spivak’s (2012 (1987): 205, original emphasis) notion of 
‘strategic essentialism’: ‘a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously 
visible political interest’. To present an alternative reading of ‘Muslim’ subjects in 
American climate change politics is not to present a fixed, homogenized category of 
‘Muslim’, but rather to locate strategic essentializations of ‘Muslim’ identities that 
challenge dominant US climate change discourses. This strategy is not in opposition to 
the anti-essentialism that underpins the thesis’ theoretical framework, influenced by 
Said’s (1994) conceptualization, and recognizes that contingent, porous 
subjectifications and collective identifications can manifest in different contexts. 
‘Strategic essentialisms’ also recognize the ‘constitutive paradox’ of antihumanist, 
poststructuralist thought: ‘that the essentializing moment, the object of their criticism, 
is irreducible’ (Spivak 2012 (1987): 205). As such, whilst this project does adopt an anti-
essentialist framework, this does not negate possibilities for strategic essentializations 
– the example of ‘Green Muslims’ – in order to present alternative voices to 
predominant US climate change debates. 
 
Green Muslims is an environmental organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. It 
was founded in 2007 by a small group of Muslims hosting a ‘zero-trash’ iftar (a meal 
held after sunset during Ramadan). This group aimed to ‘raise awareness of global 
environmental issues within a Muslim community while hoping to create a language of 
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Muslim-based environmentalism that would precipitate across communities’ (Green 
Muslims 2016a). Thus, from its inception Green Muslims has not only sought to raise 
awareness of environmental issues within specific Muslim communities, but is multi -
scalar and aims to promote a broader ‘language of Muslim-based environmentalism’. 
Green Muslims’ vision is ‘to be a source in the Muslim community for spiritually-
inspired environmental education, reflection, and action. We aim to serve locally while 
serving as a national resource’ (Green Muslims 2016a). Green Muslims’ mission is of 
‘Muslims living in the environmental spirit of Islam’ (Green Muslims 2016a). The 
organization is involved in a range of different activities. These include building tools to 
share knowledge and practical suggestions in relation to environmental issues, a 
‘Green Scripture’ initiative focused on interpretations of religious texts, leadership and 
capacity-building tools (for example consultations with schools and mosques), and 
community action programmes (e.g. park cleaning projects) (Green Muslims 2016b). 
As an organization, Green Muslims embodies a multi-scalar approach, involved in local 
projects but also identified as a ‘national resource’. It thus speaks not only to projects 
led and initiated by Muslim actors (not reduced or dehumanized to the status of a 
racial Other), but also distinctly Muslim-American identities and practices of climate 
action and environmental values. Significantly, this is not to argue that ‘Green 
Muslims’ is not without imbrication in networks of unequal power relations (it remains 
centred in Washington, D.C., for instance). Or, that there are many other forms of 
community solidarities promoting climate action independently of a national security 
frame. Green Muslims represents but one example of the multifarious, dynamic voices 
contesting discourses and meanings of climate politics in the US. 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that essentializing, racial logics delimit discursively future 
possibilities for climate-induced migration. Racialized identities function to demarcate 
the specific ways in which lives are valued in migration from the MENA region to the 
European Union. I have argued that biopolitics are not only about the rationalities and 
technologies of the government of populations, but also that bio-inequalities function 
through a lens of population (e.g. migration policy) and subjectification and Othering 
practices (partially) define these processes. For Fassin (2009: 57), biopolitical 
management of populations is about ‘the concrete way in which individuals and 
groups are treated, under which principles and in the name of which morals, implying 
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which inequalities and misrecognitions.’ Through representations of ‘Muslim’ and 
‘African’ populations as racially Other and tropes of dehumanization and determinism, 
biopolitics of unequally valued lives are constructed in context-specific moments of US 
climate security discourse. Importantly, with the brief example of ‘Green Muslims’, the 
chapter has argued that essentializing national security interpretations are not the only 
means (in fact, only one among many) through which climate change action can be 
discursively constructed in an American context. Chapter 5 analyses these relations 
with an examination of how terrorism and climate change interconnections are 
discursively constructed in climate security and intersections of racial and national 
identities in these constructions. 
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Chapter 5: 
Representations of terrorism in US and EU climate 
security discourses 
 
5.1 Introduction and research questions  
 
1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security 
discourse? 
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed 
in and through US and EU climate security discourse?  
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security 
discourse? 
 
This chapter explores constructions of terrorism in US and EU climate security 
discourse. The chapter first contextualizes ‘terrorism’ in climate security, before 
discussing how essentializing logics orient intersectional – racialized, nationalized and 
gendered – identities to climate-insecure futures. I outline academic debates on 
‘terrorism’ and ‘radicalization’ and their conceptualization in relation to environmental 
security (Section 5.2). Whilst there are accounts of climate change and terrorism 
interconnections (e.g. Renard 2008), there are few examinations of discourses of 
terrorism in climate security. In accordance with other empirical chapters, I build on a 
CDA (using Fairclough’s (2003) guidance) to elucidate findings. In doing so, the chapter 
explores intersections of racial and national identities and bridges chapters 4 (racial 
logics and CIM) and 5 (American nationhood). Section 5.3 sets out the historical 
context of climate change and terrorism interconnections and their binary 
construction. I then discuss how narratives of complexity (Section 5.4) and biological 
tropes (dehumanizing fertility and immunology metaphors) (Section 5.5) are employed 
in context-specific moments of climate security and constructions of intersectional 
racialized and gendered identities (Section 5.6). Finally, the chapter touches on 
interrelations of anti-Americanism with racial logics in climate security discourse, 
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focusing on the US government’s intervention in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami (Section 5.7).  
 
5.2 ‘Terrorism’ and ‘radicalization’ – where do they sit in climate security? 
 
Sedgwick (2010) notes that, whilst ‘radicalization’ was used by academics prior to 
2001, its greatest increase in usage by the press was from 2005-2007 with terrorist 
attacks in Western Europe (e.g. the 7th July bombings in London (2005)) and counter-
radicalization strategies by European governments. Radicalization’s meaning is highly 
contested; Sedgwick (2010) contends it can be conceptualized as absolute and relative. 
A relative understanding posits a continuum between those deemed ‘radical’ and 
‘moderate’ and denotes movement along this continuum, raising the political question 
of decisions about what constitutes the continuum and concomitant definitions of 
‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ (Sedgwick 2010). ‘Absolute’ conceptions assume self-evident 
divisions between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ and radica lization becomes a zero-sum 
game governed by essentialized, ‘with-us-or-against-us’ imaginative geographies. 
Richards (2015), writing about the UK’s CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, argues 
these terms are complicated by the concept of ‘extremism’; here, the tools employed 
in political violence are not emphasized, only the ideological underpinnings to these 
actions. This risks alienating individuals that condemn terror tactics but sympathize 
with their underpinning ideas. Richards (2015) critiques the tendency of ‘extremism’ 
and ‘radicalization’ to direct too much attention at individual agency and actions (how 
a person is ‘radicalized’, how they commit ‘terrorist attacks’, ‘lone wolf’ attackers, an 
individual’s ‘de-radicalization’, etc.), at the expense of the underlying socioeconomic 
and political dynamics behind radicalization.  
 
‘Terrorism’ is a similarly problematic concept. Chalecki (2001: 3) introduces the US 
government’s definition (from Title 22, Section 2656 of the U.S. Code): ‘premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.’ 
She (2001) argues acts of terrorism have four primary characteristics: motivation 
(ideologies and motives), means (technologies and methods used to execute political 
violence), target (targets of the attack), and enemy (the perceived enemy violence is 
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directed against). However, Coleman (2003) argues that by naming an action as 
‘terrorism’ or identifying ‘terrorists’, this immediately demarcates an imaginative 
geography around the ‘we’ targeted and in need of protection. The figure of the 
terrorist is constructed as ideologically extreme and divorced from the mainstream, 
deviant and secretive, and prone to violence (Puar and Rai 2002). Heath-Kelly (2010) 
critiques terrorism studies from a number of fronts. First is its overreliance on 
secondary information and lack of empirical case studies (Heath-Kelly 2010). Second is 
state-centrism: a critique of terrorism studies’ attribution of political violence solely to 
non-state actors and closeness to state funding/influence. Finally, terrorism studies 
has been critiqued for a positivist ethos and lack of accountability for the unequal 
power-knowledge relations in its constitution (Heath-Kelly 2010). Instead of 
prescribing particular definitions of ‘terrorism’ or ‘radicalization’ in this chapter, I 
instead focus on how these concepts are discursively rendered in climate security and 
their imbrication in essentializing logics. 
 
A strong critique relates to the securitization of Muslim communities in 
counterterrorism strategies (Kundnani 2009). For example, Heath-Kelly (2013) uses the 
idea of a ‘counterfactual’ (describing what might have happened should certain 
events/interventions not have occurred) to demonstrate how radicalization is adopted 
as a type of risk knowledge to render future terrorism governable. She (2013) 
describes how the UK PREVENT counter-radicalization strategy (introduced in 2009 to 
direct funds to local authorities with a Muslim population of 5% or higher for 
recreational activities, education programmes, and arts/creative initiatives) renders 
Muslim communities as simultaneously ‘risky’ and ‘at-risk/vulnerable’. Further, 
Eroukhmanoff (2015) claims that ‘radicalization’ is implicated in a process of ‘remote 
securitization’ of Muslim communities in the US. Organizations such as the 
Department of Homeland Security and NYPD have adopted strategies such as 
euphemistic language (of an extremist ‘fringe’ that ‘hijacks’ Islam), metaphors (for 
example ‘fertile grounds’ or ‘seeds’ of radicalization), or constructions of radicalized 
violence as an autonomous, closed system with rational agents and logical pathways, 
to discursively produce a ‘Muslim’ Other ontologically different to and remote from 
the securitizers (Eroukhmanoff 2015). This reinforces geographies of suspicion towards 
Muslim communities and justifies intensive security measures. Working from Heath-
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Kelly’s (2013) and Eroukhmanoff’s (2013) foundations, this chapter explores discursive 
constructions of climate change and terrorism linkages, their relations to essentializing 
racial and national logics, and relationships with climate-insecure futures and the 
outcomes or interventions they legitimize.  
 
However, there are very few studies investigating links between climate change and 
terrorism. Renard (2008) proposed one of the first attempts to model these 
connections. He (2008) identifies three types of causal factors linking climate change 
impacts and a likelihood for terrorism. First are ‘instigating causes’; second are 
‘permissive factors’; and third are ‘precipitant events’. Instigating causes are deep-
rooted causes of terrorism: basic factors necessary for terrorism to develop but that do 
not automatically produce terroristic violence. They include poverty (individuals with 
poorer livelihoods supposedly have more reason to rebel, though this is contested by 
the often middle-class composition of terrorist groups (Jackson 2006)); inequalities 
between social groups; and large-scale societal changes, e.g. migration, which can 
relate to marginalization in host societies. Regime instability and type (with corrupt 
governance and authoritarian regimes invoking resentment from subjugated 
populations) are also instigating causes linked to terrorism (Renard 2008). ‘Permissive 
factors’ facilitate the use of violence: they are not sufficient or necessary for terrorism, 
but can contribute to its development (Renard 2008). They include sociocultural 
groups that can aid mobilization of assailants from similar backgrounds. ‘Weak’ or 
‘failed’ states could provide space for terrorist mobilization outside of legal authority, 
while regime openness can facilitate opportunities for dissemination of extremist 
materials. Globalization – international travel, financial transactions and IT – can also 
provide a more permissive environment for terrorist activities (Renard 2008). 
‘Precipitant events’ are triggers, the final events necessary to start a process of 
violence, e.g. loss of a family member or a natural disaster.   
 
Climate change could exacerbate these factors in a multitude of ways. It could increase 
poverty (with reduced agricultural yields and affected livelihoods) or inequalities (with 
scarce resources captured by elites, or grievances invoked by climate injustices), which 
could act as instigating causes for terrorist activity (Renard 2008). Renard (2008: 44) 
subscribes to the CNA’s (2007) conclusion of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’: 
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‘like for the impacts on the instigating causes, climate change will not create new 
permissive factors. But it will exacerbate existing factors [for example food and water 
scarcities]. The level of violence could increase in the world, which could create a 
favorable environment for terrorists.’ Mass et al (2013) argue it is unlikely large-scale 
environmental terrorism will occur in the immediate future, but locate two possible 
future pathways through which it might develop. First is ‘evolution’, in which 
environmental resources would contribute to the tools or targets of existing terrorists. 
Second is ‘emergence’ of new organizations with different ideologies, strategies etc. 
(Mass et al 2013: 212). They argue that whilst opportunities to use environmental 
resources in terrorism are increasing, e.g. the development of biotechnology, it is very 
difficult to predict how terrorist organizations might develop and to prepare 
contingencies for every possible form of attack (Mass et al 2013). Whilst these 
constitute important contributions on climate change and terrorism linkages, I argue 
they do not explore discourses of climate change and terrorism interconnections in 
climate security. It is at these moments, discursive constellations of climate change 
and terrorism linkages, that unequal identity construction is constituted in relation to 
possible climate-insecure futures.  
 
However, in proposing that environmental technologies could be used as tools or 
resources for terrorism, I argue they draw on older debates on ‘eco-‘ or ‘environmental 
terrorism’. Chalecki (2001: 3) defines environmental terrorism as: ‘the unlawful use of 
force against in situ environmental resources as to deprive populations of their 
benefit(s) and/or destroy other property.’ Dangerous attributes of environmental 
terrorism include dislocation (environmental resources cross borders, making security 
mobilizations difficult), perpetrator safety/security (natural resources are often less 
well guarded than government buildings, airports etc.), and political and economic 
impacts (terrorist attacks, e.g. poisoning of water supplies, could disrupt economic 
activities). Chalecki (2001) differentiates between ‘resource-as-target’ terrorism 
(ecosystems are the focus of the attack), and ‘resource-as-tool’ terrorism 
(environmental resources are coopted as tools of violence). Schwartz (1998: 484) 
agrees, contending: ‘the term ‘environmental terrorism’ should be reserved for 
incidents in which the environment itself is disrupted or threatened by the perpetrator 
as a symbol that elicits trepidation in the larger population over the ecological 
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consequences of the act.’ Thus, the environment becomes a tool or target of political 
violence, seeking to evoke fear in populations. O’Lear (2003) critiques this from two 
viewpoints. First is to ask what ‘the environment’ means in this scenario (is it restricted 
to natural ecosystems, or does it include energy systems such as dams)? Second, are 
non-state actors the only perpetrators of environmental terrorism; does state violence 
play into these debates? More specifically, ‘eco-terrorism’ describes the destruction of 
property by radical environmental groups motivated by biocentric ideology (calling for 
all living things to have equal moral status and (in some cases) the rollback of industrial 
societies) (Chalecki 2001). Notoriously, the Earth Liberation Front (a radical 
environmental group founded in the UK and active in North America) burned down a 
ski lodge in Vail, Colorado in October 1998, resulting in $12 million worth of damage 
(Allhoff and Buciak 2013). However, although this  provides a more detailed, historically 
grounded account, there is relatively little written on the empirical contexts in which 
climate change and terrorism interlink, the discourses framing these interconnections, 
and how they implicate racial and national identities in climate security. In a context-
specific, partial manner, this chapter elucidates on these dimensions in more detail.  
Section 5.3 outlines a brief historical context for these discourses. 
 
Section 5.3 Historical contexts  
 
In 2008, the FBI declared ‘eco-terrorism’ the top terrorist threat to the US (Allhoff and 
Buciak 2013). However, in an analysis of illegal activities with an environmental motive 
in the US (1970-2007), Carson et al (2012) identify 39 incidents in 1989, through to a 
peak of 159 in 2001, followed by a decrease of 79% through to 2007. Despite the FBI’s 
claims, crimes (let alone terrorist crimes) with an environmental dimension declined 
sharply in the US from the early to mid-2000s. This is reflected in discursive 
constructions of climate change and terrorism as important issues with similarities, but 
nonetheless absent of causal relationships. For example, in Science magazine, the then 
UK Chief Scientific Advisor Sir David King (2004) discusses the Bush administration’s 
failure to produce climate policies. King (2004: 174) notes: ‘in my view, climate change 
is the most severe problem that we are facing today – more serious even than the 
threat of terrorism.’ King draws an explicit hierarchy of priorities (on a scale of 
‘severity’ and ‘seriousness’) and states unambiguously the urgency of climate change. 
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Furthermore, Hopkins (2008b) writes in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists ‘climate 
change and the war on terror mix like oil and water’. He warns against a militarization 
of climate policy (2008b, original emphasis): ‘we must collectively agree not to 
consider military action when it comes to security issues that are rooted in 
environmental degradation … climate change and violent extremism must be delinked 
in the eyes of the public.’ Thus, Hopkins (2008b) separates climate change from 
terrorism in order to avoid a militarization of environmental policy. This feeds into 
broader critiques of a militarization of environmental issues (Deudney 1990). Gilbert 
(2012) warns that, whilst national security can be a useful frame to mobilize policy, it 
goes against the grain of climate change as a global problem and doesn’t draw 
attention to socioeconomic and political structures implicated in environmental 
degradation, e.g. oil dependency. National security depends on an externalized 
concept of nature as ‘the commons’: something to be controlled and organized for the 
benefit of American military power (Gilbert 2012). However, as De Goede and Randalls 
(2009) note in their analysis of preemption and apocalyptic futures, terrorism and 
climate change are increasingly constructed together, with the number of citations of 
both issues in the same sentence (in the UK broadsheet press) increasing from 2002-
2007 (Figure 2):  
 
  
  
Figure 2: UK broadsheet newspapers citing climate change and terrorism in the same 
sentence (based on a NexisTM search), from De Goede and Randalls (2009: 864) 
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De Goede and Randalls (2009: 864) connect this rise to comparisons between climate 
change and terrorism as apocalyptic, unmanageable issues in the media, by NGOs and 
security institutions. The trend does not suggest the two issues are causally connected, 
but rather is a useful discursive tool to compare climate change and terrorism and 
highlight their unpredictable, complex qualities. Climate change and terrorism are 
discussed in proximity, but not in terms of their causal interconnections. I argue that 
whilst these discursive tactics provide important historical context (Section 5.3) and 
conceptual background (Section 5.2), they do not account for causal debates on 
climate change and terrorism interconnections (with the exception of conceptual 
accounts of terrorism-climate change connections (e.g. Renard 2008)), the points at 
which national and racial logics (with concomitant biopolitics of unequally valued lives) 
are discursively constructed in relation to climate-insecure futures. To begin, I discuss 
complex causal chains linking climate change and terrorism in US climate security. 
 
Section 5.4 Complex causal chains connecting terrorism and climate change 
 
In narratives of complex causality, environmental degradation is connected to regime 
instability and ‘ungoverned spaces’ extremists are able to exploit. Butts and Bankus 
(2013: 157) state: ‘Environmental security issues affect both state and human security 
… As states fail, and ungoverned space grows, the increasing allure of Africa as a 
training base for external terrorist groups should be expected, and the likelihood that 
the presence of these forces will encourage the growth of local terrorism and 
insurgency is strong.’ In her study of responses to the 2010 floods in the Sindh region 
of Pakistan, Siddiqi (2014) documents her ethnographic work with Islamist group 
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) as first responders for humanitarian welfare, e.g. food packages 
and healthcare. However, there was no linear relationship between withdrawal of 
government support and an upsurge in JuD support. There were blurred divisions in 
which JuD representatives interchanged with local politicians, community leaders, 
army employees and aid workers (Siddiqi 2014). Siddiqi (2014: 887) writes: ‘I argue 
that while Islamist groups did influence and affect the post-disaster political landscape 
in southern Sindh, the relationship between climatic disasters and such radical politics 
is not linear and requires a far more complex analysis.’ This means that although 
terrorism and climate change interconnections share commonalities with determinism 
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tropes (see Chapter 4, section 4.5), they do not reduce the likelihood of violence to a 
probabilistic compulsion and instead draw more complex causal chains. For example, 
in testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Foreign Relations in May 2014, Dr. 
Daniel Y. Chui, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy in the 
Department of Defense (p.7-8), reflects on possible consequences of climate 
insecurities (including droughts and natural disasters):  
 
‘These developments could undermine already fragile 
governments that are unable to respond effectively or challenge 
currently-stable governments, as well as increasing competition 
and tension between countries vying for limited resources. These 
gaps in governance can create an avenue for extremist ideologies 
and the conditions that foster terrorism.’  
 
 
In a similar line of thought, the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy (a document 
released by the Director of National Intelligence on a three-year basis which lays out 
the strategic risks for American intelligence agencies (Director of National Intelligence 
2014)), declares (p.5):  
 
‘Many governments will face challenges to meet even the basic 
needs of their people as they confront demographic change, 
resource constraints, effects of climate change, and risks of global 
infectious disease outbreaks. These effects are threat multipliers 
that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, 
environmental degradation, political instability, and social 
tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other 
forms of violence. The risk of conflict and mass atrocities may 
increase.’  
 
 
In these passages, the effects of climate change are connected indirectly to terrorism 
via chains of causation (including poverty, social tensions and political instability). 
These chains are articulated with reference to geographical terminology to offer 
direction, e.g. ‘gaps’ and ‘revenues’. Whereas determinism implies a compulsion 
towards violence (exhibited through verb choices such as ‘is likely to lead to’ or ‘will 
lead to’), causal chains are prefigured with modal verbs, e.g. ‘can create’, ‘could 
undermine’, or ‘can enable’. In these terms, openness to more variable outcomes is 
facilitated. However, despite this, causal chains are constructed in an almost 
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teleological fashion; here, climate changes figure at the beginning of the causal chain, 
and terroristic activity at its conclusion. This implies that terrorism is an endpoint or 
culmination of these prior events. In the National Intelligence Strategy quote, terrorist 
activity is not the endpoint, but ‘mass atrocities’. Thus, in this excerpt there is a 
sequence of progressively more violent outcomes (from social tensions, to terrorism, 
to mass atrocities) before reaching this extreme conclusion. And although authors 
stress these outcomes are only possibilities, a teleology with political violence as an 
endpoint suggests a process of inevitability or of falling dominos. Eroukhmanoff (2015) 
argues this discourse is premised on a ‘logic of unexpected consequences’, a 
consequentialist logic in which it is possible to infer outcomes in a system with 
autonomous, rational agents in full knowledge of their situations and actions. It could 
be argued that this focus on autonomous agency disconnects terrorism and climate 
change from their surrounding political contexts and the discursive construction of 
terrorist subjects in climate security. By extension, it becomes more difficult to locate 
culpability for political violence, where this sits in relation to sociopolitical contexts, 
and the climate injustices implicated in these relations.  
 
A prominent example, and one I argue exemplifies these tensions, is the Syrian Civil 
War (2011-present). Two high-profile studies (Gleick 2014; Kelley et al 2015) analyze 
this topic in relation to climate change, with the latter asserting there is evidence the 
conflict in Syria is connected to climate change. The 2006-10 drought was the worst on 
instrumental record, leading to rural-urban migration of farmers to Syrian cities, 
dissatisfaction with the Assad Government’s agricultural policies, and therefore 
contributions to broader grievances behind the 2011 uprisings and Civil War. Kelley et 
al (2015) contend anthropogenic climate forcing made the 2007-10 drought three 
times more likely and conclude that climate change is implicated in the current Syrian 
conflict. However, in drawing these causal chains, it could be that there is an 
interesting politics of causal attribution and culpability. For instance, speaking at the 
Milan universal exposition (September 17th, 2015) on the themes of food security, 
climate change and sustainability, US Secretary of State John Kerry states: 
 
‘It is not a coincidence that immediately prior to the civil war in 
Syria, the country experienced the worst drought on record. As 
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many as 1.5 million people migrated from Syria’s farms into Syria’s 
cities, and that intensified the political unrest that was beginning 
to brew. Now, I’m not telling you that the crisis in Syria was 
caused by climate change. No. Obviously it wasn’t. It was caused 
by a brutal dictator who barrel bombed, starved, tortured, and 
gassed his own people. But the devastating drought clearly made 
a bad situation a lot worse. Climate change is – to borrow a term 
from the US Department of Defense – a “threat multiplier.” Even if 
it doesn’t ignite conflict, it has the ability to fan the flames and to 
make situations much more complicated for political leaders to 
deal with.’ 
 
 
Similarly, in a speech to graduates of the US Coastguard Academy (New London, 
Connecticut, May 20th (2015b)), Barack Obama states: 
 
‘Around the world, climate change increases the risk of instability 
and conflict. Rising seas are already swallowing low-lying islands, 
from Bangladesh to Pacific islands … Globally, we could see a rise 
in climate refugees. And I guarantee you the coastguard will have 
to respond. Elsewhere, more intense droughts will exacerbate 
shortages of water and food, increase competition for resources, 
and create the potential for mass migrations and new tensions. All 
of which is why the Pentagon calls climate change a “threat 
multiplier.” 
 
Understand, climate change did not cause the conflicts we see 
around the world. Yet what we also know is that severe drought 
helped to create the instability in Nigeria that was exploited by the 
terrorist group Boko Haram. It’s now believed that drought and 
crop failures and high food prices helped fuel the early unrest in 
Syria, which descended into civil war in the heart of the Middle 
East. So, increasingly, our military and our combatant commands, 
our services – including the Coast Guard – will need to factor 
climate change into plans and operations, because you need to be 
ready.’  
 
 
In these remarks, both Barack Obama and John Kerry draw indirect connections 
between climate changes, the Syrian drought, and the outbreak of conflict. However, 
both are very careful to nuance their statements about the causal chains connecting 
these phenomena. Using alliterative language, Kerry notes that the ‘devastating 
drought’ made the situation much worse and states that climate change ‘has the 
ability to fan the flames’. Similarly, Obama remarks that ‘climate change increases the 
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risk of instability and conflict’. Both speakers are careful to illustrate each stage of the 
causal chains connecting these phenomena: a drought, agricultural depletions, rural -
urban migration, political unrest, and ‘war in the heart of the Middle East’. In a 
different example, Obama also links drought in Nigeria to instability and terrorist group 
Boko Haram. Both Obama and Kerry refer to the Department of Defense’s term ‘threat 
multiplier’ as a means to capture the nuance of these causal relations: climate change 
is not a direct cause of violent conflict, but can amplify other factors (e.g. agricultural 
depletion and rural-urban migration) that are related to its emergence. Interestingly, in 
illustrating these causal relationships, Obama and Kerry are both clear that climate 
change is not a direct cause of the war in Syria. Obama says: ‘Understand, climate 
change did not cause the conflicts we see around the world’. Kerry is also unequivocal, 
stating: ‘No, I’m not telling you that the crisis in Syria was caused by climate change’. 
Subsequently, he repeats the term ‘no’ as part of an affirmative simple sentence and 
the claim that ‘obviously it wasn’t’. Thus, in both excerpts, Obama and Kerry do 
suggest that climate change is related (through complex, indirect causal pathways) to 
political violence and conflict, but are categorical that climate change is not a direct 
cause. The reason for this cautious attribution of causality could be indicated by 
Kerry’s subsequent sentence: ‘It was caused by a brutal dictator who barrel bombed, 
starved, tortured, and gassed his own people’. Kerry is careful to clarify that although 
climate change is related to the underlying causes of political instability in Syria, it is 
the Assad Government’s violent repression that is the primary reason for the Civil War.  
 
I argue that these excerpts highlight a nuanced, complex politics at play in the 
demarcation of conflicts and terrorist activities linked to climate change. Obama and 
Kerry – both committed to policies designed to mitigate and adapt to climate change – 
highlight the complex, indirect ways in which climate changes exacerbate political 
instability. However, they are both cautious to avoid the charge that climate change is 
‘causing’ the Syrian Civil War or terrorist attacks (with the political implication that this 
reduces the culpability of political actors (e.g. Assad) for these violences). Writing for 
the sceptical think tank The Heritage Foundation (2015), Peter Brookes, a Senior 
Fellow in National Security Affairs, critiques the Obama administration’s associations 
of climate change and terrorism. Brookes (2015) writes that it is ‘substantively wrong 
to link climate change and terrorism – whether directly or indirectly. And relating the 
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two to create a sense of national security urgency is not only misleading – it is 
dangerous because it distracts us from today’s very real, very immediate life-and-
death threats from terrorism.’ He (2015) claims that it is not only inaccurate to link 
climate change and terrorism (in his view there are no empirical connections between 
these phenomena), but also because this association detracts from the ‘very real, very 
immediate life-and-death’ threats of terrorism. However, in making this argument in 
the context of a sceptical think tank (the Heritage Foundation (Dunlap and Jacques 
2013)), it could also be that Brookes wants to dissociate climate change and terrorism 
in order to devalue climate change concerns in the US Government. From a different 
perspective, that of the right-wing news outlet Breitbart, Martel (2014) reports on the 
release of the 2014 Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board’s report National 
Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change. The title of Martel’s (2014) 
piece is: ‘Climate change, not Islam, is catalyst for terrorism, Arab Spring, Syrian war’. 
She (2014) also notes that ‘the report goes on to blame climate change for a number 
of political phenomena that are notably linked by an obvious culprit: radical Islam’. 
From Martel’s perspective, writing for Breitbart, it could be that drawing causal 
relationships between terrorism and climate change is problematic not only because 
climate change is considered an inadequate causal factor, but also because it detracts 
away from other causes of political violence, i.e. ‘Islam’ and ‘radical Islam’. From an 
examination of these varied sources, I argue that there is a multifarious, nuanced 
politics of attributing causality in relation to terrorism-climate change 
interconnections.  
 
Although narratives connecting climate change impacts with terrorism suggest a 
teleological pathway and relation to a compulsive determinism, their ontological and 
epistemological foundations are grounded in complexity and this raises difficult 
questions about where to locate culpability for climate changes and terrorism. I argue, 
however, that national, racial, and gendered identities are also constructed 
discursively in these complex causal relations. And whereas narratives of complex 
causality indicate difficulties in attributing responsibility, I contend that the input of 
essentializing logics into these causal interconnections constructs racial Others in US 
and EU climate security discourses and intersects with constructions of (anti-)American 
nationhood. In this vein, Section 5.5 examines biological metaphors in particular, 
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context-specific moments of US climate security discourse and their dehumanizing 
assumptions.  
 
Section 5.5 Biological metaphors in climate security discourses  
 
Biological fertility metaphors are occasionally employed in US climate security 
discourse to describe possibilities for terrorism. These include ‘breeding grounds’, 
‘seedbeds’, ‘petri dishes’, ‘breeding soils’, etc. Fairclough (2003) notes metaphors can 
make abstract concepts more grounded, but also avoid direct reference to and political 
contextualization of the phenomenon under figurative iteration. Kruglanski et al (2007) 
illustrate that epidemiological metaphors are regularly adopted in counterterrorism 
and counter-radicalization discourses. They rely upon a partition between external 
agents, a susceptible host, an environment that brings them together, and ‘disease’ 
transmission via particular ‘vectors’ (Kruglanski et al 2007). Here, the ‘agent’ refers to 
ideologies terrorists utilize, ‘hosts’ are populations ‘at-risk’ from radicalization and 
political violence, ‘environment’ refers to broader conditions producing vulnerabilities 
in populations, and ‘vectors’ are conduits for transmission of ideologies, e.g. social 
media platforms. Kruglanski et al (2007) argue epidemiological metaphors can provide 
a framework for mapping longer-term causation behind terrorism, but are limited by 
neglect of the immediate requirements to respond to political violence. In Renard’s 
(2008) schema, it could be that epidemiological metaphors are an effective descriptor 
for ‘instigating causes’ or ‘permissive factors’. However, I argue that by seeing 
vulnerable human populations as a fertile ‘substrate’, as well as a lack of 
contextualization of the subjects of terrorist violence (with terrorism reduced to a 
‘disease’ that afflicts human populations), this contributes to a dehumanization that 
negates human populations’ agency in these processes.  
 
Importantly, whilst I contend that biological tropes contribute to a racial logic of 
dehumanization (the diminution of human agency to epidemiological processes), there 
is greater conceptual confusion with the term ‘naturalization’. In Chapter 4 (section 
4.3.1), I adopt Hall’s (1996: 144) understanding of naturalization as that which ‘is not 
grounded in nature, but producing nature as a sort of guarantee of its truth’. 
Naturalization in this sense renders statements and assumptions as ‘common sense’, 
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‘taken-for-granted’ etc. However, with biological metaphors, Baldwin’s (2013b) 
concept of naturalization is relevant, especially its emphasis on the use of nature 
‘idioms’ to describe CIM. Whilst biological metaphors describing terrorism and climate 
change interconnections do touch on ‘natural’ phenomena (e.g. seedbeds), others are 
based on ‘human-made’ phenomena (e.g. petri dishes). Although Baldwin’s (2013b) 
account of naturalization is applicable in this case, I focus on how essentializing logics – 
through strategies of naturalization (at the scale of underlying assumptions behind 
metaphors) and dehumanization – construct racial and national identities in climate-
insecure futures. As a case in point, I draw on examples from the Center for Naval 
Analyses’ (2007) Military Advisory Board report. In a series of sections in which senior 
military personnel reflect on their insights and experience, retired officials Admiral 
Lopez (p.17) and General Anthony Zinni (p.31) state:  
 
Lopez: ‘Climate change will provide the conditions that will extend 
the war on terror … You have very real changes in natural systems 
that are most likely to happen in regions of the world that are 
already fertile ground for terrorism … Droughts, violent weather, 
ruined agricultural lands – those are the kinds of stresses we’ll see 
more of under climate change … More poverty, more forced 
migrations, higher unemployment. Those are conditions ripe for 
extremists and terrorists.’  
 
Zinni: ‘You may also have a population that is traumatized by an 
event or a change in conditions triggered by climate change … If 
the government there is not able to cope with the effects, and if 
other institutions are unable to cope, then you could be faced 
with a collapsing state. And these end up as breeding grounds for 
instability, for insurgencies, for warlords. You start to see real 
extremism. These places act like Petri dishes for extremism and for 
terrorist networks.’  
 
 
Admiral Lopez’ argues climate impacts are likely to create ‘fertile ground’ for 
extremism. He lists a range of intervening factors, e.g. poverty and unemployment, 
before arguing these conditions are ‘ripe’ for extremists. Using phraseology associated 
with fertility, it could be this reinforces a notion of climate change as not a direct cause 
of terrorism per se, but something that creates an environment in which these 
phenomena can flourish. ‘Fertile ground’ suggests an abundant, fecund atmosphere 
for terrorist groups, whilst ‘ripe’ suggests that, with particular ingredients, e.g. poor 
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governance, these environments will be ‘ready’ for terrorism. Zinni uses a similar 
metaphor of ‘breeding ground’ to situate conditions in which ‘warlords’, ‘insurgencies’ 
and ‘real extremism’ could develop. ‘Breeding’ suggests extremism could also be 
perpetuated or reproduced. Alongside biological metaphors, laboratory-centred or 
medical metaphors are also adopted. This includes reference to ‘failed state’ spaces as 
‘Petri Dishes’. This metaphor, as with ‘breeding grounds’, suggests  a substrate upon 
which extremism might develop, but refers to a ‘Petri Dish’, a laboratory instrument 
used for cultivation of microbiological substances. Terminology associated with 
medical contexts in Zinni’s comments also includes descriptions of populations as 
‘traumatized’ and being able ‘to cope’. In the 2009 National Intelligence Council report 
on the geopolitical implications of climate change in North Africa, the NIC (2009a) 
discuss the social impacts of climate-induced food scarcities:  
 
‘Agriculture will be less able to act as an employment safety valve 
for underemployed or seasonally employed unskilled workers. 
Stress on rural communities may lead to civil unrest or encourage 
radicalization’ (p.13) 
 
‘Conditions in the region’s burgeoning urban slums (“shanty 
towns”) – already incubators for extremism and urban unrest – 
will face the most degradation’ (p.14)  
 
 
In these passages, another medical metaphor of ‘the incubator’ is used to highlight 
conditions – climate stresses on employment and agriculture – that create an 
environment in which radicalization or extremism could flourish. All of these 
metaphors (‘petri dishes’, ‘breeding grounds’, and ‘incubators’) suggest a platform 
upon which terrorism can develop. By reducing ‘ungoverned spaces’ and human 
populations to a substrate upon which the virus or contagion of terrorism can grow or 
‘breed’, human agency is negated in these processes. In the above quotations, direct 
human decisions and agents are not noted; instead ‘terrorism’ or ‘radicalization’  is cast 
as an abstracted, independent phenomenon that acts upon vulnerable populations. 
Eroukhmanoff (2015) notes this dehumanizing effect (a diminishment of human 
agency in climate security debates on terrorism) of fertility metaphors in American 
radicalization debates. She (2015: 252) writes: ‘radicalization interpreted as a bad seed 
dehumanizes the individuals in the process of radicalization … the security 
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practitioners place the Muslim community and their inherent potential for “growing” 
at a distance, where their “growth” is independent of the practices of the security 
actor or with the order they are living in.’ This dehumanization contravenes one of 
Sedgwick’s (2010) principal critiques of radicalization discourses: that they 
overemphasize individual human agency (and rational choice theory) at the expense of 
socioeconomic contexts.  
 
The separation of the securitizer from the securitized, of ‘remote securitization’ in 
Eroukhmanoff’s (2015) terms, implies the ‘securitizers’ – American security actors – 
are detached from implication in abstracted, ‘inevitable’ teleologies of radicalization. 
As such, it could be that dehumanizing metaphors in US climate security not only 
diminish the agency of ‘risky’ and ‘at-risk’ populations, but also veil the unequal power 
relations constituting these discourses (as with discourses of complexity in terrorism 
and climate security more broadly (see section 5.4)). It is important to note that this is 
not a conscious dehumanization, but, through metaphors, assumptions about 
populations at risk from terrorism in climate-insecure futures are naturalized. 
Dehumanization in these quotes operates at the level of naturalized assumptions 
(facilitated by metaphors) and the negation of vulnerable populations’ agency that this 
confers in climate-insecure futures. The essentializing logic – formulated at the scale of 
naturalizing assumptions oriented towards climate-insecure futures – constructs 
distanced, dehumanized human populations (‘at risk’ from terrorism, or vulnerable to 
radicalization and terrorist infiltration) in conditions of future climate insecurities.  
 
However, because vulnerability to terrorism is discussed in abstract terms (without 
reference to a particular population), while there is a racial trope of dehumanization in 
the examples – diminishment of human agency, as with geopolitical metaphors in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.4) – there is not a racialization of particular populations. In the 
first, abstract sense, this suggests geographies of ‘vacuums’, ‘ungoverned spaces’, of 
climate change-induced terrorism as a ‘contagion’ to be ‘contained’. However, in the 
case of the NIC Report (2009a: 14), there is a specific focus on the incubatory spaces of 
North African cities and ‘urban slums’. Lacher (2008) investigates these discourses in 
the construction of the Sahara, particularly its Southern borders (e.g. between Mali, 
Algeria and Niger), as a ‘breeding ground’ for terrorism. He (2008) charts the 
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simultaneous anxieties about a lack of security intelligence in the region and the scope 
it provides for a ‘political economy of danger’. While in the 1990s the Southern 
borderlands of the Sahara didn’t capture the attention of Northern policymakers, this 
changed post-9/11 with the broader securitization of ‘Africa’ (Abrahamson 2005). The 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (created in 2004 to facilitate cross -border 
military and intelligence cooperation) extended US interests in the Sahara (Lacher 
2008). Lacher (2008) contends that through this securitization, Saharan populations 
and spaces emerge as fields of intervention and ‘breeding grounds’ for terrorism. This 
is characterized by ‘ungoverned spaces’ and ‘porous borders’ amenable to terrorism, 
migration, clandestine crime (e.g. smuggling), demographic associations with high 
fertility and poverty, and a sociopolitical milieu in which some forms of knowledge are 
prioritized over others. In Lacher’s (2008: 400) terms: ‘what we encounter in the 
securitization of the Sahara is … actually existing security … a discursive struggle that 
produces the threats it relies on, performing and transforming the Sahara as a field of 
intervention, with unpredictable consequences.’ Following Lacher’s (2008)  argument, I 
contend essentializing logics are not only about how possible futures are mediated in 
climate-insecure futures (about the ‘contagion’ of terrorism and dehumanizing 
assumptions about ‘risky’ or ‘at-risk’ populations), but also how interventions are 
legitimized in the present, ‘actually existing security’ (Lacher 2008: 400). This is 
discussed in more depth in Section 5.7 on anti-Americanism and humanitarian 
intervention in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. More specifically, 
whilst essentializing logics – through a trope of dehumanization – are implicit in 
biological metaphors in US climate security discourse, I argue there are also moments 
of naturalization of specific populations in these discourses.  Looking at intersections of 
racialized, gendered and national identities, sections 5.6 and 5.7 explore the role of 
essentializing logics in these particular identity constructions. 
 
5.6 Intersectional, essentializing logics of climate change-terrorism debates 
 
In this section, I explore gendered and racialized essentializing logics in particular, 
context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourse. Referring to these 
constructions as intersectional, I do not hold intersectionality to constitute totalizing 
connections between essentially different identities. Rather, following Krenshaw 
 
 
 
164 
164 
(1991: 1296), intersectionality is viewed as ‘a way of mediating the tension between 
assertions of multiple identities and the on-going necessity of group politics.’ She 
(1991: 1245) differentiates between different forms of intersectionality. First is 
structural intersectionality, the multiple structural factors that make the experiences 
of women of colour fundamentally different to those of White women. Second is 
political intersectionality, the ways in which feminist and antiracist movements both 
fight against patriarchy, sexism and racism, but do not always account for the 
particular inequalities experienced by women of colour. Third is representational 
intersectionality, concerned with the cultural construction of women of colour 
(Krenshaw 1991). This project, while it attempts to situate exclusionary intersectional 
identities in particular moments of climate security discourse, is limited in two 
respects. First is that, although the project discusses the unequal power relations of 
climate security discourse, my overriding emphasis is on discursive representations 
(‘representational intersectionality’ in Krenshaw’s (1991: 1245) terms). This emphasis 
neglects important structural (for example political-economic and technological 
regimes of border security in climate-induced migration discourses (Buxton and Hayes 
2016)) intersectionalities in climate security politics. Secondly, the structure of the 
thesis – divided into research questions and empirical chapters on racial logics, 
national logics (each a type of essentializing logics) and connections between terrorism 
and climate change – undermines its ambition to explore identity intersections by 
partitioning these into chapters. Although this empirical chapter functions to bridge 
differences to a small extent, for example discussions of racialized identities and anti-
Americanism in climate security, the thesis structure (chosen for analytical clarity) does 
limit the capacity for intersectional analysis. In this sense, the project is clearly limited 
in its consideration of intersectionality. Whilst I do touch on different moments of 
intersectional identity constructions, e.g. in discourses about migrants in North African 
cities (section 5.6), anti-Americanism and humanitarian intervention (section 5.7), and 
racialized constructions of nationhood in relation to Hurricane Katrina (section 6.5), 
the lack of these reflections is an important shortcoming of the project. 
 
More broadly, ‘intersectionality’ has been critiqued for its presumed status as a 
‘buzzword’ (Davis 2008). Such a status doesn’t account for the specific political context 
– as ‘an analytic that has a particular relationship to the fleshy materiality of black 
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women’s bodies’ (Nash 2016: 12) – in which ‘intersectionality’ developed. Importantly, 
this is not to argue that intersectionality cannot or should not be applied to different 
forms of identity intersections (e.g. sexuality), but rather to situate the concept (as 
decontextualized, broadened accounts do not always do (Nash 2016)) in a particular 
critical politics. Writing about the double, mutually reinforcing oppressions 
experienced by women of colour in the US, Krenshaw (1991) argues social construction 
and anti-essentialism are important to investigate the power relations of identity 
categories. However, she (1991) states that identity categories have material, 
exclusionary effects. Thus, while Krenshaw accepts identities’ constructed-ness, she 
contends it is important to understand their political appropriations (including for 
emancipatory causes) and interactions in shifting contexts. This interpretation mirrors 
Edward Said’s (1994) theorization of cultural identities. Cultural differences and 
boundaries are porous, constructed, and contingent, but not dissoluble to the extent 
that analytic distinctions or cultural differences are subsumed entirely.  
 
Such a position, a cautious, critical and reflective acceptance of particular distinctions 
or contingent boundaries, still carries a risk of re-essentializing differences. For 
example, in the preface of Covering Islam, Said (1997 (1981): xxix, original emphasis) 
writes of American imperialism: ‘The tendency to consider the world as one country’s 
imperium is very much in the ascendency in today’s United States. But whereas most 
other great cultural groupings appear to have accepted the United States’ role, it is 
only from within the Islamic world that signs of determined resistance are still strong. ’ 
Through his use of generalized collective labels, e.g. ‘great cultural groupings’ or ‘the 
Islamic world’, it could be that Said replicates the cultural essentialism he  aims to 
critique. Said’s (1997 (1981)) claim that resistance comes from ‘within’ the Islamic 
world suggests the ‘Islamic world’ has a discrete shape, a bounded inside contained 
from an essentially different outside. As such, whereas he critiques essentializing 
discourses, Said (1997 (1981)) risks perpetuating such essentialisms to a certain extent.  
These examples demonstrate the need for a careful, grounded appraisal of 
essentialized, intersectional identities in moments of US and EU climate security 
discourse. Krenshaw (1991) and Said (1994) accept cultural identities are permeable 
and contingent, but recognize important differences which make it possible to analyze 
points of intersections and unequal political dynamics and effects. I argue a particular, 
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context-specific point of intersection in US and EU climate security discourses is a 
figure of a young, ‘Muslim’, ‘African’ male with a capacity for extremism or terrorism. 
This is drawn several times in earlier (2007-10) climate security publications. For 
example, to return to the 2009 NIC Report on the geopolitical implications of climate 
change in North Africa, the authors note in a discussion about climate change impacts 
and North African cities (2009a: 15):  
 
‘Cities like Cairo, Casablanca, Alexandria, Algiers, and Oran are 
already overflowing with thousands of angry and unemployed 
young men who congregate in ghetto-like environments passing 
their days leaning on walls with little to no hope of escaping their 
fate.’  
 
 
Later in the document (p.19), these claims are elaborated:  
 
‘Islamic extremists across the region may exploit climate change’s 
destabilizing impacts and ineffective state responses to promote 
the spread of militancy and anti-regime violence. Indeed, Islamist 
militants could point to climate-induced catastrophes as evidence 
as God’s wrath against “apostate regimes” whose un-Islamic 
behaviour has plunged the region into desperate circumstances … 
Moreover, Islamic extremist groups could take advantage of dire 
socioeconomic conditions to recruit more followers, particularly 
among disaffected youth in the shanty towns of Morocco and 
Algeria. The concentration of unattached, unemployed young men 
in overstressed North Africa cities as well as disaffected, 
marginalized rural communities under acute climatic stress will 
provide ideal recruiting grounds for extremists.’  
 
 
In these excerpts, a young, masculine subjectivity is constructed in terms of 
hopelessness, anger, susceptibility to Islamist extremist ideologies and disaffection. 
Adjectives such as ‘overstressed’ and ‘overflowing’ manufacture an image of 
overstretched urban environments and communities at ‘bursting’ or ‘boiling point’, a 
simmering anger and dissatisfaction. This is cultivated with the grievances of 
unemployment and ‘acute climatic stresses’. These excerpts also reinforce a 
subjectivity of fatalism and hopelessness among young men in North African cities, e.g. 
with the phrase ‘little hope of escaping their fate’. An image of fatalism is also 
engendered earlier in the report when the NIC (2009a: 18-19) claim: ‘North Africans 
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tend to hold a religiously-based view that “what will be, will be.” Owing to this 
fatalistic mindset, North Africans are unlikely to blame the state for climate related 
stresses.’ Whilst careful to avoid an overt, certain generalization with the phrase ‘tend 
to’, this comment continues to make a sweeping assertion about the ‘mindset of North 
Africans’. In one sense, this suggests a generalized fatalism that separates ‘North 
Africans’ from their agency to react in different ways to climate-insecure situations. 
This could be reinforced through the imagery of idleness implied by young men 
‘passing their days leaning on walls’. A latent susceptibility to terrorism also 
accompanies these statements. As the second passage asserts, if young men are 
dissatisfied and unemployed, they may be vulnerable to Islamist ideas which ‘point to 
climate-induced catastrophe as evidence of God’s wrath against “apostate regimes.”’ 
Finally, young men are said to be ‘angry’ which could reinforce a racialized image of 
Muslim males as inherently aggressive or anger-fuelled (Razack 2008). Moreover, 
North African males are at their most ‘risky’ in congregation, with a ‘concentration of 
unattached, unemployed young men’ and ‘thousands of angry and unemployed young 
men who congregate in ghetto-like environments’. Hendrixson (2014) argues that such 
assertions of grand numbers are reductionist, strip young men of their agency and 
subjectivity, and do not account for the diversity of young male – and female – 
experiences.  
 
It could be that these assumptions are underwritten by ‘youth bulge’ theory. 
Developed in 1985 by geographer Garry Fuller whilst a visiting scholar to the CIA’s 
Office of Global Issues, ‘youth bulge’ theory was designed to provide intelligence 
analysts with a tool to predict national security threats (Hendrixson 2004). A ‘youth 
bulge’ is a scenario whereby people aged 15-24 represent above 20% of a national 
population (Hendrixson 2004). It is argued to correlate – when combined with poor 
educational opportunities, unemployment and unequal resource allocations – with an 
increased propensity towards violence (Hendrixson 2004). A higher young population 
is not necessarily negative and can be interpreted as a ‘demographic dividend’ 
providing economic opportunities. Both schools of thought are gendered: ‘youth 
bulges’ are associated with young men, and a ‘demographic dividend’ promotes 
opportunities for young women (Hendrixson 2004). Dowd (2015) connects this to 
religious demography, rejecting any culturalist explanations of Muslim-majority 
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populations and terrorist violence. Summarizing its racialized underpinnings, 
Hendrixson (2004: 8) notes: ‘Personified as a discontented, angry young man, almost 
always a man of colour, the “youth bulge” is seen as an unpredictable,  out-of-control 
force in the South generally, with Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia and Latin 
America all considered hotspots.’ It could be that a discontented, young ‘African’ male 
in particular moments of US and EU climate security discourses thus represents a 
particular crossroads of racialized and gendered ‘Muslim’ identities. To argue they 
intersect is not to say they are not contingent and context-specific, but to recognize 
that there are points at which multiple identities intersect to create a racialized 
‘Muslim’ Other oriented towards possible climate-insecure futures (a racial logic).   
 
As Hopkins (2004) points out, negative attitudes towards Muslim men have 
accentuated in the aftermath of 9/11. Focusing on experiences in Glasgow, he notes 
how biological signifiers (‘brown skin’ and beards) were employed to racially abuse 
Muslim men. Young men negotiate the interchange of their religious and Scottish 
identities – e.g. in relation to alcohol consumption or visiting nightclubs – to buttress 
defences against discrimination and assert religious solidarity (Hopkins 2004). The 
turban has been endowed with racist, culturally ignorant meanings, with Sikh males 
accused of suicide bombing and terrorism (Sian 2010). Heteronormative patriotism has 
also been apparent in sections of the US media (Kunstman et al 2010). Supposedly 
protecting US citizens from Islam’s inherent homophobia, ‘Muslim’ masculinities have 
been pathologised (for instance a diagnosis of terrorists’ martyrdom (based on the 
promise of sexual pleasure in paradise) as failed heterosexuality) and queered 
mockingly in opposition to a masculinist, nationalist US imaginary (Puar and Rai 2002). 
Collectively, these discourses manufacture a figure of a sexually deviant, violent, 
‘Muslim’ male (Puar and Rai 2002). Projected onto terrorism discourses in climate 
security, they contribute to context-specific racial logics in which a gendered ‘Muslim’ 
Other is aligned to climate-insecure futures. However, I also argue that in particular, 
context-dependent moments of US climate security, American nationhood intersects 
with racial Othering (I use the American government’s humanitarian intervention in 
Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami as an instructive example). 
Essentializing logics are not only about series of naturalized assumptions which 
foreground a racial Other in uncertain or ‘risky’ futures, but also the interventions 
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these assumptions propagate and legitimize in pasts and presents. I turn to these 
assumptions in Section 5.7. 
 
Section 5.7 Anti-Americanism and climate security 
 
As Klaute (2011) identifies, anti-Americanism is a perpetually contested concept. 
Ceasar (2003) argues it centres on the idea that there is something fundamentally 
wrong with the US and American ‘way of life’. Anti-American sentiments originate in 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries in European countries, where stereotypes of 
Americans as uncouth, materialistic and superficial developed (O’Connors 2004; 
Pieterse and Peters 2012). Post-WW2, anti-Americanism became associated with anti-
imperialist and anti-Vietnam War activists, whilst after the end of the Cold War anti-
globalization movements and critiques of neoliberal capitalism were prevalent (Klaute 
2011). Anti-American and anti-Western sentiments are also associated with Muslim-
majority populations and countries. In their investigation of Twitter usage in Arabic-
speaking countries in the MENA region, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Jamal et al 
(2015) postulate anti-American sentiments, notably around important events, e.g. the 
July 2013 coup d’état unseating President Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, or the Boston 
Marathon bombings in July 2013, are predominantly political. Their results suggest 
anti-Americanism is not sociocultural (directed against US society or culture), but 
rather critical of American foreign policy (Jamal et al 2015).  
 
In a different reading of anti-Westernism, Cooper (2008) studies resonances between 
neo-fundamentalist, anti-imperialist Islamic thought and feminist and postcolonial 
scholars. Cooper (2008) argues that, in seeking alternatives which embrace irreducible 
alterity, postcolonial theorists unwittingly reinforce a sexual politics and 
heteronormative modes of desire: the foundation of absolute value in the intimate, 
pious construction of the feminine, what Cooper (2008: 27) labels ‘genealogical 
purification’. Instead, she (2008: 43) forwards possibilities of ‘postcolonial literatures 
of transit’ which, engaged with critical literatures on racialized and gendered dynamics 
of imperialism, can promote a critical politics that ‘can be pursued without seeking to 
reinvent a new, and absolutely pure, genealogical order’. In relation to climate change 
politics, Klaute (2011) notes an important source of anti-American sentiment has been 
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the US Government’s refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol. Touching on this, Osama Bin 
Laden commented in a 2002 letter to the American people (cited in Jasparro and 
Taylor 2008: 248):  
 
‘You have destroyed nature with your industrial waste and gases 
more than any other nation in history. Despite this, you refuse to 
sign the Kyoto agreement so that you can secure the profit of your 
greedy enterprise and companies.’  
 
 
In a later address (2007, cited in Jasparro and Taylor 2008: 248), Bin Laden added:  
 
‘In fact, the life of all mankind is in danger because of global 
warming, which is largely due to emissions of the factories of the 
major companies; nonetheless, the representatives of those 
companies in the White House insist on not observing the Kyoto 
Accord, notwithstanding … the death and displacement of millions 
of people as a result.’  
 
 
In these statements, Bin Laden refers directly to the US with the second person 
pronoun ‘you’ and to important symbols of American power, e.g. ‘the White House’. 
He utilizes negative lexis to describe the actions of American governments and 
companies, for instance ‘destroyed’, ‘greedy’, ‘danger’, ‘death’ and ‘displacement’. 
These discursive strategies indicate antipathy to US climate policy. Notwithstanding 
these general statements, anti-Americanism and anti-Western statements are also 
occasionally articulated with reference to Southeast Asia in climate security literature. 
In a 2009 report and consultation about the geopolitical implications of climate change 
for the region, the National Intelligence Council (2009b: 5) state:  
 
‘The West is currently seen as the primary culprit, and as the 
climate change-induced challenges become more severe and 
apparent, this could bolster anti-Western sentiment in the region 
… The framing of climate change as a Western-generated 
phenomenon creates the potential for major anti-Western 
backlashes over virtually any climate change-induced crisis in the 
region.’  
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In this quote, climate insecurities are repeatedly linked to a perception of Western 
culpability and anti-Western sentiment, e.g. the West as ‘the primary culprit’, ‘anti-
Western sentiment in the region’ and ‘major anti-Western backlashes’. Jasparro and 
Taylor (2008) contend climate change could be implicated in counter-terrorism 
debates in Southeast Asia, with increased poverty and lower state capacity as 
conducive to terrorism. Jasparro and Taylor (2008: 247) note that developed countries 
could be susceptible to terrorism due to higher historic greenhouse gas emissions; the 
US is ‘especially vulnerable in this respect due to its intransigence on Kyoto … and the 
ineffectiveness of its public diplomacy.’ In these discourses, anti-American and anti-
Western imaginaries are explicitly connected to climate change and terrorism. Through 
an examination of the US government’s response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 
Indonesia, this section argues these imaginaries intersect with racial logics about a 
‘Muslim’ Other and terrorism. In several pieces on US climate security interests, 
‘Muslim’ populations are specifically connected to a vulnerability towards or capacity 
for terrorist violence in an Indonesian context. In Smith’s (2007) academic account of 
climate change impacts and terrorism, he notes:  
 
‘Normally terrorism and the environment are viewed as two 
unrelated phenomena, but the case of Indonesia suggests a much 
greater association than perhaps recognized previously. As the 
Southeast Asian country with the world’s largest Muslim 
population … Indonesia is viewed by the United States as a pivotal 
state that will heavily influence the long-term goals of the U.S.-led 
global war on terrorism’ (p.273) 
 
‘Unlike Indonesia, the Philippines is not a Muslim-majority state 
(the Muslim population is about 4.5 million out of a total of 91 
million). However, for historical and geopolitical reasons, the 
Philippines is considered by the U.S. to be a critical anchor in 
countering terrorism in Southeast Asia’ (p.274) 
 
 
Here, Smith – using a fact (Indonesia as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country) –
associates Indonesia’s Muslim population with US goals in the ‘war on terrorism’. In 
the second quotation, Smith references the Philippines as a ‘critical anchor’ for 
countering terrorism in Southeast Asia, but still announces that the Philippines is ‘not a 
Muslim-majority state’. Therefore, in both contexts, Muslim populations and Muslim-
majority states are associated with counterterrorism efforts. In a similar manner as the 
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NIC (2009a) and Age of Consequences (Campbell et al 2007) reports, albeit referring to 
very different backdrops, I argue a racial ‘Muslim’ Other is constructed through 
repeated, naturalized assumptions that discursively produce this figure. In his 2007 
publication Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action, Joshua Busby 
writes:  
 
‘Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population – about 88% 
of its 245.5 million people. Some have been radicalized, but most 
have not. Indonesia is also a fragile democracy and politically 
unstable with a history of separatist movements. Meanwhile, as 
an island archipelago with large forest reserves, the country is 
both vulnerable to climate change and important for climate 
mitigation. Climate change, through drought conditions or storms, 
might further destabilize Indonesia, and if the government 
provided a weak response to a future weather disaster, this could 
encourage separatists or radicals to challenge the state or launch 
attacks on Western interests.’  
 
 
Busby begins by citing Indonesia’s status as the country with the world’s largest 
Muslim population, stating ‘some have been radicalized, but most have not.’ Whilst 
Busby is careful to note that ‘most’ Muslims have not been radicalized, this 
nonetheless associates Muslim populations in particular with a capacity for 
radicalization. After this, Busby (2007) claims climate change impacts (e.g. droughts) 
might ‘further destabilize’ Indonesia and encourage ‘radicals’ or ‘separatists’ to attack 
‘Western interests’. I argue an important point of intersection is a racialized ‘Muslim’ 
Other and its naturalized assumptions (of a capacity for terrorism) with constructions 
of anti-Americanism. A key strategic objective of the US government has been to reach 
out to Muslim communities and populations around the world. In the 2010 National 
Security Strategy, the US’ central national security strategy produced by the White 
House (outlining key strategic priorities), the authors write (White House 2010: 4):  
 
‘And our broader engagement with Muslim communities around 
the world will spur progress on critical political and security 
matters, while advancing partnerships on a broad range of issues 
based upon mutual interests and mutual respect.’  
 
 
Further into the document, this ambition is clarified (p.22):  
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‘We will continue to stand up for the universal rights of all people, 
even for those with whom we disagree. We are developing new 
partnerships in Muslim communities around the world on behalf 
of health, education, science, employment, and innovation. And 
through our broader emphasis on Muslim engagement, we will 
communicate our commitment to support the aspirations of all 
people for security and opportunity. Finally, we reject the notion 
that al-Qaida represents any religious authority. They are not 
religious leaders, they are killers; and neither Islam nor any other 
religion condones the slaughter of innocents.’  
 
 
As indicated by these quotations, a key objective of US strategy at this point is 
constructing ‘partnerships’ with Muslim communities worldwide. From a different 
perspective, a 2013 report by the Center for Climate and Security (a Washington D.C. 
based policy institute that carries out research, policymaking, and advocacy in relation 
to climate security issues (Center for Climate and Security 2015)) The Arab Spring and 
Climate Change: A Climate and Security Correlations Series affirms outreach to Muslim 
communities as a key US objective (Femia and Werrell 2013: 5). Translated to 
humanitarian interventions, Tobias Feakin and Duncan Depledge (for the German 
Marshall Fund) (2010: 6-7) state:  
 
‘Being able to respond in a timely and effective manner can be 
hugely important for the way that the West is perceived in other 
parts of the world. For example, in the aftermath of the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami in 2004 – a disaster to which the United States 
responded by leading a huge international relief effort – public 
support for the United States in Indonesia dramatically increased. 
Similarly, Pakistani perceptions of the United States also improved 
after an earthquake in 2005 – again the United States was one of 
the first responders.’  
 
 
In relation to humanitarian interventions after the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) and 
the Pakistan earthquake (2005), ideas of ‘outreach’ and ‘improving relations’ with 
Muslim-majority countries are employed. In the context of climate change and 
security, engagement with Muslim communities is also a factor. In these instances, I 
argue that a particular focus on outreach to ‘Muslim communities’ is fuelled by a 
perception of anti-Western or anti-American sentiment among Muslims ‘in other parts 
 
 
 
174 
174 
of the world’ (Feakin and Depledge 2010: 6-7). This is not to say that there are not 
strong anti-American sentiments expressed among Muslim-majority populations (as, 
for example, studied by Jamal et al (2015)), but rather anti-Americanism or anti-
Westernism are used in association with naturalized assumptions and associations 
about Muslim-majority populations and a vulnerability towards or capacity for 
violence. In its most extreme form, this feeling is characterized by the phenomenon of 
‘Muslim rage’ (Lewis 1990). Reflecting on this concept, Bernard Lewis (1990) posits it 
developed from a ‘clash of civilizations’ (a phrase later adopted by Samuel Huntington 
(1993)) viewpoint and the decline of ‘Islamic civilization’ at the commencement of the 
European renaissance. Making a series of generalized assumptions, Lewis (1990) notes:  
 
‘The Muslim has suffered successive stages of defeat. The first was 
his loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power of 
Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his 
authority in his own country, through an invasion of foreign ideas 
and laws and ways of life and sometimes even foreign rulers or 
settlers, and the enfranchisement of native non-Muslim elements. 
The third – the last straw – was the challenge to his mastery in his 
own house, from emancipated women and rebellious children.’  
 
 
In these passages, Lewis (1990) asserts that an ‘outbreak of rage’ has been instilled in a 
masculinist, angry ‘Muslim’ figure. More recently, this concept has emerged in 
discussions about anti-Western sentiment and anger in Muslim populations. On 17th 
September 2012, American magazine Newsweek published a cover entitled ‘Muslim 
rage’, a supposed anti-Western ‘rage’ derived from a series of cartoons depicting the 
Prophet Mohammed in Danish magazine Jyllands-Posten (30th September 2015) (Ali 
2012; Daily Telegraph Foreign Staff 2015). On September 15th (2012), The Economist 
released an editorial entitled ‘Muslim rage: Why they won’t calm down’, discussing 
representations of the Qur’an. The Nation also contributed with an editorial (19th 
September 2012), underlining grievances among Muslim populations in terms of US 
foreign policy, especially support for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 
However, there has been relatively little academic literature published on this concept, 
aside from Aydin’s history of anti-Western ideas in pan-Islamic and pan-Asian 
philosophies (2007) and Hallaq’s (2003) thesis of ‘Muslim rage’ as rooted in European 
colonialism and the coercive introduction of European legal systems (usurping Islamic  
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law) in Muslim-majority societies. In US climate security literature, I argue that 
‘outreach to Muslim communities’ is premised on a need to improve relations due to 
assumptions about an anti-Western and anti-American ‘Muslim’ Other with a capacity 
for and vulnerability towards radicalized violence. Importantly, these assumptions are 
involved in the US humanitarian intervention in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami.  
 
Triggered by a magnitude 9 earthquake at 7.58am on 26th January 2004, the Indian 
Ocean tsunami was unprecedented, with waves reaching heights of almost 10m at 
landfall in Sumatra (New Scientist 2005). At least 226,000 people died. In Aceh – the 
worst affected Indonesian province – 167,000 people were killed and over 500,000 
displaced (Zeccola 2011). Impacts included the loss of homes, infrastructure, 
livelihoods and community facilities (Rofi et al 2006). The total amount of 
humanitarian assistance pledged by the US government was $35,000,000 (USAID Fact 
Sheet 2005). Alongside the Department of Defense’s response – named Operation 
Unified Assistance – USAID committed resources to the humanitarian effort in 
Indonesia. On December 27th, the US Ambassador Lynn Pascoe issued a disaster 
declaration and an initial $100,000 was provided to the Indonesian Red Cross for 
disaster assistance; the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) also provided 
$2,000,000 for food, water, sanitation and shelter provision (USAID Fact Sheet 2005). 
Two planes were dispatched carrying supplies (e.g. plastic sheets and water 
containers), and on 29th December USAID/Indonesia donated $1 million for NGO relief 
activities in Aceh, Sumatra (USAID Fact Sheet 2005).  
 
As Hyndman (2007) argues, the geopolitics of humanitarian interventions can be 
rooted in the production of fear and nationalism to favour certain political 
constituencies. In this sense, humanitarian mobilizations can hide injustices and 
unequal power dynamics (Fassin and Pandolfi 2010). Fassin (2010: 269) defines 
‘humanitarian government’ as the ‘introduction of moral sentiments into the political 
sphere’, with an underlying assumption that humanitarianism, motivated by an ethical 
mission to ‘save lives’, is separate from politics. He (2010) challenges this and argues 
that humanitarian ethical and political concerns are deeply interconnected. For 
example, as Mamadouh (2008) documents, the Dutch government’s response to the 
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2004 tsunami played an important part in fostering national unity and reconciliation. 
After the murder of anti-immigration and anti-Islam politician Pim Fortuijin on 6th May 
2002 and right-wing filmmaker Theo Van Gogh on 2nd November 2004 by a Dutch 
national of Moroccan descent (Mohammed Bouyeri), anti-Muslim sentiments and far-
right politics were on the rise in the Netherlands (Mamadouh 2008). However, the 
Dutch response to the tsunami, for example raising 124.6 million euros (by 12th 
January) in donations to a common bank account operated by Dutch NGO 
Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties (SHO), was seen as a symbol of national unity and 
reconciliation (Mamadouh 2008). Concerning the 2010 Pakistan floods, Amoore and 
De Goede (2011: 193) point to the hesitant reaction of Western countries in providing 
aid, highlighting a geography where ‘the victim subjects of Pakistan are rendered the 
risky and suspicious population in which future terrorist attacks have their origins.’ 
Against a backdrop of drone attacks on the Afghan-Pakistan border and the tight 
regulation of aid monies to charities (e.g. Islamic Relief), Amoore and De Goede (2011) 
note a humanitarian politics in which populations in Pakistan are imagined as 
simultaneously risky and vulnerable to terrorism. Similarly, I argue that the geopolitics 
of US intervention is partially grounded in imaginaries of perceived Anti-Americanism 
and naturalized assumptions about ‘Muslim’ populations and a ‘Muslim’ Other. As 
McGrady et al (2010: 51, a report for the Center for Naval Analyses) note, the US 
government is not mandated to respond to ‘foreign disasters’. The decision is made by 
the OFDA and many considerations can influence it (including national security 
interests ‘surrounding the event and the populations affected’, availability of assets, 
and level of need and sense of urgency). For McGrady et al (2010: 68), the OFDA 
decision to supply humanitarian aid after the 2004 tsunami is at least partially 
motivated by political reasons:  
 
‘The large-scale response by the United States to the 2005 
tsunami was influenced by several factors, including the immense 
size of the disaster, the long-standing relationship between the 
Indonesian armed forces and US armed forces, and the US desire 
to engage and support the large Muslim populations that were 
affected. The destruction caused by the tsunami was massive, and 
the Indonesian government recognized that it did not have 
adequate capabilities to respond. The five countries that Indonesia 
initially approached for assistance, Australia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and the US, were chosen based on their 
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existing ties with Indonesian armed forces as well as the 
capabilities they could provide.’  
 
 
As this passage contends, one of the reasons for US humanitarian intervention in 
Indonesia was ‘the US desire to engage and support the large Muslim populations that 
were affected.’ As with earlier proclamations, this isolates Muslim communities and 
populations specifically. Indeed, in January 2006, US nonprofit Terror Free Tomorrow 
conducted a survey that showed that favourable opinions towards the US in Indonesia 
had increased from 34% to 44% from January 2005. Terror Free Tomorrow cite 
humanitarian aid as the key reason for this shift, with 65% of those surveyed 
confirming humanitarian relief was an important part of their favourable views. With 
bullet points of the implications of this survey, the first listed is (Terror Free Tomorrow 
2006: 2): ‘American humanitarian assistance can make a significant and long -term 
different in building goodwill toward the United States and eroding popular support 
for global terrorists.’ Foregrounding the favourable opinions, Terror Free Tomorrow 
(2006: 1) contextualize this against a background of ‘widespread stories on Koran 
desecration, Guantanamo, even the Danish cartoons’. Based on these disparate 
sources of evidence, and the particular political locus of US humanitarian intervention 
on engagement with Muslim populations in Indonesia, I argue that this is rooted 
partially in naturalized assumptions about Muslim populations ’ associations with or 
vulnerability towards terrorism and how this inflects anti-American sentiments. 
Together, these assumptions ground a ‘Muslim’ Other with a capacity for terrorism 
and links to anti-American sentiment. Articulated in US climate security discourse, they 
legitimize a range of political outcomes (for example objectives to reach out and 
engage ‘Muslim populations’) and manifest as part of the reasoning behind 
interventions, e.g. US military and USAID responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. 
Conceptualized this way, discourses of climate change, terrorism and the geopolitics of 
humanitarian intervention suggest the intersectional interplay of (anti-)national 
imaginaries and racial logics in particular, context-specific moments of US climate 
security discourse. They also suggest that essentializing logics do not only orient racial 
and national identities towards possible outcomes in climate-insecure futures, but are 
also important constituents to justify interventions in the ‘here and now’ (or recent 
past in the case of the 2004 Indonesian Ocean Tsunami). 
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I argue that this particular politics of humanitarian intervention in US climate security 
is also biopolitical. Fassin (2007: 500) contends that humanitarian action constitutes a 
‘politics of life’: ‘politics that give specific value and meaning to human life’. This differs 
from Foucauldian biopolitics in that politics of life relate not only to technologies of 
power and ways populations are governed, but ‘to the evaluation of human beings and 
the meaning of their existence’ (Fassin 2007: 500). Fassin (2007) accepts that 
humanitarian actions are biopolitical in a Foucauldian sense, for instance the 
management of refugee camps or population movements and disease pandemics. 
However, humanitarian politics of life are invested in selections about ‘which 
existences it is possible or legitimate to save’ and what ‘sort of life’ is taken into 
account in the political work of humanitarianism (Fassin 2007: 50). This involves 
demarcations about which lives can only be sacrificed (populations for whom 
humanitarians intervene), as opposed to lives that can be ‘risked’ (aid workers). It 
involves lives with higher value (e.g. expatriate humanitarian workers as opposed to 
national staff), and differences between those who are narrated in the first person (the 
interveners), and those recounted in the third person (‘voiceless’ victims in whose 
name a ‘cause’ is created and interventions occur) (Fassin 2007). In the case of US 
government intervention in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 
Indonesia’s population becomes a point of biopolitical intervention in a humanitarian 
crisis. Indonesian populations, partially because of their Muslim-majority status and 
assumptions about a need for American outreach, are ‘selected’ as lives ‘to be saved’ 
in Fassin’s (2007: 500) terms. In this sense, the construction is not a ‘Muslim’ identity 
as a dangerous Other in this case, but rather naturalized assumptions about its 
possibility to become this in climate-insecure futures (‘Muslim’ populations’ capacity 
to favour extremist groups and anti-Americanism as a measure of this).  
 
Thus, whereas essentializing logics underpin how populations (identified in moments 
of US and EU climate security discourse at their gendered, racialized, sexualized and 
national intersections) are oriented towards climate-insecure futures, they are also 
underpinned by unequal biopolitics of valued lives in humanitarian interventions. This 
chapter (exploring discussions of terrorism in US climate security) has therefore argued 
that naturalized assumptions partially legitimize geopolitical interventions and 
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outcomes in the present (and past) as well as climate-insecure futures. To conclude 
the thesis’ empirical chapters, I now explore how another form of essentializing logics 
– national logics – are implicated in the production of American nationhood in context-
specific moments of US climate security discourse. 
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Chapter 6: 
Representations of American nationhood and 
national logics in US climate security discourse 
 
6.1 Introduction and research questions  
 
1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security 
discourse? 
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed 
in and through US and EU climate security discourse? 
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security 
discourse? 
 
To conclude the thesis’ empirical chapters, this chapter explores constructions of 
American nationhood in US climate security discourse. I contend that essentializing 
(national) logics function to articulate representations of what America ‘is’ or 
‘represents’, both in terms of how what America is ‘now’ impacts future outcomes, 
and of what America ‘will become’ in conditions of climate insecurity. These 
representations contribute towards multiple, unequal biopolitics of valued lives in 
moments of US climate security (inspired by Fassin’s (2009) account of ‘bio-
inequalities’ and discursive appropriations of valued lives) and are grounded in 
context-specific, unequal dynamics of power. Sections 6.2 and 3 examine constructions 
of American exceptionalism in climate security, especially a defensive, ‘fortressed’ 
American nation. Section 6.4 investigates the universalized interpretations of American 
nationhood, particularly concepts of American ‘values’, ‘leadership’ and ‘human 
security’. Section 6.5 situates American nationhood in the contexts of Hurricane 
Katrina, Hurricane Sandy and climate security in ‘the homeland’, before the chapter 
concentrates on representations of a ‘climate resilient’ America in relation to climate 
insecurities (Section 6.6). I begin by introducing concepts of American exceptionalism 
and their integration into climate change politics.  
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6.2 American exceptionalism in US climate security  
 
In his (1998 (1992): 90) book Writing Security, Campbell writes of American identity: ‘If 
all states are “imagined communities,” devoid of ontological being apart from the 
many practices that constitute their reality, then America is the imagined community 
par excellence. For there has never been a country called “America” nor a people 
known as “Americans,” from whom a national identity is drawn.’ Supporting his 
argument that national identities are founded on discursive appropriations of 
difference, the subjective construction of risky or threatening ‘Others’ to national 
security objectives, Campbell later (p.170) identifies the US as ‘the state that requires a 
discourse of danger probably more than any other.’ This invocation of American 
identity as particularly representative of Anderson’s (2005 (1991): 49) ‘imagined 
communities’ relates to longer historical associations of American exceptionalism with 
exclusionary Othering practices. It also highlights Löfflman’s (2015) injunction to 
analyze ‘American exceptionalism’ not as a positivist assessment of strengths and 
weaknesses, but a concept discursively imbued in unequal power relations. Löfflman 
(2015: 313) contends American exceptionalism plays a central role in the country’s 
geopolitical imagination, conventionally defined as a ‘special and unique set of social, 
political and economic features [that] elevates the historical development of the 
United States above and beyond that of other nations.’ American exceptionalism is 
intricately intertwined with processes of Othering and injustice. The providential, ‘self-
evident’ example the United States represents (embodied by principles of liberty, 
individualism, and democracy) – the ‘We-ness’ of America’s foundational myth – belies 
histories of racist subjugations of colonial Others, for instance Native Americans, 
African Americans and Arab Americans (Nayak and Malone 2009). American 
‘exceptional’ geopolitical identity, and the externalized imaginative geographies this 
produces (of a progressive ‘Western’ nation juxtaposed against a backwards, 
regressive Other), is also linked to regional ‘internal Orientalisms’ which construct the 
American ‘South’ as a xenophobic outcast to a forward-looking ‘America’ (Jansson 
2007). I argue these readings of American exceptionalism, grounded in ideas of 
exclusionary Othering practices and the exclusions these legitimate, are important for 
interpretations of American exceptionalism in moments of US climate security 
discourse. 
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From another perspective, Dittmer (2011: 115) presents an alternative reading of 
American exceptionalism; it ‘can be understood as the notion that the United States is 
unlike other states in terms of its creation, settlement, and sense of wider mission in 
the world’. Nayak and Malone (2009) contend it is Puritan leader John Winthrop’s 
(1630, cited in Nayak and Malone 2009: 264) declaration aboard the Arbella that ‘we 
shall by as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us’ that plays a 
foundational role in American exceptionalism. Winthrop conceived of New England as 
a site for propagation of the Gospel to Native Americans (Winthrop 1629, cited in 
Merchant 2012: 77). Stoll (2012: 97) notes that in European Puritans’ eyes North 
America was a continent for the future, divorced from ‘the past’ or the ‘Old World’. 
This vision carried a variety of exclusions. Merchant (1989: 100) writes: ‘Puritan 
leaders often brought with them ideas that legitimated the subjugation of wilderness 
and the subjection of women. Assumptions about generation, virginity, and marriage 
supported the Puritans’ treatment of nature and their cultural superiority over it.’ 
Puritans viewed the land as ‘virgin’, wild, untamed and destined for ‘marriage’ with the 
industry and agricultural labour of men (Merchant 1989). This approach subjugated 
Native American ways of life and those of ‘ordinary people’ among early settlers, many 
of whom were not regular Churchgoers and retained a perspective of nature grounded 
in the realities of everyday subsistence (Merchant 1989). Concepts of superiority, 
settlement and divine providence are important constituents of American 
exceptionalism and have been evoked in seminal moments of US history and during 
heightened periods of American nationalism, e.g. assertions of American superiority in 
the War on Terror (Toal 2003).  
 
I argue American exceptionalism folds into constructions of American nationhood in 
climate security. Describing his PhD research with US climate security professionals, 
David (2014: 375-6) recollects that ‘many speakers referred to American identity … 
pushing the idea of American exceptionalism while arguing that the problem is of such 
monumental proportions that the US is the only country that can lead the response to 
this collective action problem.’ However, beyond this there are very few accounts of 
American nationhood in climate security. With this in mind, this chapter examines how 
essentializing, national logics – introduced in Chapter 3, sections 3.7 and 3.8 – direct 
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representations of American nationhood (and connections to racialized identities) 
towards climate-insecure futures.  
 
6.3 Defensive American exceptionalisms 
 
An important manifestation of exceptionalism is a defensive, fortressed America in 
response to possible climate insecurities. This is underpinned by two ideas. First is that 
the relative vulnerability of the US is such that it could use its stronger adaptive 
capacity to withstand climate insecurities at the expense of other populations . 
Secondly, egocentrism (interpreted in terms of national self-interest and preservation 
of resources) is also noted as a justification for prioritizing the security of American 
citizens above others. In his examination of Halford Mackinder’s early 20th century 
geopolitics and American imperial geopolitics in the War on Terror, Kearns (2006) 
identifies three similarities. First are claims of a historical rupture, a suddenly changed 
world requiring a new geopolitical strategy. Second is of geopolitics as struggles for 
survival between different groups: the world is viewed as a dangerous, competitive 
place where national superiority takes precedence (Kearns 2006). Finally, Kearns 
(2006) notes both geopolitical accounts characterize military strategies as oriented 
towards a resource-defined heartland in global geo-economics. In the War on Terror, 
this is oil reserves in the Middle East. Whilst there are important differences in these 
narratives with defensive American exceptionalisms, there are some significant 
resonances. Earlier US climate security discourses  (documents published from 2003-
10) include claims of new, unprecedented geopolitical conditions; they are grounded in 
neo-Malthusian narratives of conflict and competition between self-interested, 
survivalist populations; and they focus on disputes over resources.  
 
A prominent example is found in the abrupt climate change scenario outlined in the 
Pentagon-commissioned (2003) report by Peter Schwartz (former head of planning for 
Shell Oil) and Doug Randall (Global Business Network) (Diez et al 2016). The report is a 
significant early moment in US climate security discourses and speculates on the 
national security implications of an abrupt climate change scenario. This replicates a 
similar 100-year period from 8200 years ago in which annual temperatures drop by 5-6 
degrees Fahrenheit over Asia, North America and Europe and temperatures increase 
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by 4 degrees Fahrenheit in Australia, South America and Southern Africa. Drought 
intensifies in critical agricultural regions, and winds and winter storms intensify in 
Western Europe and the North Pacific (Schwartz and Randall 2003; Diez et al 2016). 
Discussing the political implications of climatic changes, Schwartz and Randall (2003) 
refer to ‘defensive’, ‘fortressing’, or ‘walling’ outcomes  repeatedly:  
 
‘As global and local carrying capacities are reduced, tensions could 
mount around the world, leading to two fundamental strategies: 
defensive and offensive. Nations with the resources to do so may 
build virtual fortresses around their countries, preserving 
resources for themselves’ (p.2) 
 
‘The United States turns inwards, committing its resources to 
feeding its own population, storing up its borders, and managing 
the increasing global tension’ (p.13) 
 
‘The United States and Australia are likely to build defensive 
fortresses around their countries because they have the resources 
and reserves to achieve self-sufficiency’ (p.18) 
 
 
In these excerpts, verb choices indicate differing degrees of modality in conditions of 
reduced carrying capacity. On p.2, the authors (2003) document tensions ‘could’ 
mount and nation-states ‘may’ build defensive fortresses. This is set against a neo-
Malthusian background of resource scarcities and competition: ‘a discursive map of 
the globe in terms of so-called ‘carrying capacity’’ (Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015: 16-17; 
Hartmann 2010). In subsequent quotations the likelihood of possible actions increases 
as the US ‘turns’ inwards and the US and Australia ‘are likely’ to build defensive 
fortresses. Unlike essentializing logics based on how historic or present significations of 
racialized populations orient outcomes in climate-insecure futures, I argue that 
Schwartz and Randall (2003) instead speculate about how American nationhood will be 
constituted in conditions of climate insecurities, especially resource scarcity. 
Significantly, this does not mean that defensive American identities are only future 
possibilities and without historical precedents. I argue the repeated invocation of 
defensiveness in this document contributes to an essentialization of this 
representation of American-ness. What changes is the formulation of the essentializing 
logic: rather than identity significations informing possible futures, it is future 
outcomes informing possible identity significations. In both cases, essentializing , 
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national logics orient representations of American nationhood in conditions of climate 
insecurity.  
 
Representations of a defensive American nationhood suggest a neo-Malthusian 
narrative of resource scarcity and competiveness. This narrative suggests that, when 
worded as an enhanced ability to ‘preserve resources’ (p.2) or ‘achieve self-sufficiency’ 
(p.18), American exceptionalisms premised on greater adaptive capacity could produce 
defensive, ‘fortressed’ solutions to climate insecurities. Possessive pronouns, e.g . 
‘their’ (p.2 and 18) and ‘themselves’ (p.2), indicate actions whereby nation-states – the 
United States and Australia in above excerpts – preserve or manage their own 
interests and valued (American or Australian) populations foremost. This argument 
also hints at a constructed representation of egocentric American exceptionalisms: a 
defensive US underpinned by self-interest and preservation. In terms of what this 
representation of American nationhood suggests about climate-insecure futures, it 
could be that climate-induced migration (CIM) is an important issue. For example, in an 
interview with The Independent (Johnston 2016) in the run-up to the Marrakesh COP 
meeting (26th October), Major General Munir Muniruzzaman warns against defensive, 
nationalistic solutions to possible climate-induced migration. Muniruzzaman is a 
former military advisor to the President of Bangladesh and chairman of the Global 
Military Advisory Council on Climate Change (GMACCC) (GMACCC 2017a). The 
GMCACCC is a coalition of serving and retired military leaders (and associated 
institutions) formed in 2009 to highlight the security implications of climate change 
and advocate action, including by the military, to minimize these risks (GMACCC 
2017b). Referring to the possibilities of large climate-induced migrations in his 
interview, Major General Muniruzzaman states (cited in Johnston 2016):  
 
‘Imagine, with an international community unable to cope with a 
few thousand Syrian refugees, what will happen when millions of 
people are on the move … I’m very strongly of the opinion that 
walls are never a solution. You cannot build walls to stop people 
when they want to go to safety’ 
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Going on to discuss climate change challenges in relation to the current system of 
Westphalian nation-states, Major General Muniruzzaman notes (cited in Johnston 
2016):  
 
‘What has become more difficult now is that we have boxed 
ourselves into the Westphalian system of states … That is in 
conflict with nature, with the movement of people … we need to 
find a common ground … We need leaders with vision … we have 
to have a global solution to the problem, this is a civilizational 
problem … If we want to solve [these problems] with narrow 
nationalistic instincts, we will be adding more problems, not 
solving them.’  
 
 
In these excerpts, Major General Muniruzzaman laments the possibility of ‘walling’ 
solutions to climate-induced migration. Against the backdrop of the ‘refugee crisis’ and 
the construction of border fences (e.g. by the Hungarian Government), he comments 
unequivocally that ‘I am very strongly of the opinion that walling solutions are never a 
solution … You cannot build walls to stop people when they want to go to safety’. As 
such, and without reference to a particular nation-state, Muniruzzaman cautions 
against defensive, ‘wall’ solutions in possible climate-insecure futures, particularly with 
regard to climate-induced migration and ‘climate conflicts’. Muniruzzaman also 
situates these possibilities against the international system of Westphalian nation-
states: ‘we have boxed ourselves into the Westphalian system of states’. The term 
‘boxed’ – with connotations of being enclosed in a restricted space – reinforces the 
idea of defensive, constrained boundaries as unsuitable to climate-induced migration. 
It could be that as another means to avoid divisive boundaries or ‘boxing’, 
Muniruzzaman uses the pronoun ‘we’ to refer to human beings collectively, not to 
draw imaginative geographies between national populations. Furthermore, 
Muniruzzaman’s use of the term ‘civilization’ could refer to human ‘civilization’ as a 
whole, constructing a collective concept of ‘humanity’. Barnett (2007: 1361-2) 
identifies the same critique whereby although global solutions to climate change are 
called for, ‘most analyses of climate change are underpinned by the same spatial 
imaginary that underpins most standard geopolitical texts in that they categorize 
emissions as coming from states … and most often frame the analysis of impacts in 
terms of states and world regions’. Critiquing this nation-statist imaginary and its 
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potential exclusions, Muniruzzaman notes that ‘narrow nationalistic instincts’ will only 
create ‘more problems’, not contribute to ‘solving them’.  
 
Muniruzzaman articulates a view of ‘nationalistic instincts’ and ‘walls’ as ‘narrow’ and 
as ‘adding more problems’. Thought of in these terms , it could be that a defensive 
American nationhood also manifests as an egocentrism rejecting possible climate-
induced migrants to protect ‘our’ resources first, resources ‘we’ are ‘entitled’ to. 
‘Egocentrism’ should not be synonymized as ‘selfishness’. This representation is not a 
selfish motive to possess resources and which forbids a welcoming American 
nationhood, but a perceived requirement for protection and preservation in neo-
Malthusian futures of resource scarcities, competition and mass migrations (Hartmann 
2010). For example, in relation to US humanitarian interventions in possible climate-
insecure futures, Campbell et al (2007: 85) write in The Age of Consequences that:  
 
‘In a world that sees a 2 metre sea level rise, with continued 
flooding ahead, it will take extraordinary effort for the United 
States, or indeed any country, to look beyond its own salvation … 
Altruism and generosity would likely be blunted. In a world with 
millions of people migrating out of coastal areas and ports across 
the globe, it will be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for the 
United States to replicate the kind of professional and generous 
assistance provided to Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami.’  
 
 
Campbell et al (2007: 85) state that in possible climate-insecure futures of a ‘2 metre 
sea level rise’ and ‘millions of people migrating out of coastal areas and ports across 
the globe’, ‘altruism and generosity would likely be blunted’. Thus, the national logic 
suggests that in possible climate-insecure futures of high climate-induced migration 
and sea levels, US (‘or indeed any country’) national characteristics of ‘altruism’ and 
‘generosity’ could be affected by a more egocentric focus on ‘its own salvation’. It 
could be that the use of the pronoun ‘its’ and adjective ‘own’ capture this sense of 
possession and nation-states preserving their ‘own’ interests above others. In terms of 
possible outcomes suggested by this national logic, Campbell et al (2007: 85) note that 
US international assistance – as with its intervention in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami – would be ‘extremely difficult, if not impossible’. The use of the term 
‘salvation’ also suggests that not only would US international assistance be affected by 
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a more egocentric, self-preservationist approach (at the expense of national 
characteristics such as ‘altruism’ and ‘generosity’), but also that this is framed in terms 
of existential survival, a neo-Malthusian question of whether the US would continue to 
exist in resource-scarce insecure futures. In a 2015 interview with Rolling Stone 
magazine (September 23rd), Barack Obama describes the security risks of climate 
change impacts:  
 
‘What we know about climate change … is that with increasing 
drought, increasing floods, increasing erosion of coastlines, that’s 
going to impact agriculture; it’s going to increase scarcity in parts 
of the world; it is going to result in displacement of large numbers 
of people … If the monsoon patterns in South Asia change, you 
can’t move tens of millions of people without the possibilities of 
refugees, conflict. And the messier the world gets, the more 
national security problems we have. In fact, there have been 
arguments that, for example, what’s happening in Syria partly 
resulted from record drought that led huge numbers of folks off 
the farms and the fields into the cities in Syria, and created a 
political climate that led to protests that Assad responded to in 
the most vicious ways possible. But that’s the kind of national 
security challenge that we’re looking at with climate change. It will 
manifest itself in different ways, but what we know from human 
history is that when large populations are put under severe strain, 
then they react badly. And that can be expressed in terms of 
nationalism; it can be expressed in terms of war; it can be 
expressed in terms of xenophobia and nativism; it can be 
expressed in terms of terrorism. But the whole package is one that 
we should be trying to avoid, if at all possible.’  
 
 
It could be that in this excerpt Obama (cited in Goodell 2015) moves between several 
different types of essentializing logic. At the beginning of the excerpt, his comments 
are similar to what is described in Chapter 4, section 4.5 as a compulsive determinism. 
As opposed to an array of varied possibilities for how human populations ‘might’, 
‘could’ or ‘may’ react in climate-insecure futures, Obama assumes to already ‘know’ 
that ‘it is going to result in displacement of large numbers of people’. However, 
Obama’s next comment introduces an additional layer of complexity into the scenario: 
‘And the messier the world gets, the more national security problems we have’. In the 
earlier comments Obama forwards knowledge of what will happen in climate-insecure 
futures, not only in terms of climate change impacts (‘increasing floods’, ‘erosions of 
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coastlines’, etc.), but also in relation to how human populations will react to these 
changes (‘large displacement’). But, it could be that when Obama injects further 
complexity into the projected outcomes – epitomised by the phrase ‘the messier the 
world gets’ – the extent to which climate impacts delimit human populations’ 
outcomes in climate-insecure futures becomes more uncertain. At this point Obama 
refers to the example of the Syrian Civil War and, in outlining the causal connections  
that link climate changes to this conflict, appears to exercise a greater degree of 
caution. For instance, he states that ‘there have been arguments that’, and that 
‘what’s happening in Syria partly resulted from record drought’. For this point, Obama 
recognizes debate and disagreement over the issue (‘arguments’), and is careful not to 
locate too high a degree of causal attribution to the drought (‘partly’).  These decisions 
could reflect contestation over the evidence (from Gleick 2014 and Kelley et al 2015) 
that links climate change, drought and the Syrian Civil War, but also a scalar question 
about the specificity of the case study. Whereas Obama utilizes clearer language to 
talk about how climate changes will impact human populations in general, he is more 
careful about the specific case of Syria. As is outlined in chapter 5, section 5.4 (for this 
case study), this caution could also reflect the political implications of attributing the 
outbreak of the Syrian Civil War to climate change too directly. In this regard, Obama 
also documents the ‘protests that Assad responded to in the most vicious ways 
possible’. Thus, it could be argued that in his descriptions of various outcomes in 
possible climate-insecure futures (resource scarcities, displacement and conflict), 
Obama moves between different degrees of causal attribution and their impacts on 
human populations’ actions (from a compulsive determinism to complex causal 
chains).  
 
In terms of how this affects the construction of a national logic in Obama’s  interview, I 
argue that both deterministic constructions and those with a higher degree of modality 
(a less strict delimitation of outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures) are linked 
together in an interesting way. Again – and with a degree of relative certainty – Obama 
asserts that ‘what we know from human history is that when large populations are put 
under severe pressure, then they react badly’. This statement, as with others in 
chapter 4, section 4.5, assumes that in conditions of climate insecurity (‘severe 
pressure’), populations will react ‘badly’ (e.g. engage in disruptive migrations or 
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conflict). In line with a compulsive determinism, Obama assumes that populations will 
or are highly likely to react ‘badly’. This does not account a range of other adaptive 
strategies, e.g. cooperation over resource allocation or livelihood diversification, which 
could result from populations under ‘severe pressure’. Whereas the two quotes from 
CNA reports in section 4.5 (CNA 2007: 22; CNA 2014: 2) refer to populations from 
African and Asian countries, Obama (as with the quote from his West Point speech in 
section 4.5) refers to ‘human populations’ more generally. This could be because 
Obama seeks to avoid an association (and potential naturalization) of specific 
populations with particular characteristics, e.g. a compulsion towards violent conflict. 
As Brown and Crawford (2009: 6) note, deterministic, neo-Malthusian narratives tend 
‘to assume the worst in people; that they will fight rather than cooperate over scarce 
resources’. Thus, whilst it could be that Obama’s statement carries this assumption, he 
attributes this to ‘human populations’ in general, rather than assuming ‘the worst in 
people’ from ‘African’ and ‘Asian’ populations specifically. Importantly, I argue that 
Obama does still rely on a deterministic logic that essentializes (one that ‘assumes the 
worst’ in human populations: that they ‘react badly’), but this is not an essentializing 
logic that constructs a racial Other through the naturalization of particular populations 
(that ‘African’ or ‘Asian’ populations are compelled towards violence and disruptive 
migrations).  
 
Instead, it is another component of an essentializing logic (as conceptualized in 
Chapter 3), of how essentialized identities could be constituted in possible climate-
insecure futures – as with the examples from Schwartz and Randall (2003) earlier in 
this section – that suggests the essentializing logic could be constructed as a national 
logic in this case. Here, although Obama uses a deterministic statement that ‘human 
populations’ will ‘react badly’, the flexibility of the adjective ‘badly’ allows him to 
introduce a greater range of possibilities into the essentializing logic. After he 
comments that populations ‘react badly’, Obama clarifies that ‘this can be expressed’ 
in terms of ‘nationalism’, ‘war’, ‘terrorism’, ‘nativism’ and ‘xenophobia’. Thus, the 
broad semantic field of the adjective ‘badly’ allows for multiple possible outcomes in 
futures of climate insecurity. The modal verb ‘can’ in Obama’s repetition of the phrase 
‘can be expressed’ also indicates openness to a broader range of possibilities in 
climate-insecure futures. As with Major General Muniruzzaman’s concerns, Obama 
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warns that resource-scarce climate-insecure futures could produce divisive, defensive 
outcomes, e.g. ‘nationalism’ or ‘nativism’. The national logic is therefore reflected in 
Obama’s concerns that, in conditions of climate insecurity, national populations – 
motivated by resource scarcities – could turn to divisive nationalisms, xenophobia or 
nativism. Fascinatingly, as I have argued, it could also be that both compulsive 
determinisms (that populations will ‘react badly’) and possibilistic variations (a broader 
range of possibilities that ‘can be expressed’ because of a flexible interpretation of 
‘react badly’) come together in a novel manner in the constitution of this national 
logic.  
 
The testimonies of Barack Obama, Schwartz and Randall (2003), Campbell et al (2007) 
and Major General Muniruzzaman suggest a national logic in which, faced with a 
situation of climate insecurities, a discursively produced image of a defensive, ego-
centric American exceptionalism (and reactions of other nation-states) mediates 
possibilities for what might happen in these scenarios. I argue this perpetuates a 
biopolitics of unequally valued (American) lives in which a fortressed exceptionalism 
facilitates a US in which American lives are favoured in conditions of climate 
insecurities and the mobility of others, e.g. possible climate-induced migrants, is 
restricted and regulated. In this case, unequal biopolitics do not depend on a delimited 
biological understanding of ‘life’, but consider how it is grasped by a ‘politica l and 
moral anthropology’ (Fassin 2009: 48-9) that shapes exclusions. Biopolitics build on 
Foucault’s (2004 (1976): 255) account of the ‘death-function’ of racism deciding on 
which lives are ‘killed’ (submitted to death, political subjugation, rejection etc.) to 
focus on the possible ‘bio-inequalities’ (Fassin 2009) of American climate security 
discourses. Representations of a defensive nationhood facilitate bio-inequalities based 
on national logics in climate-insecure futures: in a world of resource scarcities and CIM, 
an egocentrism and relative adaptive capacity suggest American populations would be 
preferentially valued in a fortressed nation. This masks fundamental connections 
between climate insecurities and climate injustices. In a study of how Indian 
government officials view climate security discourse, Boas (2014) finds a dominant 
perspective is that climate security is a Western strategy to ensure India fulfils its 
climate mitigation obligations. Boas (2014: 148) critiques the discourse’s Western and 
Northern-centrism: ‘this alarmist type of discourse on climate change and security … is 
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largely Western-based … their arguments largely build on the assumption that climate 
conflicts and climate migration will predominantly originate in the Global South. This 
tends to give the Global South a stereotypical image of a vulnerable and dangerous 
actor that can weaken the stability and prosperity of the Global North.’ Instead, Boas 
(2014: 151) insists an alternative set of questions need to be asked: how do 
‘vulnerable’ communities in the Global South perceive the climate-security nexus? 
Which voices in Southern states support this framing of climate change and which do 
not? What alternative visions of climate change emerge from actors in the Global 
South? A defensive American exceptionalism, preoccupied with other nation-state 
actors as threats or competitors to be ‘isolated’ from, constrains these questions. As 
White (2014: 844-5) argues, a ‘fortress mentality’ approach ‘opens the door to gross 
violations of human rights within communities and societies and nation-states … it … 
bolsters the view that social and ecological problems are caused by perceived 
‘enemies’ externally (as well as internally), not by our own actions.’ These conclusions 
of insular representations of American exceptionalism in moments of earlier US 
climate security discourse suggest national logics not only promote a biopolitics of 
unequally valued American lives, but in doing so also potentially reproduce and mask 
climate injustices in possible climate-insecure futures. 
 
6.4 Universalized American nationhood  
 
6.4.1 American ‘values’ and ‘leadership’ 
 
Another variant of American exceptionalism posits the universality of American values 
(e.g. ‘democracy’, ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’). As Phillpot and Mutimer (2005) outline, this 
includes a concept of ‘American innocence’ that asserts American righteousness and 
externalizes violences intrinsic to the formation of national identity. As part of the 
promotion of a beneficent self-image, American nationhood is articulated as a 
commitment to universal values in particular, context-specific moments of climate 
security discourse, for example the 2010 National Security Strategy. This is a document 
produced by the Executive Branch and it outlines the security objectives, goals and 
interests of the US government (White House 2010). Initially mandated by the 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act (1986) to be released 
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annually, in practice strategies are published every 5 years (National Security Strategy 
Archive 2016). The authors write (2010: no pagination):  
 
‘The international order we seek is one that can resolve the 
challenges of our times – countering violent extremism and 
insurgency, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing 
nuclear materials, combating a changing climate and securing 
global growth … In all that we do, we will advocate and advance 
the basic rights upon which our Nation was founded … we reject 
the notion that lasting security and prosperity can be found by 
turning away from universal rights – democracy does not merely 
represent our better angels, it stands in opposition to aggression 
and injustice, and our support for universal rights is also 
fundamental to American leadership and a source of our strength 
in the world.’  
 
 
In this excerpt, American national identity, or the ‘basic rights upon which our Nation 
was founded’, is articulated in terms of ‘universal rights’ and ‘the international order 
we seek’. The report posits an American duty to promote universal values (‘a source of 
our strength in the world’) and plays into a concept of a ‘providential mission’ or ‘duty’ 
to spread US values (Phillpot and Mutimer 2005). Interestingly, there is ambiguous 
usage of the collective pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our’; when referring to ‘our Nation’ this 
implies an American collective, when phrased as ‘the challenges of our times’, it could 
be that this is magnified to represent humanity. These debates also translate into 
discussions of American leadership. For example, in his 2014 West Point Speech (an 
important symbolic address to graduates of the West Point Military Academy, New 
York), Barack Obama notes:  
 
‘American influence is always stronger when we lead by example. 
We can’t exempt ourselves from the rules that apply to everybody 
else. We can’t call on others to make commitments to combat 
climate change if a whole lot of our political leaders deny that it’s 
taking place … That’s not leadership; that’s retreat. That’s not 
strength; that’s weakness. It would be utterly foreign to leaders 
like Roosevelt and Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy.’  
 
 
Obama utilizes a war metaphor (‘combating’) to describe actions to mitigate climate 
change. He makes the case for American leadership grounded on commitment to 
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international law, cooperation and the strength of ‘example’. Unlike the National 
Security Strategy, the collective pronoun ‘we’ fosters a unified sense of American 
nationhood and an explicit call to avoid isolationism in ‘combating’ climate change. He 
invokes historical examples of American Presidents to construct this image of strong 
US leadership and simple sentences partitioned by semicolons to juxtapose positive 
and negative qualities, e.g. ‘that’s not strength; that’s weakness’. As such, it could be 
argued that, under a frame of national logics, Obama draws upon historic and current 
significations of US nationhood (American leadership, ‘values’, ‘example’, rule of 
(international) law and so forth) in order to suggest how America should be oriented 
towards climate-insecure futures. In this case, futures refer to ‘combating’ climate 
change and the ‘commitments’ required for this. Obama’s rhetoric also indicates his 
approach to American exceptionalism and differences across administrations. Dalby 
(2003) critiques the imperialist unilateralism of George W. Bush’s foreign policy and its 
construction of ‘wild’, ‘untamed’ spaces in the Middle East (notably Afghanistan) as 
beyond the rule of law. However, as Hayes (2016) notes, it is with the election of 
Barack Obama in 2009, with an explicit agenda to formulate policies on climate 
change, that climate security becomes more clearly institutionalized in the US security 
sector (e.g. the Department of Defense). Toal (2009) argues in an early analysis that 
Barack Obama presents American exceptionalism through five scripted ‘speech acts’.  
 
First is an ‘ineluctable globalized condition’ (the increased porosity of political and 
economic borders); second is a range of new threats (including climate change); 
‘collective security as a fundamental truth’ (the idea that American security is 
dependent on international security); fourth is the Bush administration’s record of 
foreign policy failures; and fifth is the opportunity and promise of hope and 
redemption (Toal 2009: 393). Löfflman (2015) demonstrates that whilst Barack Obama 
continues to represent American military capacity, economic power and values as 
‘exceptional’, he has attempted to shift away from a unilateralist interventionism 
towards a cooperative notion of ‘burden-sharing’ or ‘leading from behind’. This chimes 
with Obama’s utilization of American exceptionalism in climate change politics: as the 
excerpts from the National Security Strategy (White House 2010) and West Point 
Speech (Obama 2014) attest to, Obama promotes the universality of ‘American’ values 
and situates these in a cooperative international role for the US.  
 
 
 
195 
195 
A universalized interpretation of climate-secure American exceptionalism masks its 
own exclusions. Not only in the intrusive assumption that US-centric principles are 
universally applicable, but also as it could shroud the climate injustices and the 
ineffectiveness of American climate politics behind a veil of ‘American innocence’ 
(Phillpot and Mutimer 2005). On this, Derek Gregory (2004b) notes the revelation that, 
in April 2004, the Abu Ghraib prison – 20 miles from Baghdad – had been used as a site 
of torture, humiliation and horrific violence. The response in the United States was one 
of ‘condemnation followed by immediate absolution’; treatment of prisoners was 
‘unacceptable but un-American’; ‘inexcusable but an exception’, the work of ‘a few 
rotten apples’ and not a ‘vast poisoned orchard’ (Gregory 2004b: 318). The violences 
of these crimes are acknowledged, but as something exceptional, contrary to the 
‘American way’. In the West Point speech quote above, Barack Obama (2014) notes 
the mistakes of ‘our political leaders who deny that it’s [climate change] taking place’, 
but situates this divisive lack of cooperation and scientific insight as contrary to 
American nationhood, ‘utterly foreign to leaders like Roosevelt and Truman, 
Eisenhower and Kennedy.’ Notwithstanding the important historical and geographical 
differences between this example and Gregory’s (2004b) argument, here Obama 
points to mistakes by American politicians (predominantly elected Republicans), but 
counteracts these with an all-embracing representation of ‘American innocence’ to 
cast them as the exception. This is reinforced by the phraseology of ‘utterly foreign’, 
which explicitly differentiates these viewpoints from a universalized American 
exceptionalism or leadership. Thus, Barack Obama draws upon historic significations of 
American leadership – the figures of past presidents – to consolidate the need for this 
leadership (and the ‘innocence’ of its values and superiority) in climate-insecure 
futures and presents. However, whilst this approach occludes exclusions of American 
nationhood by underscoring these as exceptions, I also argue that universalized 
concepts of American climate security are imbued with unequal power relations that 
value the securities of particular populations over others. I now discuss this in relation 
to an uptake of human security in US climate security discourse.  
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6.4.2 Human security  
 
Introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report, ‘human security’ has seven 
components: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, 
personal security, community security and political security (UNDP 1994). These 
securities are backed by four principles. First is a universal concern relevant to all 
people; second is that each element of security is interdependent with the others; 
third is a move towards early prevention strategies; and fourth is a shift in the security 
referent from states to human beings (UNDP 1994). Emphases on international 
humanitarian intervention and human rights are fundamental axioms of human 
security (Chandler 2012). The concept’s core proposition is a shift in security referent 
from nation-states to individuals (O’Brien 2003). It has been taken up by academics to 
explore environmental change (Barnett et al 2008). For instance, Barnett and Adger 
(2007) explore the intersections of climate change, conflict and human security to 
hypothesize which factors influence individuals – predominantly young men – to join 
guerrilla groups.  
 
Human and national securities are also occasionally framed in opposition to one 
another in climate security (Edwards 1999; Schoch 2011). For example, as Jasparro and 
Taylor (2008: 233) declare in relation to transnational security threats: ‘As such they 
operate at the intersection of often competing notions of human security and 
traditional understandings of state/national security.’ Or, from Dabelko (2009: 16): 
‘Within the traditional narrow view of security (as opposed to the broader “human 
security” view), there are a variety of ways actors perceive climate change as an 
appropriate area of concern’. This dichotomy is reaffirmed by Kaldor’s (2007) 
argument that human security moves away from state-based governance and is 
increasingly embedded in international frameworks. Whilst it is important not to 
essentialize a single, homogenized human security ‘project’ (Owen 2008), Chandler 
(2008: 427) christens human security as ‘the dog that didn’t bark’; it has been 
mainstreamed in international policy circles, but this integration only works to 
reconfirm existing inequalities of nation-state power. For Chandler (2008), this is 
enabled by three trends: increased recognition of post-Cold War security threats (e.g. 
environmental degradation), the location of security ‘threats’ in the ‘developing world’ 
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and in requirement of humanitarian intervention, and the privileging of short-term 
decision-making at the expense of long-term, strategic foreign policy.  
 
Although human security has received significant attention in climate security 
discourses, this is still substantially lower than national security appraisals of climate 
change (McDonald 2013). However, McDonald’s (2013) typology relies on distinct 
discourses of ‘human’ and ‘national’ security from which he can then identify 
inequalities between these discourses. Treating climate security as a single yet 
heterogeneous discourse, in this section I argue a key trend is increased uptake of 
human security concerns by American security actors from 2010 onwards. This trend 
represents an important objective to not only explore human security in international 
forums, but also how nation-states utilize the concept in connection with national 
security. In the specific case of the Department of Defense, it could be that this 
sublimates human security to national security interests. Therefore, as with a 
universalized American exceptionalism, human security promotes the idea of humanity 
as a reference point of US security actors, but this is ultimately subsumed within a ‘bio-
normative geopolitics’ (Gerhardt 2009: 499) which privileges particular – American – 
populations over others. In an early piece, Liotta (2002: 473) locates the increasing 
prevalence of ‘non-traditional’ security threats: ‘climate change, resource scarcity, 
declining productivity … criminality and terrorism – the developed world was now 
confronted with human-centred vulnerabilities that had often been present previously 
only in … non-traditional challenges for developing regions.’ He postulates the future 
may witness a blurring of state security and human security concerns and the growth 
of non-discrete, non-immediate or clearly identifiable ‘vulnerabilities’ requiring 
complex, multi-scalar and multiagency responses (Liotta 2002). This trend – of 
increasing interconnections between human security and national security – is also 
reflected in moments of US climate security discourse. It could be that this reflects a 
trend towards increasing coordination of activities by USAID (United States Agency for 
International Development), the Department of State and the Department of Defense. 
For example, in 2009 USAID’s Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation produced 
a preliminary report that explores the interrelations between climate change, 
adaptation and conflict. The Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) 
was founded in 2002 to lead USAID’s efforts to understand and address sources of 
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political instability and violent conflict (USAID 2017). Discussing relationships between 
climate change and potential instability, USAID CCM (2009: 5) note:  
 
‘Factors linking climate change and the potential for conflict 
include a number of powerful threats to human security, such as 
land degradation, water scarcity, decreased food production, 
increased mortality from diseases, unplanned migration, and 
hazards associated with extreme weather events. Populations will 
have to grapple with these severe challenges, and as numerous 
experts have noted, these effects are likely to be most acute in 
countries already struggling with low levels of development, 
persistent poverty, limited social systems services, and in some 
cases, pre-existing social and political instability. Such threats to 
human security, especially if unmitigated, have strong potential to 
increase dramatically grievances that are often precursors to 
conflict.’  
 
 
In this excerpt, USAID CCM identify a range of factors that could be exacerbated by 
climate change impacts (e.g. ‘water scarcity’, ‘land degradation’ or ‘decreased food 
production’). They stress that these factors could be threats to human security and 
draw connections with the potential for violent conflict. For example, USAID CCM 
(2009) write of ‘powerful threats to human security’, that ‘populations will have to 
grapple with these difficult challenges’, and that ‘such threats to human security’ could 
‘increase dramatically grievances that are often precursors to conflict’. Given USAID’s 
mandate to promote international development, it is understandable that these trends 
are situated specifically in relation to countries with a ‘low level of development’ and 
human security concerns – associated with human development (Kaldor 2007) – are 
emphasized above other concepts of security. However, I argue that the uptake of 
human security concerns is not limited to USAID, but also across other US Government 
departments. Overseen by then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, in 2010 the first 
Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review (QDDR) was published (Department 
of State 2010). The 2010 QDDR (p.21) states that: ‘development, diplomacy, and 
defense, as the core pillars of American foreign policy, must mutually reinforce and 
complement one another in an integrated, comprehensive approach to national 
security’. Through an elevation of USAID’s role in US foreign policy, and an emphasis 
that ‘development’ and ‘diplomacy’ are fundamental components (alongside 
‘defense’) of an ‘integrated, comprehensive’ approach to national security, the QDDR 
 
 
 
199 
199 
(2010) represents an explicit attempt to change how actors within the US Government 
conceptualize security. As a part of this agenda, the QDDR (2010: 42-3) emphasizes the 
importance of human security. The QDDR (2010: 42-3) states that in order to recognize 
this importance, the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs would be 
reorganized into an Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human 
Rights. Human security issues that the Department of State lists as important to its 
mandate include preventing and responding to conflicts, managing humanitarian and 
refugee crises, advancing human rights and democracy, and countering convergent 
transnational threats such as narcotics (Anderson 2014). As the QDDR (2010: 42-3) 
highlights:  
 
‘Our national security depends on human security – on preventing 
and responding to crisis and conflict, securing democracy, and 
advancing human rights. Advancing human rights and democracy 
is a key priority that reflects American values and promotes our 
security’ 
 
 
In this quotation, the Department of State note clearly that human security is a 
fundamental ingredient to US national security. ‘Human security’ is qualified through 
concern for preventing ‘conflict’, ‘securing democracy’, and ‘advancing human rights’. 
The use of the collective pronoun ‘our’ with reference to ‘our national security’ and 
‘our security’ affirms the importance of human security concerns for the pres ervation 
of American – ‘our’ – national security. However, it could be that although the 
Department of State refers to the importance of human security concerns – e.g. 
‘advancing human rights’ – this is to underline the role of human security in the 
protection of American national security interests, not to promote human security 
more broadly. Thus, a human security agenda is promoted by the Department of State 
– including a heightened role for USAID – but this is not to promote human security 
(the security of human beings in its broadest sense) in and of itself, but to explore how 
human security concerns are implicated in US national security. Therefore, although 
the collective pronoun ‘our’ presages security, the ‘our’ denotes an American collective 
to be secured, not a collective at the scale of ‘humanity’ or ‘human beings’. All of these 
developments speak to a shift indicating increased attention to human security in 
American security debates and American climate security in particular, but 
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uncertainties about the implications of this shift. This analysis takes these uncertainties 
as its starting point and does not seek to reduce the complexity of security concepts in 
US climate security to a single narrative. Instead, I focus on one particular discursive 
strand from DOD publications and interpret this as accepting of the influence of human 
security factors in climate insecurities, but only to the extent these bolster national 
security interests (as with the QDDR excerpt above (2010: 42-3). I start with the DOD’s 
2011 Report of the Defense Science Board (a final publication of the Defense Science 
Task Force, a group convened by the DOD to explore the national security implications 
of climate change):  
 
‘This report provides a set of recommendations on approaches to 
adaptation and dealing with the near-term effects on populations 
that impact US and international security interests. The report 
addresses the need and prospects to address the near-term 
impact on human populations and longer-term adaptation to 
climate change. The impact on human populations, near- and 
long-term, translates into impact on national and international 
security’ (p. VII) 
 
‘The conventional view of national security is based on conflict 
and economic interests. Threats to a state are often seen in terms 
of territory, migration, access to resources (energy, water, food, 
and materials), or markets. Climate change threats are much less 
focused. Human security lies at the heart of the climate change 
threat to US national security. Conventional national security 
threats arise from human security origins. Dealing with climate 
change requires a human security-based strategy to prevent 
emergence of national security challenges’ (p.78) 
 
 
These passages underscore the centrality of human security to national security 
imperatives. In the first quotation, the DOD stress that the near-term impacts of 
climate change on ‘human populations’ (and the long-term challenge climate 
adaptation) as being important for ‘national security’ and ‘international security’. As 
the DOD reports: ‘The impact on human populations, near- and long-term, translates 
into impact on national and international security’. Thus, human security concerns are 
fundamental to national security outcomes. This is also affirmed by the lexis ‘heart’ 
and assumption human security is at the ‘origins’ of national security in the second 
excerpt. Repeated qualification of national security as ‘conventional’ reiterates the 
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difference human security makes to traditional security concepts. In this sense, a 
teleological pathway is constructed in which national security threats ‘arise’ from 
human security ‘origins’, or a ‘human security-based strategy’ is required to prevent 
‘emergence of’ national security issues. Whilst this establishes direct connections 
between human and national security, it does not suggest a usurping of national 
security or increased prominence of human security. National security remains the 
‘endpoint’ or ‘pinnacle’ of the teleology. Discussing the dominance of territorial, state-
based security concepts in US climate security discourse, Diez et al (2016) note that 
discourses of ‘individual danger’ (associated with human security) play a part, but are 
linked to ‘territorial danger’ concepts. They (2016: 49) write: ‘the individual security 
discourse is normally only part of a chain of argument that in the end focuses on 
territorial security considerations.’ This  finding supports a teleological interpretation 
whereby human security figures in moments of US climate security discourse, but only 
as part of a chain of causal reasoning that poses national or territorial security 
interests or dangers as its conclusion. Therefore, it could be argued that human 
security is a cornerstone in DOD’s Report of the Defense Science Board excerpts, but 
only to the extent it relates to or produces national security ‘threats’. In the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense (p.8) enunciates:  
 
‘Climate change may exacerbate water scarcity and lead to sharp 
increases in food costs. The pressures caused by climate change 
will influence resource competition while placing additional 
burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions 
around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will 
aggregate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental 
degradation, political instability, and social tensions – conditions 
that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence.’  
 
 
Here, the DOD does not isolate human security directly. However, issues within the 
remit of human security discourses, e.g. poverty, environmental degradation and food 
costs (Kaldor 2007), are situated within the DOD’s climate security language. Human 
security stressors are again illustrated in a teleological form of argumentation in which 
‘poverty’ and ‘political instability’ can produce ‘terrorist activity’ and ‘other forms of 
violence’ as endpoints – similar to discursive constructions of climate change-terrorism 
interconnections as a causal chain in chapter 5, section 5.4. In both of these examples, 
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concepts implicated in ‘human security’ discourses are given an important status in 
DOD strategies. However, in both texts this is part of a broader conception of national 
security: whether human security issues participate in the construction of higher order 
national security ‘threats’, or human security is instrumentalized for the pursuit of 
American national security interests. This is a hierarchical relation in which, although 
important to the DOD’s security objectives, human security is relegated below national 
security. Given these are positions of federal security bodies, it is unsurprising to find a 
preference for national security and this trend represents only one discursive strand of 
human-national security interactions in US climate security debates. 
 
For this particular interpretation, I argue a human security perspective subsumed 
within national security interests contributes to biopolitics of unequally valued lives in 
context-specific moments of US climate security discourse. I contend these biopolitics 
– ‘bio-inequalities’ in Fassin’s (2009: 48-9) terms – are grounded in differential 
valuations demarcating which populations are designated as the referents of US 
climate security (whether this is ‘human’ populations more broadly, or ‘American’ 
populations in national security). The chapter employs Gerhardt’s (2009) concept of 
‘bio-normative geopolitics’ to explicate these biopolitics. In this regard, my argument is 
not that national logics construct imaginative geographies that exclude less valued 
lives – e.g. possible climate-induced migrants – from a fortressed, ‘exceptional’ 
America. Rather, a discursive strand is constructed that perpetuates an American 
climate security premised on universal values (human security) and subsumes this 
within an uneven biopolitical hierarchy (national security interests). Gerhardt (2009) 
argues an important dimension of trans-territorial state power concerns the 
biopolitical reach of this sovereign power. This reach creates the possibility for a global 
‘meta-sovereign’ with the capacity to intervene internationally to preserve ‘universa l 
life’ (Gerhardt 2009: 495). Gerhardt (2009: 496) names this ‘bio-normative geopolitics’: 
‘the calculations of the sovereign state with regard to the global organization of the 
valuation of life.’ Bio-normative-geopolitics is grounded in ‘global governmentality’, 
the practices and rationalities of governing responsibly for populations worldwide. This 
postulates a global ‘meta-sovereign’ (with normative principles of universal human 
rights) with a capacity to intervene in the protection of human life above the 
jurisdiction of nation-states.     
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In the absence of a universal meta-sovereign, Gerhardt (2009: 496) argues the US has 
pursued a ‘quasi metasovereign status’ unilaterally, underpinned by representations of 
American nationhood as the embodiment of universal values and humankind. A quasi-
metasovereign status allows the US ‘to claim a global valuation of life while at the 
same time deflecting the practical requirements entailed in actually enforcing this 
valuation’ (Gerhardt 2009: 497). However, I argue the US’s role in a bio-normative 
geopolitics – its status as a quasi-metasovereign – fosters pervasive inequalities behind 
an imaginary of America as a universal assigner of values and preserver of human life.  
I propose this concept is applicable to the uptake of human security concerns by US 
defense actors. With ‘humanity, ‘human rights’ or ‘human beings’ as its referent point, 
it could be that human security is a ‘bio-normative’ concept, a universal valuation to 
preserve human life. If human security is subsumed within national security interests 
(with human insecurities as stressors for national security ‘threats’, or national security 
ranked as superior to human security), national security negates a universally equal 
valuation of human lives in conditions of climate insecurity. Instead, this national logic 
prioritizes the lives of those important to American national security interests in 
climate-insecure futures. However, whereas defensive readings of American 
nationhood are predicated on the assumption climate insecurities are generated 
outside the US, there is also increasing recognition climate change impacts US 
‘homeland security’. Section 6.5 explores this trend in relation to essentializing, 
national logics of American nationhood – and their concomitant unequal biopolitics – 
in the contexts of Hurricane Katrina (2005) and Hurricane Sandy (2012).  
 
6.5 Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy 
 
6.5.1 Hurricane Katrina 
 
Hurricane Katrina plays an important role in American histories of racism, 
neoliberalism, militarization, climate change, and disaster management (Bakker 2005). 
Katrina struck New Orleans at 6.10am on August 29th, 2005 (Merdjanoff 2013). Within 
3 hours, the storm breached the floodwalls of the Lower Ninth Ward, flooding the 
city’s poorest neighborhoods and 80% of New Orleans (Merdjanoff 2013). Over 1 
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million residents were displaced from their homes, with the majority of the population 
of greater New Orleans evacuated, and 1000 people are known to have died (Bakker 
2005). New Orleans has a history of high vulnerability to flood events and public works 
to manage this. Colten (2002) notes that from its founding in 1718 (by French 
colonists), the city has undergone a range of engineering projects, for example the 
extension of the sewerage system in the late 19th-early 20th century. There were a 
series of attempts to heighten the natural levees in the 20th century. But, while the 
draining of wetlands allowed for urban sprawl, this resulted in soil compaction and 
subsidence; accelerated by canalization to assist local oil industries, Louisiana had lost 
an estimated 1 million acres of coastal wetland since 1930 (Bakker 2005). 
Channelization and wetland reduction (to absorb flood impacts) also contributed to an 
amplification of storm surges in New Orleans (Bakker 2005).  
 
Furthermore, Katrina exacerbated existing social inequalities in New Orleans. 
Merdjanoff (2013) notes that prior to the storm 28% of the city’s population required 
federal and state assistance and median household income was 35% below the 
national average; this was particularly acute for African Americans, with 43% resident 
in neighborhoods with extreme poverty. Giroux (2006: 174) argues Katrina did ‘shatter 
the conservative fiction of living in a color-blind society’, laying bare the country’s 
‘racial and class fault lines’. TV images emerged of bodies floating in the floodwaters 
and people shepherded into New Orleans’ Convention Center (19,000) and Superdome 
(24,000), stranded for days with limited medical assistance, food and water supplies 
(Bakker 2005). 80% of residents in flooded areas were non-White, whilst 52% of 
African Americans were without access to a car (for evacuation) compared to 11% of 
poor Whites (Rhodes 2010). On 1st September, martial law was declared and 65,000 
military personnel were drafted into the city (Giroux 2006). Stories emerged of African 
Americans prevented from crossing the Mississippi River (into the affluent Gretna 
suburb) by armed police (Rhodes 2010). These images contributed to racialized, 
classed representations of poor African Americans in New Orleans as ‘looters’, 
‘trespassers’ or ‘refugees’ (Rhodes 2010). As Giroux (2006) notes, the term ‘refugee’ 
implies New Orleans residents are external to their city, denied legal citizenship and 
rights. Gotham (2014) states that the Louisiana Road Home Program, launched in 2006 
to provide compensation to homeowners and renters impacted by Hurricanes Katrina 
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and Rita, was also exclusionary. Under program rules, grants were calculated on the 
basis of the lower of two numbers: a home’s pre-storm value and the cost of storm-
damage (Gotham 2014). Therefore, if the pre-storm house price was lower than storm-
damage costs, homeowners would receive a smaller grant. Because low-income 
African American communities resided in areas with depressed house prices, this 
disproportionately affected their chances of receiving an adequate repair grant 
(Gotham 2014). Reflecting on the racialized inequalities  of Katrina and what this 
suggests about American nationhood and climate change politics more broadly, 
Naomi, an environmental justice professional in the US, notes:  
 
‘Um … to some extent I’ll start there because climate is still not 
even really … it’s not like the whole country has embraced climate 
change is happening [inaudible] … I would say more than anything 
um …  I would say it’s impacts in terms of disaster … but with 
Hurricane Katrina as an example just the images of Hurricane 
Katrina and the language that was used from Hurricane Katrina 
around refugees and looters and so forth um … in some ways it 
kind of deepens the divide because it dehumanizes the people 
who were affected by Hurricane Katrina … so I think that while the 
impacts of climate change are exacerbating or perpetuating race-
based perceptions [inaudible]’ 
 
 
Naomi argues the language of ‘refugees’ and ‘looters’ surrounding Katrina 
dehumanized those impacted by the hurricane. She highlights disasters – because they 
can underscore social inequalities – as a means through which American ‘race-based 
perceptions’ and ‘deepened divides’ are exposed. She is careful to point out the 
relation to American nationhood is more nuanced than this, and ‘it’s not like the whole 
country has embraced climate change is happening’. Although the final part of the 
excerpt is inaudible, the conjunction ‘while’ indicates a racialized response to disasters 
and American nationhood is only one part of the reality. In the specific context of 
Katrina, Giroux (2006: 175) argues the disaster response was exemplary of a 
‘biopolitics of disposability’: ‘hyper-neoliberalism is now organized around the best 
way to remove or make invisible those individuals and groups who are either seen as a 
drain or stand in the way of market freedoms, free trade, consumerism, and the 
neoconservative dream of American empire.’ Poor Americans, especially people of 
colour, are expected to sustain themselves independently of state assistance. While 
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the New Orleans Army Corps of Engineers requested more funding to support the 
levees and there were repeated warnings about the city’s vulnerability, the Bush 
government cut the Army Corps funding by $0.5 billion in 2002 (Giroux 2006). 
Similarly, funding for FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), tasked with 
managing disaster response, had been cut by 10% since 2003 (Rhodes 2010). Giroux 
(2006: 181-2) identifies a biopolitics – oriented around race-class intersections – that 
‘includes state-sanctioned violence’ and ‘relegates entire populations to spaces of 
invisibility and disposability’.  
 
Braun (2005) contends that Katrina highlighted a biopolitics of ‘abandonment’. He 
(2005: 808) argues that ‘abandoned being is internal to American democracy … Katrina 
revealed that the potential for abandoned being is present and often realized in the 
spaces of the nation itself, in its cities, streets, sewers, markets, housing and hospitals.’ 
Braun (2005) and Giroux (2006) conclude that Katrina revealed unequal biopolitics of 
valued lives (and devalued as ‘abandoned’ or ‘disposable’), populations in American 
politics demarcated by racial, class and national intersections. Though difficult to 
attribute individual storms to climate change, Buxton and Hayes (2015) contend 
Hurricane Katrina was a ‘watershed moment’ in the need to focus on the welfare of 
present and future generations, not to produce a militarized response with American 
citizens as security threats. They (2015) worry a national security approach detracts 
from climate change as a social justice issue and compounds the injustice that ‘those 
least responsible for climate change will be most affected’.  
 
However, American environmental justice groups and civil rights organizations have 
conceived of climate change in terms of injustice. For example, the NAACP (National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People) has an Environmental and Climate 
Justice Program, premised on the notion that environmental injustices have 
disproportionate impacts on people of colour and low-income communities in the US 
and worldwide (NAACP 2016a). The program works to reduce harmful pollution (e.g. 
advocacy to enforce environmental regulations), operating at the state, federal and 
local levels to promote renewable energy schemes and incentives, and strengthening 
community resilience and liveability (e.g. promotion of participatory democracy) 
(NAACP 2016b). In a blog entry based on remarks given at the University of California, 
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Santa Cruz, on the ‘geopolitics of climate change’ (February 27th, 2016), Director of the 
NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program Jacqueline Patterson argues that 
the impacts and drivers of climate change are politically and geographically grounded. 
She writes that decision-making spaces (e.g. courtrooms, the UN and Congress) must 
transform to be ‘truly representing the needs of the people, the nations, and the 
planet they should serve’ (Patterson 2016). This call to action crosses political contexts: 
‘Bound by darker hued skin, political disenfranchisement, and disproportionate 
impact, nations in the Global South and communities of color in the global North … 
these communities and nations share common cause against the moneyed goliaths of 
the world’ (Patterson 2016). Patterson’s vision of the ‘geopolitics of climate change’ is 
explicitly grounded in racialized and classed inequalities. Her argument includes a 
multi-scalar perspective incorporating communities within the US and ‘nations’ from 
the ‘Global South’, and a call to transform the decision-making spaces and processes 
that embody these inequalities. In the case of the NAACP’s Environmental and Climate 
Justice Program (headed by Jacqueline Patterson), it could be that alternative visions 
of multi-scalar ‘climate security’ and ‘geopolitics’  – driven by principles of 
environmental justice – are proposed in a US context. As with the example of Green 
Muslims in chapter 4 (section, 4.5), these conceptions are embedded in unequal power 
relations, but nonetheless represent partial, alternative voices in American climate 
security discourse. On a similar theme of multi-scalar climate (in)securities, the case of 
Hurricane Sandy is now discussed. 
 
6.5.2 Hurricane Sandy 
 
Despite the significance of Katrina for American politics more broadly, in the particular 
context of US climate security debates interviewees noted Hurricane Sandy as an 
important turning point. Sandy was a post-tropical cyclone that swept through the East 
Coast in 2012 (Sharp 2012). The storm made landfall at 8pm (29th October), striking 
near to Atlantic City (New Jersey) with 80mph winds. As of November 1st, almost 4.7 
million people (in 15 states) were without access to electricity and the storm led to $20 
billion worth of property damage across the US Northeast. The confirmed death toll 
was at least 149 individuals, with 42 fatalities in New York and 12 in New Jersey (Sharp 
2012). Though less severe than Katrina, poverty rates were on average higher in 
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flooded tracts of New York City than dry areas. African American communities were 
more likely to be flooded (alongside elderly Whites), and transport disruption had the 
greatest impacts for Asian and Latino neighborhoods in Queens (Faber 2015). It could 
be that Hurricane Sandy highlights a nuanced, multi-scalar politics that touches on 
climate change impacts in the US. Traveling to the US for fieldwork – in September 
2014 – I remember encounters of personal stories from Sandy. Flying into John F. 
Kennedy airport, I was asked by the border guard at immigration control about the 
purpose of my journey (to validate my Visa Waiver application). After introducing the 
project as about American climate politics, she identified this as a contentious issue for 
New Yorkers and noted how many of her friends were still affected by displacement, 
damaged properties, and insurance claims after Hurricane Sandy. This example 
indicates individual anecdotes as a means to relocate climate (and human) insecurities 
to the scale of Americans’ everyday lives.  
 
In contrast, Smith (2001) detects an inverse trajectory for the scalar politics of 9/11. He 
(2001) asks how in the aftermath of a terrorist attack that was simultaneously local 
(involving emergency services in Lower Manhattan) and global (with victims of many 
nationalities), 9/11 was rendered into a distinctly ‘American’ tragedy and infringement 
of ‘US’ national security by the Bush administration. Dalby (2003: 73) develops a scalar 
politics of nationhood further: ‘the lesson of 11 September may well finally be a 
recognition that the splendid isolation of America as a separate continent, a 
geopolitics of isolation, is longer possible.’ For Dalby (2003: 73), ‘the geographical 
categories of Americans’ are changing to calibrate their interconnectedness in a 
globalized world. These examples underline important differences between Katrina 
and Sandy. Katrina demonstrates how environmental insecurities (a hurricane) are 
implicated in the exposition and reproduction of racialized, classed and gendered 
inequalities ‘inside’ the American nation. Sandy – interpreted in response to a 
defensive, fortressed conception of American nationhood in which climate securities 
are perceived as ‘external’ – represents a turning point in how climate change 
threatens the security of ‘the American homeland’. I argue it is this idea that climate 
securities are perceived to impact Americans directly (rather than an ‘external’ threat 
or one which impacts particular populations rendered as ‘disposable’ (Giroux 2006)) 
that underpins a shift in US climate security discourse to incorporate the idea of 
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‘resilience’. This is not held in causal relation with Hurricane Sandy (which occurred in 
2012 after climate resilience is first institutionalized in US government policy), 
however. National logics of a ‘climate-resilient’ American nationhood portray the US as 
adaptive, resourceful, and able to respond to a world of climate insecurities directly 
impinging American interests, territory and populations. Section 6.6 explores these 
representations in US climate security.  
 
6.6. Climate-resilient American nationhood  
 
6.6.1 A climate-resilient national subject? 
 
The discursive subject position of a climate-resilient American nation is intricately 
interconnected with a multi-scalar politics of resilient subjectivities. Importantly, 
whereas I contend a climate-resilient nationhood is discursively constructed in US 
climate security, this contradicts parts of the critical resilience literature in which 
resilient subjectivities operate at several scales, including individuals, communities and 
globally, but move away from the nation-state as a resilient subject (Coaffee and 
Fussey 2015). Ecologist C.S. Holling (1973: 17) first defines resilience as that which 
‘determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of the 
ability of these systems to absorb changes … and still persist.’ Resilience is an ability of 
ecosystems to absorb changes and continue to function; it can encompass socio-
ecological dynamics within a complex adaptive system framework and is characterized 
by adaptation, survival and self-empowerment (Cooper and Walker 2011). A subject’s 
(in)security is not only dependent on the character, severity and unpredictability of 
potential threats (vulnerability), but also the resilience of the subject to these threats 
(Cavelty et al 2015: 4).  
 
Anderson (2015) supplements this to argue that resilience is the latest ‘promise’ of 
security. Furthermore, in their study of ‘security-driven resilience’ practices in the UK, 
Coaffee and Fussey (2015: 95) note resilience’s ‘fluid’ and ‘complicated’ scalar politics, 
but nonetheless chart a shift from ‘national protection’ to ‘localized prevention and 
self-organizing responses’. A shift to localized scales of resilience also corroborates a 
similar development of individualized resilient subjectivities grounded in neoliberal 
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governmentality: ‘knowing when and how to exploit uncertainty to invent a new and 
better future is … a prominent feature of the adaptable, flexible and enterprising 
subject of resilience’ (O’Malley 2010: 505-6). Chandler (2013b: 220) adds to this the 
concept of the ‘autotelic self’, an individual subject capable of self-governing in a world 
of ‘radical uncertainty’ and ‘contingency’, and which ‘turns insecurity into self-
actualization’ and ‘growth’. Rather than a universalized liberal subject endowed with a 
will to know and secure its external world, the autotelic self is focused on the internal, 
cognitive development of an individual (Chandler 2013: 220). I contend that all of 
these examples exhibit a shift towards resilience produced as an adaptive, 
entrepreneurial subject flourishing in uncertain circumstances.  
 
Resilience is also constructed at a universal scale, part of a global, liberal order of 
governmentality (Corry 2014). Evans (2013: 40, original emphasis) contends the 
resilient subject traverses a contingent, complex landscape defining ‘the topos of 
contemporary politics’ in which ‘late liberalism’ is characterized by contingency and 
immanence. Asked in an interview about whether the discourse of resilience is linked 
to ‘a new period in our civilization’, Reid (2016) replies: ‘Absolutely … what is different 
today is the way resilience has become so powerfully discursive and self-evident … It is 
so prevalent and obvious that you don’t have to read Adam Smith or liberal philosophy 
in order to see this theory of subjectivity on display … Everything is resilience 
nowadays.’ However, with its acceptance of a world of perpetual insecurities, 
resilience can hamstring possibilities for resistance (Neocleous 2013). It can 
redistribute responsibility for insecurities or ‘lack of resilience’ away from governments 
and onto individuals or communities (Cavelty et al 2015). In the context of CIM, 
Methmann and Oels (2015: 64) critique resilience’s tendency to ‘eliminate the 
political’. They (2015) note how it shifts responsibility onto those affected by climate 
impacts (and possibly away from high emitting states), and naturalizes climate change 
as an inevitable fate people must endure. Corry (2014: 262) also critiques a presumed 
resilient neoliberal universality for first relying on a ‘theoretically overdetermined 
model of Foucauldian governmentality’ understood as neoliberal governmentality with 
a global reach; and second for postulating resilience as a totalizing, fully-fledged 
regime without any clinks. To challenge universalizing models of an individualized 
resilient subjectivity on the one hand, and of a globalized universality on the other, I 
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follow Brassett and Vaughan-Williams (2015) lead to explore the ambiguities and 
multiplicities of resilience. As such, I emphasize that resilience articulates 
heterogeneous subjectivities and refuses the possibility of ‘one resilient subject’ 
(Anderson 2015: 61).  
 
In doing so, Anderson (2015) acknowledges that resilience does not require its subject 
to be an individual, but can involve collective subjectifications. I argue a climate-
resilient nationhood is constructed in US climate security discourse. This is not to 
detach resilient subjectivities from neoliberal governance, or from the unequal power 
relations identified by Neocleous (2013) and Methmann and Oels (2015), but to situate 
these as particular (interconnected) articulations of resilience with nationhood. I argue 
national logics construct climate-resilient American nationhood in two respects: first, 
through the pursuit of a shared, resilient nation in conditions of climate insecurity; and 
second, with the use of historic and current significations to suggest climate-resilient 
American futures. Although they are different to racial logics which construct a racial 
‘Muslim’ Other in conditions of possible future climate insecurities, all of these 
constructions contribute to uneven biopolitics of valued lives in particular, context-
specific moments of US and EU climate security discourses. 
 
6.6.2 Histories of resilience in the US 
 
Cooper and Walker (2011) point out that resilience was first utilized in 1970s US 
security policy when an alternative, decentralized grid was proposed to promote 
energy independence. However, it reached increased prominence with the creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, in November 2002, preceded by the 
Office of Homeland Security) and the 2002 and 2007 national strategies for homeland 
security (Neocleous 2013). In the 2002 document (Office of Homeland Security), 
homeland security is defined as (p.2) ‘a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terroris m, and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.’ Here, the remit of 
homeland security concentrates exclusively on terrorism. Between the 2002 and 2007 
strategies, Cooper and Walker (2011) argue that Hurricane Katrina blurred the 
distinctions between an unidentified terrorist threat, environmental disaster and 
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financial crisis, reinvigorating the need for ‘resilience’ and ‘national preparedness’. In 
the 2007 strategy, the DHS widened its vision to encompass preparedness for natural 
disasters. As George W. Bush (2007) writes in the foreword: ‘We have applied the 
lessons of Katrina to this Strategy to make sure that America is safer, stronger, and 
better prepared.’ 
 
However, the 2007 strategy does not contextualize homeland security in relation to 
climate change. In their testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, David Heyman and Caitlin Durkovitch (Feb 12th, 2014, on 
‘Extreme Weather Events: the Costs of Not Being Prepared’) outline a history of Barack 
Obama’s resilience policy. They note the creation of a Resilience Directorate to 
establish ‘resilience’ and ‘security’ as the twin pillars of homeland security (in 2009). 
This was cemented with the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, published in 
2010. In March 2011, the National Presidential Policy Directive on National 
Preparedness was released and defines resilience as ‘the ability to adapt to changing 
conditions and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies’ (cited in Heyman 
and Durkovitch 2014). It was followed in September 2011 by the National 
Preparedness Goal establishing what it means for the US to be prepared for a range of 
disasters across themes of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery 
(Heyman and Durkovitch 2014). I argue these policies and directives represent 
important steps in the construction of a concept of resilient American nationhood. This 
is a nationhood that orients America towards insecure futures and posits national 
characteristics of adaptability and strength. For example, to return briefly to the 2010 
DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, as one of the Strategy’s key objectives 
the DHS (p.15) state:  
 
‘The challenge is to foster a society that is robust, adaptable, and 
has the capacity for rapid recovery. This concept is not new, and 
different eras in our history reflect an unwavering focus on 
building national resilience. The history of civil defense in the 
United States … is marked by sweeping national debates about 
concepts that, if not by name, were nevertheless entirely about 
resilience. Notable among these was the debate spanning the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations about whether to expend 
resources on sheltering individuals in the face of nuclear attack or 
to focus investments in a national highway system to facilitate 
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mass evacuation of urban populations … The rapid evolution of 
national security threats and the arrival of the information age 
have increased the urgency of building up – and reemphasizing – 
our historically resilient posture.’  
 
 
Here, resilience is characterized as a collective capacity to be aspired towards with 
‘urgency’. Repetition of the collective, possessive pronoun ‘our’ affirms a sense of 
national unity and suggests resilience is something America can own or possess, ‘our’ 
resilience. A resilient ‘posture’ suggests a firm and strong America in the face of 
uncertainties, as does the verb ‘building’ national resilience. The DHS utilizes historic 
significations of what ‘our historically resilient posture’ represents in order to suggest 
how this should play into insecure futures (‘the rapid evolution of national security 
threats’ and ‘arrival of the information age’). Thus, instead of an endpoint or future 
condition to be aspired to, the essentializing, national logic draws upon historical 
analogies of what resilience ‘is’ to make the case for ‘what it can be’. The national logic 
posits a series of representations or assumptions, about what ‘national resilience’ 
looks like (historic and current significations), and positions these in an argument 
about what a resilient America should be in insecure futures. In this regard, the 
authors note that historical examples – civil defense, sheltering individuals from a 
nuclear attack and a highway system – may not have the same name, but are 
‘nevertheless entirely about resilience’. This temporality draws upon present and 
historic discursive significations to articulate a resilient future American nationhood.  
 
Contemplating the temporalities of resilience-security relations in her study of the 
bombsite of the Bali terrorist attacks in 2002, Heath-Kelly (2015) argues resilience 
discourses signify unpredictability and uncertainty as catalysts for security. Security 
failures thus become integral to the possibilities for better security in the future. 
Heath-Kelly (2015) contends that resilience redeploys past examples of security failure 
in order to promise a better future but does not act upon the visceral realities of the 
bombsite in the present (emergency triage and disaster recovery). This feedback loop – 
‘securing through the failure to secure’ – reveals a temporal ambiguity and casts 
resilience as a ‘chimera’: something which utilizes past invocations of security failure 
and national trauma for anticipation of resilient futures, but is completely absent from 
the present (Heath-Kelly 2015: 70-71). Importantly, this temporality also draws upon 
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narratives of nationhood. Discussing how Australian journalists and politicians 
understood the Bali bombings, Heath-Kelly (2015: 76, original emphasis) writes: ‘Such 
responses frame violent events as evidences of the natural resilience of the nation’s 
people, and in doing this they act upon the past … retrospective attributions of 
resilient ‘national spirit’ function to ‘return’ the past to a palatable state where 
performances of nationhood are no longer disrupted by the memory of televised 
bodies and stricken survivors … it is the past which is reworked as success – not the 
future. It is resignified to speak of national endurance, identity and wholeness.’  
 
In this regard, it could be that the DHS’s (p.15) invocation of civil defence in the 
Homeland Security Strategy functions partially as a temporal ‘feedback loop’ because 
it reworks historical significations of resilience – ‘our historically resilient posture’ – 
into assumptions about resilient American futures (‘a society that is robust, adaptable, 
and has the capacity for rapid recovery’). In one sense, it also negates discussions of 
present injustices, e.g. the unequally experienced impacts of climate change or failures 
of climate mitigation policies. Present injustices are hidden behind a feedback loop 
that situates resilience in the American past and American future. However, I also 
argue that ‘resilience’ is present in its discursive construction: whilst it is something 
that was ‘held’ previously or to be ‘acquired’ in the future, it is also discursively 
constructed in present national security discourses. Although a condition of resilience 
is unobtainable at present, the concept is present discursively in texts. Based on these 
observations, I argue that essentializing, national logics of a resilient American 
nationhood echo Heath-Kelly’s (2015) observations for one temporality: that which 
utilizes past invocations of resilience to articulate what a resilient American 
nationhood might look like in future insecurities. But, in another temporal possibility 
past significations of American ‘national resilience’ are not invoked and resilient 
American nationhood is constructed as a new phenomenon, one to be aspired towards 
in climate-insecure futures.  
 
6.6.3 Climate resilience and American nationhood 
 
It could be that a notion of ‘climate resilience’ first emerges with the establishment of 
the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force (ICCAF) in 2010 (ICCAF 2010). 
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The Task Force was co-chaired by the Council on Environmental Quality, the National 
Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, and the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy and consisted of more than 20 government agencies (ICAAF 2010). It was guided 
by a strategic vision of a healthy, resilient nation and key principles include: adaptation 
should be integrated into policymaking processes, and the most vulnerable should be 
prioritized. The best available science should be used, adaptation should depend on 
strong partnerships, adaptation planning should apply risk-management techniques, it 
should maximize mutual benefits, and performance should be continuously evaluated 
(ICAAF 2010). In 2010, the Task Force produced a report with key principles and policy 
recommendations (ICAAF 2010). This was followed in 2011 with a publication 
evaluating how these reforms were working in federal government agencies. In this 
report, resilience (ICAAF 2011: 2) is defined as ‘a capacity to anticipate, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from significant multihazard threats with minimum damage to 
social wellbeing, the economy, and the environment.’ Such a definition chimes with 
that in the National Presidential Policy Directive (2011, cited in Heyman and 
Durkovitch 2014), but broadens beyond ‘emergencies’ to the term ‘multihazard 
threats’. Additionally, it notes ‘the environment’ as an important aspect of resilience, 
expanding on ‘natural disasters’ and accommodative of environmental issues such as 
climate change. A significant point in both of these reports is the plurality of possible 
futures, of which one is a shared, unified American future. For example, in the 
conclusion of the 2010 report, the ICAAF (2010: 53) write:  
 
‘Through the actions described in this report and the collective 
actions of stakeholders at all levels, we strive to be a Nation that 
better understands, and is better prepared for, the impacts of a 
changing climate. Adaptation across all scales and sectors will 
enable us to reduce the risks and seize the opportunities 
presented by climate change. These efforts, in tandem with 
advancing efforts to manage greenhouse gas emissions, are initial 
steps in what must be a long-term, iterative, and collaborative 
approach to make our Nation more resilient to a range of possible 
futures.’  
 
 
In this excerpt, the ICAAF (2010) reiterate the impulse to be a unified, shared nation 
through collective pronouns, e.g. ‘we’ and ‘our’. The embodiment of the ‘nation’ as a 
collective subject is reinforced with verbs that personify American nationhood, e.g. a 
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Nation that ‘strives’ and better ‘understands’ climate impacts. However, the authors 
announce this resilient nationhood is compatible across ‘a range of possible futures’. 
This raises a fascinating politics of futurity in the sense that, out of a range of possible 
futures, a resilient American nationhood promotes a shared identity that is prepared 
for and can adapt to these futures. As such, ICAAF acknowledge a multitude of possible 
futures (and do not reduce American nationhood to a single national ‘destiny’) but 
instead argue that a resilient American nationhood is one possibility (a shared, unified 
vision) held in a relation of resilience with other possibilities (including ‘the impacts of 
a changing climate’). In a similar quotation from the 2011 ICAAF report, the authors 
(p.25, original emphasis) note:  
 
‘Partnerships and actions across all scales will be necessary to 
more fully realize the Task Force’s vision of a resilient, healthy, and 
prosperous Nation in a changing climate. Agencies across the 
Federal Government are developing a diversity of non-Federal 
partnerships to maximize opportunities for coordination and 
collaboration, and to exchange information and lessons learned 
with cities, states, tribes, and other nations that are incorporating 
adaptation into their own decision processes. The Task Forces will 
work to align Federal efforts with those of communities, states, 
tribes, and regions to reduce the risks of extreme events and 
climate impacts through adaptation. These collective efforts will 
help advance the Nation toward a more sustainable future.’  
 
 
Here, the notion of climate resilience as a shared, ‘collective effort’ is rearticulated. 
There is also the wide range of actors discussed (‘cities, states, tribes and other 
nations’) and emphasis on descriptors such as ‘coordination’ and ‘collaboration’. 
Additionally, a singular nationhood is reinforced with italicized segments outlining the 
Task Force’s (2011: 25, original emphasis) vision: ‘a resilient, healthy, and prosperous 
Nation.’ The ICAAF also proclaim the desire to ‘advance the Nation toward a more 
sustainable future.’ In this instance, ‘sustainable future’ is highlighted in the singular. 
However, this does not negate multiple futures, but instead posits a collective 
American national future held in relations of resilience with other possible futures, 
those of ‘risks of extreme events and climate impacts’. Thus, although the conclusion 
of this section is singular and not plural (as in the 2010 report), this emphasizes the 
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shared unity of a resilient American nationhood in relation to other futures and does 
not reduce all outcomes to a single narrative.  
 
In 2013, Barack Obama authorized Executive Order 13653 – ‘Preparing the United 
States for the Impacts of Climate Change’ (White House 2013). The federal 
government used this initiative to promote ‘resilience’ and ‘preparedness’ as key 
concepts of climate adaptation. The Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task 
Force was dissolved and an interagency Council on Climate Preparedness and 
Resilience created to integrate climate resilience in all areas of government (White 
House 2013; Hayes 2016). An Executive Order followed in September 2014 to facilitate 
‘climate-resilient international development’: this calls for the integration of climate-
resilience into all of the United States’ international development work, including 
investments, programmes, overseas facilities etc. The Order postulates that 
‘collectively, these efforts will help to better optimize international development work 
and lead to enhanced global preparedness for and resilient to climate change’ (White 
House 2014). All of these political moves speak to a gradual change in climate security 
discourse. Boas and Rothe (2016) trace a discursive shift whereby earlier, conflict-
based narratives transition towards a more nuanced climate security language 
grounded in complexity and resilience. Focusing on UK climate security debates, Boas 
and Rothe (2016) argue it was increasing uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
neoliberal, market-based mechanisms and the failure of international climate politics 
in the late 2000s (e.g. the 2009 Copenhagen COP) that explain the popularity of 
resilience. Its capacity to appeal to a range of policy communities (from international 
development to security and foreign policy) is also an important factor (Boas and 
Rothe 2016). I argue in the US case that the election of Barack Obama in 2009 (with a 
clear climate policy agenda (Hayes 2016)) and the realization that climate change 
impacts directly affect American populations and territories (see section 6.5), are 
important contributory factors to a discourse of climate-resilient American 
nationhood.   
 
However, repeated invocations of a ‘collective approach’, of a ‘shared unity’ in climate-
resilient American nationhoods, raise questions of power-knowledge relations and the 
positioning of different actors within this vision. As Simon Dalby (2002) notes, an 
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effective interrogation of security includes the following questions: who or what is to 
be secured, what is the threat to be secured against, and how will security be 
guaranteed? To mirror this, it is important to ask who is to administer or provide 
‘resilience’, and who or what is to be made resilient or embody this capacity? In this 
manner, although the ICAAF (2010 and 2011) refer to a wide range of actors implicated 
in climate resilience, the Executive Branch still plays a central role in funding allocation, 
agency creation, and the discursive construction of climate-resilient American-ness. 
Furthermore, particular subject positions are constituted in unequal power relations of 
climate security and climate resilience. For example, in the 2014 Center for Naval 
Analyses report, written by the Military Advisory Board, a group of retired three- and 
four-star flag retired personnel from the Navy, Army, Air Force and Marine Corps (CNA 
2016), the authors (p.III) note:  
 
‘Political posturing and budgetary woes cannot be allowed to 
inhibit discussion and debate over what many believe to be a 
salient national security concern for our nation. Each citizen must 
ask what he or she can do individually to mitigate climate change, 
and collectively what his or her local, state, and national leaders 
are doing to ensure that the world is sustained for future 
generations. Are your communities, businesses, and governments 
investing in the necessary resilience measures to lower the risks 
associated with climate change? In a world of high complex 
interdependence, how will climate change in the far corners of the 
world affect your life and those of your children and 
grandchildren? If the answers to any of these questions make you 
worried or uncomfortable, we urge you to become involved. Time 
and tide wait for no one.’  
 
 
In this excerpt, the authors appeal to readers (addressed through the second person 
pronouns ‘you’ and ‘your’) to take action on what they term a ‘salient national security 
concern’. An evocative simple sentence to conclude the excerpt, with the term ‘tide’ 
emphasizing links to climate change, adds to the severity of this message. As with the 
ICAAF strategies, the quote also highlights a broad coalition of actors implicated in 
climate action – including ‘necessary resilience measures’ – such as businesses, 
communities and governments. Based on these quotations and the shift towards a 
climate-resilient nationhood more broadly, I argue that these representations 
contribute to a possible biopolitics of unequally valued lives. Corry (2014: 269) 
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contends that resilience is not necessarily dependent on a ‘friend-enemy’ logic (the 
definition of an external ‘enemy’ against which a protected referent is secured) 
because shocks to the system can come from ‘non-actors’ such as systemic instability, 
e.g. with the financial crisis. Boas and Rothe (2016: 617) agree with Corry (2014) in the 
sense that resilience focuses on a system or community’s inherent vulnerabilities, not 
external ‘threats’. But, they (2016) contend that at a secondary level, where 
communities fail to adapt or become resilient, they could be cast as threatening to 
Western nation-states. I argue that Othering practices operate in climate security in a 
different sense: as a national logic about which (valued) populations are considered 
part of a national, resilient collective, and which are excluded. In discursive 
constructions of a resilient American nationhood in climate-insecure futures, this is 
frequently posed in terms of ‘our’ nation or ‘we’ as a national collective. Whilst this 
linguistic choice does draw upon a wide range of actors in the constitution of a 
‘resilient America’, this is still within an umbrella of ‘our Nation’. For instance, in the 
2014 CNA report excerpt (p.III in the report, see previous page), the MAB introduce a 
wide range of actors implicated in resilient nationhood, e.g. ‘communities’ and 
‘governments’, but this is still contextualized as the national security context of ‘our 
nation’. The construction of a climate-resilient and climate-secure nationhood as ‘we’ 
or ‘our’ demarcates an imaginative geography around those included within this 
national collective – those to be made ‘resilient’ – and those excluded from this 
nationhood.  
 
Whether national logics of climate-resilient American nationhood are constructed via 
historic and current significations oriented towards climate-insecure futures, or 
representations of a climate-resilient nationhood to be worked towards, they assume 
a collective subjectivity that incorporates particular populations (‘our’ nation) and not 
others. National logics thus construct a context-specific biopolitics of valued subjects – 
‘governments’, ‘communities’, etc. – through the prism of resilience. This affirms 
Foucault’s (2009 (1977): 42) claim that populations can be subjects of government: 
‘The population is also a political subject, as a new collective subject … a subject since 
it is called upon to conduct itself in such and such a fashion.’ In this case, a discursively 
rendered American nationhood constructs a collective national subject in which 
particular populations (American citizens, governments, communities and so forth) are 
 
 
 
220 
220 
oriented towards climate-insecure futures. Because American populations are 
constructed with a capacity to obtain resilience (or reconstruct it based on historic 
significations) in these documents, this produces a particular, context-specific set of 
‘bio-inequalities’ in which lives within a resilient American ‘nation’ are valued 
differently to those outside it.  
 
To conclude, this chapter has explored how national logics filter multiple 
representations of American nationhood in particular, context-specific moments of US 
climate security discourse. Through an examination of defensive American 
exceptionalisms, universalized American nationhood and human security dynamics, 
the cases of Hurricane Katrina and Sandy, and a climate-resilient American 
nationhood, I have argued that each relates to different, yet interconnected, 
biopolitics of unequally valued lives. The first is constructed around a politics of 
exclusion built on egocentrism, relative adaptive capacity, and ‘fortressed’ 
populations. The second functions through a ‘bio-normative geopolitics’ (Gerhardt 
2009) that states the universal value of human lives, but prioritizes national securi ty 
referents over human securities. Finally, climate-resilient nationhood is discursively 
represented as two temporalities: one which draws upon historic significations of 
national resilience to articulate resilient futures, and one which postulates climate-
resilience is yet to be achieved and represents it as an objective of climate adaptation 
and security. In both, a collective imaginary of the ‘resilient’ American nation is 
constructed that demarcates imaginative geographies about whose resilience is 
facilitated, and whose is not. To question the essentializing tendency towards which 
these representations are directed – of a collective American national subject, or of a 
racial Other in CIM and terrorism discourses – the thesis concludes by exploring the 
possibilities that an environmental justice perspective (grounded in the conception of 
‘abundant futures’ from Collard et al (2015) and Koopman’s (2011) account of ‘alter-
geopolitics’) can offer for US climate security discourses. 
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Chapter 7: 
Conclusion: Towards possibilities for just 
environmental securities 
 
7.1 Introduction and research questions  
 
1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security 
discourse? 
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed 
in and through US and EU climate security discourse? 
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security 
discourse? 
 
This chapter reflects on the project’s research objectives  and questions. For the first 
objective – to explore intersections of racial and national identities in US and EU 
climate security discourse – I return to each of the research questions to examine 
project findings and their situation in current contexts of climate security politics 
(section 7.2). The chapter subsequently turns to the thesis’ second objective: to 
explore possibilities for multiple, situated and environmentally just securities (section 
7.3). This section builds upon the brief discussion of environmental justice in chapter 3 
(section 3.7) and examines the second research objective in connection to Koopman’s 
(2011) ‘alter-geopolitics’ and a manifesto for ‘abundant futures’ (Collard et al 2015). 
Finally, to conclude the thesis (section 7.4), the chapter reflects on the project’s 
contribution to critical climate change (and security) literatures and outlines avenues 
for future research.  
 
7.2 Research findings and current contexts  
 
The project’s first objective was to explore intersections of racial and national 
identities in US and EU climate security discourse. To tackle this objective, I formulated 
three research questions. The first is concerned with constructions racialized ‘Muslim’ 
 
 
 
222 
222 
and ‘African’ populations in climate security; the second about discursive renderings of 
interconnections between climate change and terrorism; and the third about 
representations of American nationhood in US climate security discourse. This section 
reviews findings for these research questions and situates these in current contexts of 
US and EU climate security politics.  
 
1. How is a racial Other constructed in and through US and EU climate security 
discourses? 
 
Elaborated in chapter 4, the thesis has argued that a racialized ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ 
Other is constructed in particular, context-specific moments of US and EU climate 
security discourse. This trend is particularly the case for representations of climate-
induced migration from the MENA region to the EU in earlier climate security 
documents (from 2007-10). I have argued racial logics function through three tropes. 
First is naturalization: the role of essentializing logics in constructing a racial ‘Muslim’ 
and ‘African’ Other based on naturalized assumptions about a latent capacity towards 
radicalization or terrorism, and as inherently culturally incompatible with European 
societies. These representations raise possibilities for policies of containment against 
possible climate-induced migrants in climate-insecure futures. The second trope is 
dehumanization, the use of geopolitical narratives that negate possible climate-
induced migrants’ agency and carry assumptions about what populations lack or do 
not have (for example naming of their cultural identities or capacities for rational 
thought). Finally, I argue a trope of compulsive determinism is constructed in which 
‘African’ populations are highly likely or certain to partake in acts of violence or 
disruptive migrations in climate-insecure futures. Throughout, I have argued that racial 
logics (a type of essentializing logic oriented towards racialized identities) are only a 
feature of particular, partial and context-specific interpretations of moments of US and 
EU climate security discourses. To situate these findings in the current context of 
migration from the MENA region to the EU, I discuss the ‘refugee crisis’ and 
imbrications of climate-induced migration in these issues.  
 
What is referred to as the ‘refugee crisis’ is linked to the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings from 
2011 onwards. By December 21st, 2015, 1 million refugees had arrived in the EU, with 
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942,000 claiming asylum in different EU countries (BBC 2015). The UNHCR (2015) 
estimated that 1 in 2 of 2015 refugee arrivals in Europe were Syrians, with a further 
21% from Afghanistan and 9% from Iraq. In September 2015, the European 
Commission formulated a plan to relocate refugees among Member States, but this 
was rejected by several nation-states, including the UK and Hungary. A deal reached 
between the EU and Turkey came into effect in March 2016. The EU provides funds for 
refugee camps in Turkey (and Turkish security officials crack down on people 
smugglers) and a ‘one in-one out’ policy came into force whereby for every irregular 
migrant returned from Greece to Turkey, a refugee from Turkey is granted admittance 
to the EU (Cohen 2016). Rejection of refugees included Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán’s (September 4th, 2015) claim that Syrian Muslim refugees represent a 
threat to European Christianity (Traynor 2015). President-elect Donald Trump 
announced a complete ban on all Muslims entering the US (December 7th, 2015), later 
modifying this to strict vetting procedures for all migrants from countries with a 
‘proven history of terrorism’ (June 13th, 2016) (Park 2016). However, there is sparse 
evidence that racial logics of CIM discourse are linked directly to the ‘refugee crisis’.  
It could be that climate change is considered an important contextual factor, a ‘threat 
multiplier’ for European geopolitics. O’Hagan (18th August, 2015) argues in The 
Guardian that mass migration is not a temporary ‘crisis’: ‘Thanks to global climate 
change, mass migration could be the new normal’. Solh (21st September, 2015, The 
Guardian) supports this, noting that ‘we need to recognize this migration crisis as the 
canary in the mine on climate change’. Although space is devoted to a discussion of 
the Syrian Civil War in Chapter 5 – on terrorism-climate interconnections in US and EU 
climate security discourse (section 5.4) – Wendle (2015) writes in Scientific American 
that, following the drought preceding the war, a number of Syrian refugees to the EU 
are ‘climate refugees’. Notwithstanding that such contemporary contexts suggest 
disconnects between refugee policy, racialized CIM debates, and ‘climate refugees’ 
from the Syrian Civil War (Wendle 2015), this project’s findings do indicate racialized 
narratives of CIM figure in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security 
discourse. These conclusions are especially important for issues of care, justice, and 
protection in climate change politics. Bettini et al (2016: 8) caution that ‘the large 
numbers of deaths in the Mediterranean and the push to securitize borders within and 
around Europe are a warning against the conservative responses that could emerge 
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against those ‘disenfranchised’ by the impacts of environmental and climate change.’ 
Thus, even if CIM (and its racialized connotations) and the ‘refugee crisis’ are not 
linked discursively in a sustained manner at present, the possibilities of linkages (and 
the inequalities they suggest) render studies of this context important. 
 
2. How are interconnections between climate change and terrorism constructed 
in and through US and EU climate security discourses?  
 
Exploring discursive constructions of interconnections between climate change and 
terrorism, the thesis has elaborated on a range of ways through which such 
connections are represented. They include narratives of climate change and complex 
causality (with the Syrian Civil War as a case study) and the difficulties of attributing 
culpability this raises. I have argued that representations of terrorism in climate 
security discourses represent important points of intersection of racial and national 
identities. This is partially through dehumanizing biological metaphors, but also 
intersectional racialized and gendered identities (especially the figure of a young, 
African, Muslim male) in limited, context-specific moments of climate security 
discourse. Finally, exemplified by the example of US intervention in the aftermath of 
the 2004 Indonesian Ocean tsunami, chapter 5 explored intersections of anti-
Americanism with racial logics in US climate security discourse (section 5.7). Although 
there are very few academic accounts of climate change and terrorism 
interconnections (for exceptions, see Siddiqi (2014) and Renard (2008)), several 
important political figures linked these issues at the time of the 2015 Paris COP. 
Interviewed in September 2015, Connie Hedegaard, former European Commissioner 
for Climate Action, posits that if the conference doesn’t succeed she fears  ‘there will 
be radicalization’ (Rowley 2015). Mary Robinson, former Irish President and climate 
justice campaigner, argued (December 6th, 2015) that ‘in a world where climate change 
exacerbates the stresses of daily life on people already disenfranchised by poverty or 
social standing, radicalization is very likely.’ Robinson and Hedegaard’s testimonies 
suggest that, particularly in relation to important political events (as Schäfer et al 
(2015) note, climate security discourses peak at significant political  moments, e.g. 
annual COP meetings), terrorism, radicalization and climate change are framed as 
causally linked security issues. Given that an important finding of this thesis is that 
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these interconnections can be a partial, context-specific site of intersections of racial 
and national identities, I argue it is fundamentally important to study these 
interconnections in depth.  
 
3. How is American nationhood constructed in and through US climate security 
discourses? 
 
I have argued that American nationhood is constructed as multiple different 
representations in US climate security discourse. In earlier publications (predominantly 
from 2003-10, but also in more recent public interviews (e.g. with Barack Obama)), 
defensive, fortressed American exceptionalisms are situated in neo-Malthusian futures 
of resource scarcities, competition and conflict. Second, universalized conceptions of 
American nationhood are constructed based on ideas of American leadership, values, 
and an uptake of human security in US climate security politics. Chapter 6 (section 6.5) 
also reflects on Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy and their links to American 
national identity. Finally, the project has traced the emergence of representations of 
climate-resilient American nationhood in which a collective national subject is 
produced in relation to a condition of or aspiration towards resilience. For all of these 
representations (intersectional national and racial identities), I have argued 
throughout the thesis that they are grounded in multiple, unequal biopolitics of valued 
lives and populations. These include a biopolitics of containment to restrict possible 
CIM, an unequal biopolitics of American humanitarian intervention following the 2004 
Indonesian Ocean tsunami, and a bio-normative geopolitics (Gerhardt 2009) in 
association with human security in US climate security politics. Unequal biopolitics are 
also conferred by imaginative geographies in discursive representations of American 
exceptionalism and climate-resilient US nationhood.  
 
7.2.1 Donald Trump and US climate security 
 
On 14th September (2016), the Climate and Security Advisory Group (CASG) released a 
briefing book with recommended policies (for the then unknown new administration) 
to address the security risks of climate change (CASG 2016). The CASG is a group of 
military, national security, foreign policy and homeland security professionals – chaired 
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by the Center for Climate and Security in engagement with George Washington 
University’s Elliot School of International Affairs – that provide evidence and insights 
on climate security risks (CASG 2016). In the briefing book, they recommend that the 
President create a cabinet-level position for climate and security issues, that the 
Department of State create a Climate and Security Office (led by a Climate and Security 
Envoy), and that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with other agencies to 
develop a National Adaptation and Resilience Strategy to improve US resiliency and 
preparedness for climate extremes (CASG 2016). On 21st September (2016), Barack 
Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum requiring Federal departments and 
agencies to incorporate national security implications of climate change into their 
strategies (White House 2016). This includes the establishment of a Climate Change 
and National Security interagency working group, involving organizations such as the 
Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of 
Defense and Department of State (White House 2016). The Group is mandated to 
produce an Action Plan and Federal Agency Implementation Plan to ensure relevant 
bodies take actions such as identifying climate-related national security risks to assets 
and programs and pursuing adaptation plans incorporative of national security 
dimensions (White House 2016). However, Donald Trump’s election (Nov 8th, 2016) 
has left American climate security politics in flux. Previously sceptical about 
anthropogenic climate change (including a 2012 Tweet that climate change was 
invented by the Chinese government (Wong 2016)), Trump later announced 
(November 22nd, 2016) an ‘open mind’ about whether the US would withdraw from 
the Paris Agreement (Milman 2016). However, his early appointments suggest a 
harmful scepticism towards environmental policy. Scott Pruitt, Trump’s EPA 
administrator, is sceptical about climate science (Revesz 2016). Trump’s selection of 
climate change sceptics for national security positions – for example Republican 
Congressman Mike Pompeo to head the CIA – also suggests that ‘the military and 
intelligence communities may soon turn a blinder eye towards some climate change-
related threats’ (Levitan 2016).  
 
In a blog entry on November 28th, 2016, co-founders and Presidents of the Center for 
Climate and Security Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell note that despite near-term 
uncertainties, e.g. the growth in nationalist movements and cyber-security threats to 
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democratic elections, longer-term risks remain prevalent, e.g. climate change (Werrell 
and Femia 2016). Similarly, in unpublished exchanges following his confirmation 
hearing (12th January, 2017) to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis affirms that climate change poses risks to US national security. 
He states that ‘climate change can be a driver of instability and the Department of 
Defense must pay attention to potential adverse impacts generated by this 
phenomenon’ (Mattis 2017, cited in Revkin 2017). However, in an Executive Order 
issued on 28th March (2017), President Trump rescinded Barack Obama’s Presidential 
Memorandum (21st September, 2016) on climate change and security, and Executive 
Order 13653 (1st November, 2013) on ‘Preparing the United States for the Impacts of 
Climate Change’ (White House 2017). This Executive Order rescinds several of Barack 
Obama’s signature strategies to mitigate and adapt to climate change, including his 
2013 Climate Action Plan (White House 2017). At the time of writing, there is 
uncertainty as to whether the Trump administration will withdraw the US from the 
2015 Paris Agreement. Milman (9th May, 2017) reports disagreement within the 
administration between Steve Bannon (Trump’s Chief Strategist) and Scott Pruitt (the 
EPA Administrator), who favour withdrawal, and Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner 
(Trump’s daughter and son-in-law) and Rex Tillerson (the Secretary of State), who 
favour remaining in the accord. Milman (2017) reports that a final decision will not be 
made until after the G7 summit in Sicily (26-27th May). On May 8th, 2017, the Center 
for Climate and Security’s Advisory Board – comprised of professionals (e.g. military 
officials and academics) with climate security expertise – published two letters, one to 
Rex Tillerson and the other to James Mattis, recommending that they take the lead in 
addressing the security implications of climate change (Werrell and Femia 2017). 
However, given the Trump administration’s scepticism and actions to constrain climate 
policies thus far, and his Executive Order (28th March) rescinding Barack Obama’s 
Presidential Memorandum, it could that these developments suggest a negative 
approach to US climate security more specifically. 
 
In the broader context of Trump’s politics , Page and Dittmer (2016: 77) note a Trump 
‘dissonance machine’ in which dimensions to his character that appeal to some 
supporters (White authoritarianism, apparent financial success, aggressive 
masculinity), simultaneously repel others (including other Republicans). Trump’s 
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embodied, affective performances of White, racist, sexist and capitalist masculinity are 
representative of his enactments of American populism (Page and Dittmer 2016). 
Simultaneously, Bernard (2015, cited in Derickson 2016: 2) has characterized 
contemporary racial politics in the US as ‘the Age of Ferguson’: a politics in which 
police brutality and technology (cell phone footage, social media and so forth) are 
connected to deeper structural inequalities of racism and a security state. ‘The Age of 
Ferguson’ is linked specifically to the shooting of unarmed black teenager Michael 
Brown by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri (9th August, 2014), and the 
subsequent development of the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement (Derickson 2016). The 
current context of American politics – Trump’s climate (and climate security) 
scepticism, authoritarian nationalism, and racist inequalities suggested by Trump’s 
politics and ‘the Age of Ferguson’ – suggest this project’s findings (on intersections of 
racial and national identities) are a relevant if limited addition to these debates. The 
chapter proceeds to discuss the project’s second objective: to explore possibilities for 
just, situated environmental securities.  
 
7.3 Just, situated environmental securities  
 
The thesis has argued that essentializing logics, directing racial and national identities 
towards climate-insecure futures, work to delimit future possibilities in US and EU 
climate security discourse. Racial and national logics foster biopolitical exclusions 
(which populations are valued or devalued, and which political interventions are 
attached to these exclusions). Chapter 3 (section 3.9) outlines a case for bringing 
environmental justice and critical environmental security into conversation. This is not 
the first account of environmental justice, climate security and climate-induced 
migration. Bettini et al (2016) explore different framings of CIM in the context of 
(in)justice, inequality and responsibility. Questions of climate justice rest on a logic that 
the harms of climate change are unjust because not everybody contributes to the 
problem of GHG emissions (Bond 2014). The effects (benefits and harms) of this are 
not equally distributed, not everybody has the adaptive means to cope with climate 
change impacts, and action should be taken to repair these wrongs (Bettini et al 2016).  
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Bettini et al (2016) note that a shift from a ‘climate refugees’ to ‘migration-as-
adaptation’ narrative (after the 2011 Foresight Report (UK Government Office for 
Science 2011)) risks diminishing concerns about inequality, care, (re)distribution and 
injustice. ‘Climate refugee’ narratives infer the inherent rights of vulnerable persons 
and obligation of states to provide protections for environmentally displaced persons 
(for example through a legal extension of the Geneva Refugee Convention (1951)). A 
‘migration-as-adaptation’ narrative displaces responsibility onto individuals; rather 
than the inherent rights of migrants, climate change provides ‘opportunities’ to move, 
find work, and build resilience (Bettini et al 2016). The authors (2016) do not advocate 
a ‘climate refugees’ concept as a solution, however. And whilst a ‘migration-as-
adaptation’ narrative acknowledges the agency of migrants, ‘one step forward’, Bettini 
et al (2016: 7) are concerned that this approach doesn’t account for fundamental 
injustices and political questions of (re)distribution and inequality (‘two steps back’). 
Baldwin (2016: 11) writes (in the context of a CIM debate with racial connotations): 
‘the politics of climate justice really must come to terms with race and racism beyond 
simply recognizing that climate change will be disproportionately experienced by 
people of color, the majority world.’ This fundamental injustice – that those least 
responsible for climate change could be the most affected – is crucially important. 
Baldwin (2016) draws upon Claire Colebrook’s  (2014, cited in Baldwin 2016) injunction 
to think of mobility as a normal condition of human life, rendering a sedentarist, 
containment-oriented state the exception to the norm. However, whilst Bettini et al 
(2016) and Baldwin (2016) provide important analyses of the (racialized) injustices of 
CIM, they do not explicate in detail what an alternative politics of climate justice (other 
than Baldwin’s (2016) reflections on Colebrook) would look like. Nor, and 
understandably given the particular focus on CIM, do they consider interactions 
between (in)justice and (in)security. This account does not provide rejoinders to these 
limitations by any means. It attempts to locate tentative, initial possibilities through 
which environmental justice and security debates can be brought into meaningful 
conversation. 
 
O’Brien and Leichenko (2010: 158), writing about global environmental change, argue 
that ‘equity-based approaches must first and foremost address human security, and in 
particular the underlying social, economic, political, and cultural issues that contribute 
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to inequities and insecurities’. O’Brien and Leichenko (2010) contend there is a need to 
resist ‘global’, universalized, or undifferentiated solutions to climate change and focus 
on differential vulnerabilities: whose security is at stake, and what are the 
underpinning factors that make some communities more vulnerable than others? 
Without restricting her account to a particular concept of security, Floyd (2011) 
proposes a normative framework to analyse ‘just’ securitizations. She (2011: 428) 
establishes three criteria to assess the ‘moral rightness’ of a securitization. First is that 
there is an objective existential threat (regardless of whether this has been perceived 
by any individual or institution) to an actor’s survival. Second is that the security 
referent is morally legitimate (it threatens human wellbeing and basic human needs). 
And third is that the security response is appropriate to the threat (the securitizer must 
be sincere in her/his intentions, and the response must be appropriate to the scale of 
the threat) (Floyd 2011). In line with O’Brien and Leichenko’s (2010) example, this 
section outlines an understanding of the multiple, situated and multi-scalar 
interrelations of environmental justices and securities.  
 
The thesis has sought to critique centralizing, essentializing identities that engulf 
cultural differences and inequalities (‘the Other’). Chaturvedi and Doyle (2015: 61) 
argue that neoliberal climate solutions (e.g. carbon trading) risk creating a global 
‘citizen-consumer’. This fosters an essentializing ‘global soul’ that elides differences of 
power, wealth, gender, race and class: material, intra-generational inequalities 
(Chatuverdi and Doyle 2015). Although in a different context, Hannah’s (2011) account 
of universal biopolitical solidarity is critiqued in chapter 3 (section 3.9) for inscribing a 
universalized humanity that negates differences within this category. I argue this 
critique also applies to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s analyses of climate change and ‘the 
Anthropocene’. Chakrabarty (2012: 9) writes: ‘Humans, collectively, now have an 
agency in determining the climate of the planet as a whole, a privilege reserved in the 
past only for very large-scale geophysical forces.’ Human beings constitute geophysical 
agents with a capacity to alter Earth systems (driven by fossil fuel extraction, 
consumption, and population growth) (Chakrabarty 2009; 2012). Chakrabarty (2009) 
proposes several theses to describe this condition. One is that distinctions between 
natural and social history dissolve with the emergence of humanity’s geophysical 
agency. Another is that this juncture requires a critical conversation between histories 
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of capital and the Anthropocene; critiques of capitalist globalization should be 
contextualized against human beings’ geophysical agency and deep geological time 
(Chakrabarty 2009). However, I argue that Chakrabarty’s (2009; 2012) figuration of 
‘human beings’ as a collective geophysical force negates the injustices of climate 
change. Chakrabarty (2009) acknowledges that unequal impacts of climate change are 
undoubtedly linked to industrial development. He (2009: 219) points to climate change 
and humanity’s geophysical agency as ‘a shared catastrophe that we have all fallen 
into’. Whilst it is feasible that climate change is a ‘shared catastrophe’ for all human 
beings (albeit to differing extents), the collective term ‘human beings’ cannot 
encompass responsibility for the causes of climate change (specific histories  and 
geographies of industrialization, fossil fuel extraction etc.). As Tolia-Kelly (2016) notes, 
the Anthropocene implicates erasures and destructions of histories and cultures (all 
interconnected) of both biological and human lives. Thus, by referring to ‘human 
beings’ as a ‘geophysical agent’ in the Anthropocene, Chakrabarty (2009; 2012) could 
be constructing an essentializing account that does not account for the inequalities 
within this classification. Drawing on alternative interpretations (Gibson-Graham 2011 
and Collard et al 2015), I argue that environmental justice and climate change could 
draw upon multiple, situated and multi-scalar conceptions of environmental securities.  
 
Asking what a feminist project of ‘belonging’ in the Anthropocene would involve, 
Gibson-Graham (2011) notes that deconstruction – a questioning of binaries and 
openness to radical heterogeneity – does not encompass what is needed for this task. 
Instead, Gibson-Graham (2011) emphasizes materialist concepts of ‘connection’ and 
‘interdependence’ as alternatives and critiques anthropocentric understandings of 
‘subjects’, ‘places’, ‘regions’ and ‘communities’. Similarly, Collard et al (2015: 322) 
argue that the Anthropocene ‘prompts the question of how humans intervene in the 
environment: how to live in a multi-species world.’ From this starting point, Collard et 
al (2015: 323) issue a manifesto for ‘abundant futures’: ‘futures with more diverse and 
autonomous forms of life and ways of living together.’ The authors (2015) take 
inspiration from decolonizing frameworks sensitive to the violences engendered by 
Eurocentric colonialisms and imperial modes of power. Crucially, Collard et al (2015) 
argue their manifesto is not exclusively focused on the future, but is grounded in 
historical structural inequities through which contemporary socio-ecological 
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inequalities arise (including eradications of nonhuman, animal abundance). Abundant 
futures underline pluriversal, heterogeneous ways of living. They are made possible 
through multispecies entanglements, worlds of nonhuman animal abundance and 
autonomy, defined as ‘the fullest expression of animal life, including capacity for 
movement, for social and familial association, and for work and play’ (Collard et al 
2015: 328). Throughout this thesis, I have argued that essentializing logics (based on 
historic and current significations of a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other) contribute to 
a delimitation of possible futures, for example containment of climate-induced 
migrants’ mobility.  
 
A manifesto commitment to ‘abundant futures’, of pluriversal, diverse ways of being 
(human and nonhuman entanglements) that are cognisant of historical injustices, 
could provide an informative analytic lens to challenge essentializing logics’ biopolitical 
inequalities. However, my arguments fall far short of the specifications outlined by 
Collard et al (2015) and Gibson-Graham (2011). The thesis does not rely upon 
decolonizing or Indigenous scholarship and ethics. Through its focus on elite texts, the 
thesis also reproduces and re-essentializes the discourses it seeks to critique. The 
terms ‘subject’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘biopolitics’, ‘populations’ and ‘lives’ are also restricted 
to ‘human’ subjects, lives or populations. Whilst I argue that human (racial and 
national) inequalities are critical constituents of environmental injustices, the project 
negates entanglements of human and nonhuman lives that a manifesto for ‘abundant 
futures’ necessitates. As such, any resonances between an ‘abundant futures’ 
manifesto and situated, environmentally just securities must be qualified by the thesis’ 
limitations. 
 
Nevertheless, I contend that a specific, qualified interpretation of ‘abundant futures’ 
could be applied productively to think about multiple, situated and just environmental 
‘securities’. At this point, I return to Koopman’s (2011: 281) ‘alter-geopolitics’: a 
feminist geopolitics that acts to build shared, nonviolent securities founded on ‘dignity’ 
and ‘justice’. Alter-geopolitics is about geopolitics as it is being ‘done’: about bodies 
moving together in action to create safety and security (in a multiple sense) (Koopman 
2011). Groups doing alter-geopolitics weave together multi-scalar securities and do 
not try to protect ‘Us’ from ‘Them’; they build connections  across ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, 
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groups from past and present (Koopman 2011). Using the analogy of a chess game, 
Koopman (2011: 282) argues hegemonic geopolitics is about ‘Big Men’ moving pieces 
on the board. Alter-geopolitics, on the other hand, ‘is not only pawns but all sorts of 
pieces, from both sides, working together to move themselves into shapes that make 
them all safer’ (Koopman 2011: 282). A possible limitation to Koopman’s (2011) 
account is that it focuses exclusively on human actors, human communities and 
human-centred securities. This constrains the extent to which alter-geopolitics can be 
conceptualized alongside ‘abundant futures’ (Collard et al 2015). However, I argue that 
if (a qualified interpretation of) alter-geopolitics is considered with an ‘abundant 
futures’ manifesto (Collard et al 2015), this provides an opportunity to conceive of 
multiple, shared securities grounded in entanglements of human and nonhuman lives 
and oriented towards diverse, plural futures. As such, alter-geopolitical environmental 
securities could be abundant, open to multiple possible futures (and yet 
interconnected to and cognisant of unequal, imperial histories of exclusion), whilst 
situated, multi-scalar and grounded in shared calls for justice(s). This conceptual 
entanglement could therefore provide an appropriate means through which multiple, 
situated environmental justice(s) could be brought into conversation with multiple, 
shared environmental (alter-geopolitical) securities.  
 
These possibilities must be situated in the context of this thesis. Koopman’s (2011) 
alter-geopolitics is an explicit critique and move away from elite texts and discursive 
representation, the cornerstone of this project’s analysis. However, despite the 
project’s specific focus, I do not argue climate and environmental securities are  
restricted to textual materialities; they are embodied, existential phenomena. 
Koopman (2011: 280) uses the example of ‘protective accompaniment’ in Colombia 
(individuals who are less at risk, for example international volunteers, accompanying 
people more at risk of attack whilst moving between places) to explore how these 
actions are involved in the ‘daily making of spaces of peace and alternative securities’. 
In the limited space of this thesis, it is difficult to conceive of what alternative, just, 
environmental securities would look like. As a challenge to essentializing logics, they 
could include the NAACP’s work on exposing environmental and climate injustices 
(elaborated in chapter 6, section 6.5). Or, they could involve faith and interfaith groups 
and initiatives providing alternative perspectives on environmental action and human 
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beings’ multi-scalar relationships with wider ecosystems (for example Green Muslims, 
see chapter 4, section 4.5). These examples are grounded in their own unequal power 
relations and represent only fleeting, partial moments in the thesis (a limitation of 
which is its central focus on essentializing identities in elite discourses). But, they do 
provide tentative scope for thinking through what the possibilities and politics for just, 
situated and multi-scalar environmental securities could be.  
 
7.4 Contribution and future research directions  
 
To conclude the thesis, this final section summarizes the project’s contributions to 
critical climate security debates and avenues for future research. First, I reflect on the 
theoretical framework underpinning the thesis.  
 
Theoretical directions: essentializing logics and biopolitics of climate security  
 
The thesis makes two theoretical contributions to debates in critical race studies , 
critical security studies, and critical climate security scholarship. First is the concept of 
‘essentializing logics’, a specific formulation (bringing together Stuart Hall’s (1996) and 
Ben Anderson’s (2010a) theoretically different accounts) of how racial and national 
identities are configured in climate security. In particular, ‘essentializing logics’ 
demonstrate how essentializations (racial and national) can work at the level of 
underlying, coded assumptions and associations. Moreover, they provide an analytic to 
explore essentialization in relation to future possibilities: to suggest how 
essentializations of populations (‘Muslim’, ‘African’ and ‘American’) could configure 
outcomes or legitimize interventions in climate-insecure futures. In short, 
essentializing logics provide a means to investigate how identity constructions 
configure future possibilities. For future research, I hope this concept may contribute 
to understandings of other forms of essentialized identities (for example sexualized or 
gendered identity constructions) and their discursive configurations in possible 
futures.  
 
Second, the project has offered a specific conceptualization of biopol itics as multiple 
and based upon discursive appropriations of unequally valued lives and populations. 
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This approach is inspired by Didier Fassin’s (2009) concepts of ‘bio-legitimacy’ and ‘bio-
inequalities’. This conceptualization of biopolitics draws more specific attention to the 
roles of subjectification and Othering practices in configuring biopolitical inequalities. 
A significant limitation of the thesis is the under-theorization of processes of 
‘valuation’ throughout. While ‘valued’ and ‘devalued’ lives and populations are 
articulated in terms of racial and national identity constructions, the specific 
conceptualization of ‘valuation’ is underdeveloped in the thesis. As such, an interesting 
avenue for future research could be to think through what ‘valuation’ means in these 
contexts and its conceptual interrelations with subjectification, biopolitics and 
discourse.  
 
Racial and national identities in climate security  
 
Finally, there is a need for more work on racialized and national identities in climate 
security politics. The most important contributions of this thesis are context-specific 
interpretations of racialized identities and representations of American nationhood in 
US and EU climate security discourse. Specifically, this includes naturalized 
assumptions about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations (predominantly in 
representations of possible climate-induced migration from the MENA region to the 
EU) and their construction as a racial Other. Furthermore, the thesis has examined 
different ways in which American nationhood is configured in climate security 
discourse. These include ideas of American exceptionalism, universalized American 
nationhood and human security, climate-resilient nationhood, and anti-Americanism in 
relation to humanitarian interventions. However, as areas for future research, a more 
explicit focus on intersectionality is needed. A key limitation of the project is a lack of 
clear, thematic analysis of intersectional identities. Future research could explore 
specific points at which racial and national identities (or gendered, sexualized and aged 
identity configurations, for instance) intersect and the political implications of such 
intersections. Interconnections between terrorism and climate change could provide a 
productive line of enquiry for this objective. Another limitation of the project is its lack 
of historical contextualization of racial and national logics in climate security. 
Alternative research could situate racial and national logics of climate security in 
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longer histories of race-nation intersections with climate change (for example 
environmental determinist tropes in the late 19th/early 20th centuries (Piguet 2013)). 
 
Beyond this, future avenues for research could include specific subjectivities through 
which American nationhood and climate security are constructed. These include, for 
example, the figure of the ‘retired general or admiral’ (CNA 2007), or of the ‘veteran 
activist’ (see, for example, Operation Free (2016)). It is also important to research the 
potential for racist or xenophobic reactions against those who could be classified as 
‘climate-induced migrants’, even if ‘climate-induced migrants’ are a difficult category 
to identify (Baldwin 2013b). All of these possibilities suggest this thesis, like any 
research project, can generate more questions than it answers. Throughout, the thesis 
has tried to examine and interpret inequalities and injustices in context-specific 
moments of EU and US climate security discourse. It is this ethos, one that is critical 
from start to finish (and beyond), that I hope is the lasting impact of this dissertation 
and its contribution to climate change scholarship.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Total CDA sample 
 
Name of organization 
Number of documents from this 
organization 
US government institutions 
Department of Homeland Security 4 
Department of Defense 10 
National Intelligence Council 7 
USAID 4 
The White House 7 
ICAAF 2 
Department of State 2 
US Global Change Research Program 1 
Director of National Intelligence 1 
Congressional testimonies 10 
Think tanks 
Center for Naval Analyses 3 
Center for a New American Security 5 
Council for Foreign Relations 1 
International Institute for 
Sustainable Development 
6 
Brookings Institution 1 
German Marshall Fund 4 
Center for Climate and Security 8 
Center for American Progress 3 
Woodrow Wilson Center 1 
Other US sources: 
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Academic 10 
Other online sources (e.g. blogs, 
information websites) 
1 
EU sources: 
European External Action Service 1 
European Commission/High 
Representative 
3 
European Commission 20 
Council of the European Union 10 
European Parliament 5 
Frontex 1 
Academic 1 
Online sources/blogs 1 
German Advisory Council on Global 
Change 
1 
Adelphi and the German Foreign 
Federal Office 
2 
UK Government Cabinet Office 1 
UK Government Office for Science 
(Foresight) 
2 
G7-commissioned report (developed 
by Adelphi, International Alert, 
Woodrow Wilson Center, EU 
Institute for Security Studies) 
1 
G7 Foreign Ministers 1 
UK Foreign Office 
2 
 
E3G 1 
Environmental Justice Foundation 1 
UK Military of Defense 4 
Clingendaal 1 
Other sources 
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United Nations Security Council 2 
UNEP 1 
IPCC 1 
United Nations General Assembly 1 
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Appendix B: Full list of interviewees 
 
Note: As this is a full list of interviewees, the number of individual interviewees listed 
is larger than the total number of interviews (to reflect the two group interviews). As 
such, there are 24 interviewees listed for the US based interviews, despite only 21 
discussions taking place.  
 
Interviewee status Cited in the thesis Pseudonym 
US based interviewees 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
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Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Environmental advocacy 
professional 
No N/A 
Environmental advocacy 
professional 
No N/A 
Environmental advocacy 
professional 
No N/A 
Environmental justice 
professional 
No N/A 
Environmental justice 
professional 
Yes Naomi 
Environmental justice 
professional 
No N/A 
Environmental justice 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
EU based interviewees 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
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Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate security 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
Climate change 
professional 
No N/A 
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Appendix C:  General interview themes 
 
Interview theme Description 
 
US interviews 
Concept of ‘climate 
security’ 
This theme involved asking participants if they 
have come across the concept of ‘climate 
security’ and, if so, what it means to them. In 
some interviews, we also discussed different 
concepts of security in relation to climate change, 
e.g. ‘human security’, ‘national security’, and so 
forth. 
Climate-induced 
migration 
This involved asking interviewees for their general 
thoughts on the topic of climate-induced 
migration. This included asking for their views on 
the concept, evidence of climate-induced 
migration, responses to climate-induced 
migration (e.g. prejudice or racism against 
possible climate induced-migrants), how the issue 
is discussed by politicians, in the media, and so 
forth.  
Climate change and 
conflict 
This theme included asking interviewees about 
the possible linkages between climate change and 
conflict, the academic and policy debates on this 
issue, possible examples (for instance the Syrian 
Civil War or the Darfur Conflict), and what 
government responses to conflicts linked to 
climate change could be. 
Terrorism/radicalization This theme involved asking respondents if they 
thought terrorism/radicalization and climate 
change were connected and the various types of 
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discursive and causal linkages drawn (by 
academics, the media, policymakers, etc.) 
between these issues. Discussions also touched 
on the ideological underpinnings to terrorism and 
radicalization connected to climate change, for 
example ideas of anti-Americanism. Finally, I 
would ask about the broader geopolitical context 
of the ‘War on Terror’ and if climate security is 
related to these debates in any way. 
US climate change 
politics 
Usually at the beginning of interviews, I would ask 
interviewees to describe the general landscape of 
American climate change politics as they see it. I 
would also ask interviewees for their views on 
Barack Obama’s climate change (and climate 
security) policies and initiatives. 
Climate change (and 
security) perspectives 
This question, usually at the conclusion of the 
interview discussion, was two-sided. I would ask 
interviewees on the one hand what they think of 
climate security politics in the US, and on the 
other what they think ‘the rest of the world’ 
(using particular nation-states or constituencies 
of their choosing) thinks of the US when it comes 
to climate change policy and climate security. 
US nationhood This theme discussed different images of 
American nationhood or nationalism. For 
example, several interviewees discussed the 
notion of a defensive, isolationist vision of the 
United States as a response to different forms of 
climate insecurities. American exceptionalism and 
‘leadership’ were also themes raised frequently 
by interviewees. 
Framings of climate This theme discussed different types of 
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change politics organizations involved in American climate 
change (and security) politics and the frames they 
employ to talk about the issue. This includes 
religious organizations (e.g. the ‘creation care’ 
movement), security bodies (intelligence agencies 
and the defense sector), health bodies, 
environmental NGOs, climate sceptics, and so 
forth. Interviewees discussed the varieties of 
different constituencies that could be reached by 
using different frames, their effectiveness, 
competition between different frames, and their 
usefulness for building political consensus on 
climate change issues. 
US military I would ask interviewees about their opinion on 
the US military’s involvement in climate security 
politics. Did they think this was useful, 
appropriate, politically effective, etc.? Could 
consensus among military actors drive bipartisan 
solutions in Congress? 
United Nations I would ask respondents about their views on the 
role of the UN in climate change (and climate 
security) politics. Did they think the UN Security 
Council should play a role? I also asked about the 
UNFCCC, IPCC and COP meetings in international 
climate negotiations. 
Environmental justice Environmental justice was discussed in 
interviews, for example its relations to climate 
and environmental security, and racial and class 
inequalities in connection to climate security. 
Histories of American 
environmental 
politics/climate change 
Interviews would often include discussions of 
historical moments in American environmental 
politics. For example, we would discuss 
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politics environmental legislation (e.g. under the Nixon 
administration), the emergence of environmental 
and climate security discourses, the roles of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and so forth. 
 
EU interviews 
 
EU climate change 
politics 
Firstly, I would ask interviewees to describe the 
general landscape of climate change (and climate 
security) politics in the EU as they see it. 
Concept of climate 
security 
This involved asking interviewees if they were 
familiar with the term ‘climate security’ and, if so, 
what did the concept mean to them. In some 
interviews, we also discussed different concepts  
of security, e.g. ‘human security’ or ‘national 
security’. In others, it also involved discussions of 
the concept of ‘security’ in relation to linked (but 
different) notions of ‘defence’ and 
‘militarization’. 
EU leadership The notion of EU leadership was often discussed 
in interviews. This included the idea that the EU is 
a leader in international climate politics (e.g. 
UNFCCC negotiations), how this relates to climate 
security debates, and so forth. Interviews also 
touched on relations between EU institutions and 
other bodies, e.g. NATO. 
Histories of EU 
environmental 
politics/climate change 
politics 
Interviews would often involve discussions of 
historical debates and changes to EU 
environmental and climate change politics. For 
example, this included EU institutions’ roles in 
COP conferences (e.g. Copenhagen), as well as 
the development of climate security discourses in 
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EU institutional contexts. 
The EU as a political 
actor(s) 
This theme revolves around differences between 
the ‘EU’ as an international ‘actor’ (for example 
the role of the Commission’s DG CLIMA for 
climate change negotiations), and the multiplicity 
of political voices within this demarcation, e.g. 
different Member States (the roles of Germany 
and the UK were frequently cited in this regard), 
different EU institutions, and relationships with 
actors outside of the European Union.  
The UN I would ask respondents about their views on the 
role of the UN in climate change (and climate 
security) politics. Did they think the UN Security 
Council should play a role? I also asked about the 
UNFCCC, IPCC and COP meetings in international 
climate negotiations. 
EU geopolitics This theme involved discussions with 
interviewees about the EU’s position in the 
world, its ‘neighbourhood’, relationships with the 
MENA region, and security concerns linked to 
this, for example the Syrian Civil War. This theme 
was also discussed in relation to migration, 
particularly the context of the ‘refugee crisis’ and 
climate-induced migration. The EU’s geopolitical 
situation was also discussed in relation to the US 
and its climate security initiatives. 
Climate-induced 
migration 
This involved asking interviewees for their 
general thoughts on the topic of climate-induced 
migration. This included asking for their views on 
the concept, evidence of climate-induced 
migration, responses to climate-induced 
migration (e.g. prejudice or racism against 
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possible climate induced-migrants), how the issue 
is discussed by politicians, in the media, and so 
forth. In the context of the EU, I would also ask 
interviewees if they thought there would be 
prejudice or racism directed against possible 
Muslim climate-induced migrants from the MENA 
region.  
‘EU’ and ‘European’ 
identity 
For this theme, I would ask interviewees what 
they think of the idea of an ‘EU’ identity as 
opposed to a concept of ‘European-ness’ or 
‘European’ identity. This included questions 
relating to political affiliations (e.g. which 
European countries are EU Member States), 
‘European values’, etc. 
Terrorism/radicalization This theme involved asking respondents if they 
thought terrorism/radicalization and climate 
change were connected and the various types of 
discursive and causal linkages drawn (by 
academics, the media, policymakers, etc.) 
between these issues. 
Climate change and 
conflict 
This theme included asking interviewees about 
the possible linkages between climate change 
and conflict, the academic and policy debates on 
this issue, possible examples (for example the 
Syrian Civil War or the Darfur Conflict), and what 
government responses to conflicts linked to 
climate change could be. 
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